Saudi Arabia, the WTO, and American Trade Law and Policy by Bhala, Raj
Saudi Arabia, the WTO, and American Trade Law
and Policy
RAj BHIA*
I. Is American Trade Law Toward the Kingdom
Constructive?
"In fact, I would say that the World Trade Organization (VVTO), which prides itself as a
rules-based system, does not have rules on accession. For example, despite the fact that
existing VTO members, including many major trading countries, have not bound tariffs on
all industrial items, acceding countries are required to do so. Furthermore, despite the fact
that some VWTO agreements are plurilateral agreements and some are initiatives which have
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been subscribed to by only a few VWTO members, acceding countries are again required to
accept these."
Osama yafar Al-Faquih, former Minister of Commerce, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.'
A. THE THESIS AND THREE SUPPORTING ARGUMENTS
This article will consider whether American trade law toward the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia (Kingdom) is "constructive."2 This author rejects the proposition that American
trade law toward the Kingdom has no merits. However, the thesis offered is that this law, on
balance, may not be constructive. Moreover, one wonders whether the law is a foundation for even
greater resentment against the United States.
Law, in this context, means legal policy, particularly with respect to the Kingdom's ac-
cession to and participation in the World Trade Organization (WTO). By "constructive,"
the question is whether that law forges an enduring (that is, long-term) and robust (that is,
high and increasing values and volumes) two-way trade relationship between the United
States and the Kingdom, and more generally the Arab and Muslim Worlds.' Perhaps most
fundamentally, "constructive," means a trusting relationship. In September 2003, 72 percent
of Americans polled by Time magazine and CNN said they could not trust the Kingdom
as an ally. In November 2003, the Financial Times of London quoted a senior Saudi official
as saying: "The Saudi public doesn't like America and vice versa. It makes it more difficult
1. Daniel Pruzin, Working Party Chair Predicts Saudi Accession by End of 2001, 17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
1616 (Oct. 19, 2000).
2. Some background historical and legal points about the Kingdom are worth noting.
- The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was proclaimed an independent nation on September 23, 1932, following
a successful thirty-year campaign to unify the Arabian Peninsula led by King 'Abd al-'Azz ibn Sa'uid (1880-
1953) that began with his 1902 conquest of Riyadh and its fort.
* The area is slightlylarger than one-fifth of the United States.
* The governmental structure is a monarchy in which the King (King Fahd bin 'Abd al-'Aziz ibn Sa'fid since
June 13, 1982) acts both as the Chief of State and the Head of the Government.
* The legislative branch is comprised of a 120 member council and a chairman, all appointed by the King.
This consultative council is called the Shura, or formally, the Majlis As-Shura.
* There is an "independent" judicial branch known as the Supreme Council ofJustice, all members of which
are appointed by the King.
* The legal system is the Sbarta, i.e., Islamic Law, with the Constitution being the Holy Qur'an.
* In 1992, the King implemented a number of Constitutional reforms, within the context of the Qurdn and
Sunnab of the Prophet Muhammad (Peace Be Unto Him). The resulting "new" system is known as the
"Basic Law," which might be loosely analogized to a foundational statute or code. Commercial disputes
are handled by special committees (though it is not always evident to outsiders how the committee members
are appointed).
U.S. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, WORLDFACTBOOK 2003, available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/
factbook/geos/sa.html#Geo (last visited Sept. 16, 2004) [hereinafter CIA FACTBOOK] (material posted about the
Kingdom).
3. By "Arab World," I mean the twenty-one sovereign countries, plus Palestine, holding membership in the
Arab League. They are: Algeria, Bahrain, Comoros, Djibouti, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya,
Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, United Arab
Emirates, and Yemen. See Roula Khalaf, Arab Nations Focus on Bolstering their Economic Ties, FIN. TIMES, Mar.
28, 2001, at 8 (reporting on Arab League plans to create a free trade area by 2005). By "Muslim World," I
mean all countries with an Islamic population of at least fifty percent. I mean no offense by focusing on such
countries, and not on Arab or Muslim minority populations in other nations, but simply reflect the sovereign
character of international trade negotiations and WTO affairs.
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for us publicly to cooperate with the U.S."'4 These negative attitudes need to change. Trade
is one arena in which the countries involved may shift for the better.
American trade law is not to blame for every economic difficulty the Kingdom faces, not
the least of which are its unemployment rate of about 25 percent and increasingly large
population.5 Some comments by certain American officials amount to finger-pointing at
Riyadh.6 It is also true that there is no shortage in the United States of "doubters" of the
Kingdom.7 More seriously, there is the critique offered by the World Bank.
4. Guy Dinmore & Roula Khalaf, The U.S. National Interest is Caught Up with the Saudis in a Very Complex
Way. They Are More than a Gas Pump, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2003, at 13 (reporting on the poll results and
quoting the Saudi official).
5. Some background economic and demographic points about the Kingdom are worth noting:
- The GDP is US$240 billion (as of 2002, in purchasing power parity terms), and per capita GDP is $10,500.
* The population is approximately 24.3 million, of which about 5.6 million are non-nationals from many
countries.
* The labor force consists of about seven million Saudi nationals.
* The demographic structure is a pyramid, with 54.8 percent of the population between the ages of fifteen
and sixty-four (though about thirty-five percent of this cohort is comprised on non-nationals). Significantly,
42.3 percent of the population is between the ages of zero and fourteen, and only 2.9 percent is age sixty-
five and over.
* The median age in the Kingdom is eighteen (about twenty-one for males and seventeen for females).
* The population growth rate is 3.28 percent.
See CIA FAcrBooK, supra note 2. The pyramidal structure and low median age indicate the Kingdom faces a
challenge for the foreseeable future to provide gainful employment for its young people.
With respect to unemployment data, see CIA FAcTBOOK, supra note 2 (mentioning unemployment statistics
in the Kingdom). Self-Doomed to Failure, EcONOMIST, Jul. 6, 2002, at 24, 25 [hereinafter Self-Doomed to Failure]
(reporting an unemployment rate in the Arab World of fifteen percent); Roula Khalaf, Arab Nations Focus on
Bolstering their Economic Ties, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 28, 2001, at 8 (reporting an average fifteen percent unemploy-
ment rate among Arab League countries).
6. Christopher S. Rugaber, Bush Administration Mulling Trade Strategyfor Middle East, 20 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 730 (Apr. 24, 2003) (Stating that, in April 2003, the United States Trade Representative himself all but
laid blame on the Kingdom, characterizing it as "'hot and cold' on the WTO," and giving it credit only for
"signs" of interest). Christopher S. Rugaber, Bush Administration Mulling Trade Strategyfor Middle East, 20 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 730 (Apr. 24, 2003).
7. Did, and does, it sincerely seek to participate actively in the WTO as a full Member? The answer is "it
depends who is asked." There are many senior (and not-so-senior) officials resolute in their belief the Kingdom
should accede as quickly as possible, and it should do everything reasonable toward that end. There are others
who are said to be less enthusiastic about the WTO.
There are many political science-type commentaries in the United States on the Kingdom's government,
i.e., about which officials are pushing reform and liberalization, and which ones seem to be in no great hurry.
Michael Scott Doran, The Saudi Paradox, 83 FOREIGN ArF. 35-51 (Jan./Feb. 2004) (saying that "[t]he Saudi
state is a fragmented entity, divided between [sic] the fiefdoms of the royal family," portraying the Kingdom
as "in the throes of a crisis," namely, "a profound cultural schizophrenia [that] prevents the elite from agreeing
on the specifics of reform," arguing the embodiments of a reformist westernized elite and conservative Wahhbdi
religious establishment, respectively, are Crown Prince Abdullah and his half-brother, the Interior Minister,
Prince Nayef, and characterizing their opposing positions as based on two different Islamic doctrines, taqarub,
which refers to rapprochement between Muslims and non-Muslims, and which is favored by the Crown Prince,
and tawbid, favored by Prince Nayef, which translates as "monotheism," and which is interpreted to suggest
Judaism and Christianity are not truly monotheistic and, therefore, pose a threat to Islam that must be resisted
byjihdd, or struggle).
Unfortunately, these "analyses" tend to crowd out the Saudi experts themselves, who point out favorably
that WTO accession negotiations are a tool for reform, and participation in the WTO is a mechanism to lock
in liberalization. See, e.g., Saud AI-Ammari, Recent Legal and Economic Reforms in Saudi Arabia, XLV MIDDLE E.
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In September 2003, the Bank warned that economic, social, and human development in
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is handicapped by low-quality public gover-
nance.' The "governance gap," it reported, is characterized by insufficient accountability
(due in part to complacency caused by direct accrual of oil and natural gas revenues into
public coffers), and the highest military spending of any region in the world (6 percent of
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which costs the region one percentage point in annual
GDP growth.9 As imperfect a measure of development as GDP is, the statistics are dis-
couraging: the total GDP of the Arab World, $531 billion, is less than that of Spain, and
although the Arab World has a higher per capita GDP than most other developing regions,
it is below the level in 1980. The annual growth rate in per capita GDP, 0.5 percent, is
slower than in any other region save sub-Saharan Africa, meaning that at the present trends,
it will take 140 years for average Arab income to double. 10
Undoubtedly, many Arab intellectuals agree with the World Bank's critique." Indeed,
some of them are among the leading commentators. 2 Significantly, "them" includes women
EcoN. SURV. no. 11, at 3 (Mar. 18, 2002) [hereinafter Al-Ammari] (commenting "negotiations to accede...
have been an excellent lever to accelerate the wholesale commercial liberalization program" in the Kingdom
(emphasis added)).
I readily admit to mild skepticism about the ability of some modern day "specialists" in the United States to
understand the Arabian Peninsula in the profound way the great English Arabists of yesteryear did-men like
Captain Sir Richard Francis Burton, T.E. Lawrence, and Wilfred Thesiger academicians did. They have put
down their insights, which are based neither on sterile discussions with elites in air-conditioned offices nor on
econometric manipulations of data, but rather on authentic experience in bazaars and deserts, in magnificent
prose-Burton's 1893 Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage to Al-Madinab & Meccab, Lawrence's Seven Pillars of
Wisdom in 1926, and Thesiger's Arabian Sands in 1959.
Of course, I dare not to count myself even among the modem-day academic regional specialists. So, I leave
it to the best of them to hazard guess-timates on news talk shows. I suspect at least as much insight will be
gained from reading the modem-day British media incarnations of the Arabists of yesteryear. Adapt or Die,
EcoNoMisT, Mar. 6, 2004, at 4244 ; Roula Khalaf, There is a Dangerous Period Coming: Between Reform and
Repression, the House of Saud Faces its Greatest Peril, FIN. TIMEs, Nov. 18, 2003, at 13 (Part One of "Inside the
Desert Kingdom"); Guy Dinmore & Roula Khalaf, The U.S. National Interest is Caught Up with the Saudis in a
Very Complex Way. They Are More than a Gas Pump, FIN. TIMES, Nov. 19, 2003, at 13 (Part Two of "Inside the
Desert Kingdom"); How Safe is the House of Saud?, EcoNoMIST, Nov. 15, 2003, at 43 (all discussing, inter alia,
religious, economic, and demographic forces, and prospects for reform).
In sum, I proceed on the presumption, which I believe to be correct, that those in power in Riyadh who
matter most to the Kingdom's participation in the WTO are sincere in their endeavors.
8. Roula Khalaf & Gareth Smyth, Arab World "Held Back by Poor Governance," FIN. TIMEs, Sept. 9, 2003,
at 6 (summarizing the World Bank's study).
9. Id.
10. Roula Khalaf, Arab Region "Needs 5% Annual Growth," FIN. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2002, at 4 (reporting statistics
from the September 2002 Arab Competitiveness Report, published by the World Economic Forum); Self-Doomed
to Failure, supra note 5, at 24, 25 (reporting statistics from the Arab Human Development Report 2002).
11. Roula Khalaf, Saudi Refornists Raise their Voices, FIN. TiMEs,Jan. 17-18, 2004, at 5 (reporting on demands
among Saudi intellectuals for meaningful reforms); Oula Al Farawati, Arab Intellectuals Review Challenges of
Globalization, JoRmAN TimEs (Amman), Dec. 9-10, 1999, at 2 (reporting on a conference in Jordan on "Mod-
emism and Post-Modernism" at which "fi]ntellectuals from Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Tunisia,
Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Syria issued a declaration ... setting common goals that included calls for
greater political freedoms [and] intellectual pluralism, while preserving Arab idiosyncrasy historically, politi-
cally, and culturally in the context of globalization," and "for enhancing intellectual freedom and supporting
the scientific movement and protecting Arab national security").
12. For example, a team of prominent Arab scholars led by the Egyptian sociologist, Nader Fergany, wrote
the first-ever Arab Human Development Report 2002, which was published by the United Nations Development
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as well as men," and prominent officials from the Kingdom itself.'4 Thus, one need not be
an apologist for self-inflicted wounds in the MENA region. To put the point directly, this
author has no doubt the Kingdom understands unemployment of its youth helps account
for an increase in Islamic extremism. 5
However, assessment of the severity and implications of, and remedies for, self-inflicted
wounds is best left to others. The present inquiry will relate squarely to trade, an issue that
is given less attention than a matter seen as authentically global (such as jump-starting the
Program. The Report identifies "three deficits" in the Arab World as the reasons for poor economic performance
in most Arab countries:
* First, a lack of freedom is evident from absolutist regimes, sham elections, favoritism and nepotism, an
insufficiently independent judiciary and media, and weak non-governmental organizations. This dearth
produces unresponsive, incompetent, and corrupt governmental institutions.
* Second, a lack of knowledge, evident from statistics like only 1.2 percent of Arabs having personal com-
puters, and only 0.6 percent use the Internet, is acute in science, technology, and practical job skills. It also
relates to a lack of creativity and intellectual stagnation in the arts (e.g., stunningly, since the time of the
Caliph Mamoun, 1,000 years ago, the number of books translated into Arabic equals the number of books
Spain translates in one year).
* Third, a lack of womanpower is manifest in data from fourteen of twenty-two Arab countries showing
both a trebling of women's literacy rates in the last thirty years, and one in two women being unable to
read or write. The effect is to neglect the productive potential of half the population.
Self-Doomed to Failure, rupra note 5, at 24, 25 (summarizing these facets of the Report, and also faulting the
Report for not differentiating among the heterogeneous Arab countries, and not weighing the effects of the
Arab-Israeli conflict or role of religion).
Similarly, in 2003 Arab academics compiled a follow-up to the Arab Human Development Report 2002, also
published by the United Nations Development Program. The second study highlighted human capital defi-
ciencies (in science and technology, and in a lack of curiosity), and urged specific (but politically controversial)
steps to encourage better performance and freer inquiry. Know Thyself EcoNoMisT, Oct. 25, 2003, at 42 (sum-
marizing the second study, and adding: "The patient knows he is sick. The physicians know the cure. The
question is whether the would-be surgeons-Arab governments-have the skill or the will to perform the
operation."). Of course, as any development scholar familiar with sources of growth accounting knows, it is
important not to rely on just one policy treatment-even if it is more education. In Egypt between 1970 and
1998, primary school enrollment rates increased to over ninety percent, secondary school rates from thirty-
two to seventy-five percent, and university education rates doubled. Yet, during the same period, Egypt went
from the forty-seventh poorest country in the world to the forty-eighth such country. Alison Wolf, Knowledge
Economy Fails the Test, FIN. TiMES (WEEKEND), May 2 5-26, 2002, at II.
13. For instance, consider the comments of Princess Noura Bint Mohammed Bin Sa'fid AI-Sa'fid, founder
of the Philanthropic Society of the South, Abha, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia:
"Why do some shy away from the influence of globalization? We should not forget that our very own
Islamic civilization ... existed alongside the Roman and Persian civilizations. They learned from us
and we learned from them.... We will achieve more as a society if we do not isolate ourselves from
the rest of [the] world and we should map out an aim to achieve future goals."
Intisar AI-Yamani, Globalization A Model for Improvement, SAUDi GAZETrE (Jeddah), Dec. 6, 2003, at 4. See also
id. (quoting the views of two women in the Kingdom involved in charities to help the underprivileged, Princess
Noura, and Rana AI-Miraei, on the potentially positive effects of globalization on women in the Kingdom).
14. See Arabs to Blame for their "Situation"-Prince, SAUDI GAzEr'rE (Jeddah), Dec. 6, 2003, at 2 (reporting
on the opening address to a conference in Beirut of the Arab Thought Foundation, attended by roughly 1,000
Arab intellectuals, on "The Future Economic and Political Challenges Facing the Arab World," in which the
Saudi Ambassador to the United Kingdom, Prince Khaled AI-Faisal, not only said Arabs were to blame for
their current global "situation," but also indicated they did not understand the significance of holding a ruler
accountable through elected or appointed bodies).
15. Discussions with senior Saudi officials, Riyadh and Dhahran, Dec. 2003 [hereinafter Disccusions]. BBC
News, Country Profiles: Saudi Arabia, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/middle-east/country-profiles/
791936.stm (last visited Sept. 16, 2004) (posting news accounts of this matter).
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Doha Round of multilateral negotiations), or as close to home (the Central American Free
Trade Area (CAFTA)). 16 To the extent the question is considered at all, it is treated un-
critically; that is, it is more or less taken for granted that American trade law toward the
Kingdom, and indeed the Arab and Muslim Worlds more generally, is constructive. 7
Both insufficiencies, of attention and analysis should be challenged, but not for the sake
of being a carping academic. This interest is, at a minimum, economic. Thus, I explain in
Part II why Kansas, my home state, cares about American trade law with respect to the
Kingdom. Kansans have known hardship. The state motto is Ad Astra Per Aspera-to the
stars through difficulties. Put in Kansan terms, the question is whether American trade law
inflicts too much difficulty on the Kingdom, so that neither the Kingdom nor one of its
trading partners like Kansas can reach the stars. This author suspects much of the American
Heartland has a similar pragmatic concern, albeit one expressed through different mottos
and metaphors.
As for the thesis itself, three arguments are offered in its support in Parts III, IV, and V,
respectively. First, and most importantly, the United States may have pressed the Kingdom too
hard on key terms by which the Kingdom is acceding to the WTO. Ever-increasing American
demands (chronicled in Part III) since accession negotiations commenced in earnest in 1996
meant the price paid by the Kingdom for a WTO admission ticket rose. China's dramatic
concessions in its accession odyssey, particularly in its November 1999 bilateral accord with
the United States, may well have contributed to the price hike. 8 However, the Desert
Kingdom is not the Middle Kingdom, so whether the American pressure on Saudi Arabia
can be justified by the deal with China is dubious.
Second, it seems the United States may not have treated three Islamic law issues associated with
the Kingdom's accession with sufficient care. These Sharfa topics (treated in Part V) pertain
to forbidden products (namely, alcohol, pork, and pork products), the zakat tax (one of the
essential Islamic obligations), and problematic services (specifically, certain banking and
insurance products). These observations are not meant to suggest the United States has
been insensitive to Saudi positions, but does lead one to wonder whether the United States
16. Rossella Brevetti, Costa Rican Official Sees FTA Talks with U.S. Heading Tosard January Conclusion, 21
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 98 (Jan. 15, 2004) (reporting on American insistence that Costa Rica open its tele-
communications sector); Neil King Jr. & Scott Miller, U.S. Trade Chief Moves to Revive Global Parleys, WALL
ST. J., Jan. 13, 2004, at A2 (discussing a letter sent by the United States Trade Representative to all 148 VTO
Members proposing negotiations on deep cuts in agricultural and industrial tariffs and eliminating agricultural
export subsidies, but not on an investment accord).
I should point out a previous WTO Director-General, Mike Moore, personally took a strong interest in the
accession of the Kingdom and, more generally, the participation of the Arab World in the multilateral trading
system. Speech by Mike Moore, Director-General, World Trade Organization, The WTO and the Arab World:
Preparations for Doha, Geneva, Switzerland, June 20-21, 2001, available at http://www.wto.org. (last visited
Sept. 16, 2004 ) (declaring "[tihe Arab world is as important for [the] WTO as the VTO is for the Arab
world").
17. Lest there be any doubt the American trade law approach of putting pressure on the Kingdom through
WTO accession negotiations is accepted conventional wisdom, the Council on Foreign Relations-hardly an
anti-establishment organization-sponsored a report advocating exactly this strategy toward the Middle East.
See BERNARD HOEKMAN & PATRICK MEssERLIN, HARNESSING TRADR FOR DEVELOPMENT AND GROWTH (2002).
See Amity Shlaes, Tales from the Heart of the Arab Economies, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 12, 2002, at 15 (summarizing the
report).
18. See Raj Bhala, Enter the Dragon: An Essay on China's WTO Accession Saga, 15 Am. U. INT'L L. REv. 1469-
1538 (2000). In neither Riyadh nor Dhahran in December 2003 did I find resistance to the proposition China
had "raised the bar" for Saudi Arabia.
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has advanced the goal of long-term, friendly trade relations with the Kingdom, not to
mention the Muslim World by, accommodating the uniqueness of the Kingdom's position
on these matters.
Third, in the interests of a constructive trade law with the Kingdom, there are questions whether
the United States has consistently respected the economic law of comparative advantage. The King-
dom's existing comparative advantages lie in the oil and natural gas sectors (discussed in
Part V, Sections A-B). That is evident to energy industry experts, who have never set foot
near the Kingdom, and to those (like me) who lack specialty knowledge in this industry
who had the privilege to learn from time spent (in December 2003) at institutions like the
Ministry of Petroleum in Riyadh and Saudi Aramco in Dhahran. In short, American trade
law, operating in the W'TO environment, may be aimed at containing, and even cutting
back on, these advantages (or at least having these untoward effects). The Kingdom could
well have a budding comparative advantage in certain agricultural products (as my visit to
the remarkable AI-Safi Dairy, discussed in Part V.C, suggests). American trade law hardly
seems interested in seeing the Kingdom develop these kinds of strengths.
In our security-conscious, if not obsessed, post-9/1 1 atmosphere, an obvious response to
these arguments is "so what?" Trade is about security, and this response bespeaks a monstrous
failure to see the connection.' 9 The consequence of American trade policy toward the Des-
ert Kingdom in its WTO accession odyssey may be-ironically and dangerously-to sub-
ject the Kingdom to extremely difficult adjustment costs in the earlyyears of its participation
in the WTO as a full Member. By exerting so much pressure on the Kingdom in accession
negotiations, by not easily accommodating the Kingdom on critical Shar'a issues, and by
not supporting its endeavors to retain, and add to, its comparative advantages, the United
States has taken a giant gamble.
The gamble is that the Kingdom can suffer though short-term economic dislocations
associated with the globalization of the Saudi economy, because the Saudi people will ap-
preciate that in the long-term, the benefits of openness experienced by many countries in
the post-Second World War era will redound to them too. In discussing the derailed Doha
Round of multilateral trade negotiations, the Financial Times not only commented that
"[t]he WNTO is in a mess," partly because of the "loss of leadership" from the United States,
but also rightly observed "[b]ig trade negotiations are a politically counter-intuitive activity
that requires a willingness to take short-term pain at home in the hope of long-term gains
that are thinly spread, slow to materialize, and hard to prove." 20 Even in the narrower
19. It also is about morality, but that is a matter I pursue elsewhere. See RAJ BiALA, TRADE, DEVELOPMENT,
AND SOCIAL JUSTICE (Carolina Academic Press 2003) [hereinafter BmALA, TRADE, DEVELOPMENT, AND SOCIAL
JUSTICE]. As for the official American policy on the role of trade in promoting national security, See, e.g., The
National Security Strategy of the United States (Sept. 20, 2002) (available at http://www.whitehouse.gov), issued
pursuant to section 108 of the National Security Act of 1947, 50 U.S.C. § 404a. Section VI, entitled "Ignite a
New Era of Global Economic Growth through Free Markets and Free Trade," discusses the nexus. I cannot
help but note the unfortunate imperative verb used in the Section title, though a full critique is for another
opportunity. In the meantime, See Raj Bhala, Poverty, Islam, and Doba, 36 INT'L LAw. 159-96 (2002) (explaining
negative perceptions in the Muslim World of American trade law and the WTO); Christopher S. Rugaber,
U.S. Trade Policy Overlooks Mideast Region, Could Hurt War on Terrorism, PPI Study Says, 20 International Trade
Reporter (BNA) 323 (Feb. 13, 2003) (reporting on a report by the Progressive Policy Institute, a moderate
Democratic think-tank, entitled Blank Spot on the Map: How Trade Policy is Working Against the War on Terror,
which warns American trade policy tilts against moderate Muslim, contrary to American national security
interests).
20. Halfa Crisis for World Trade, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2004, at 8.
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context of WTO accession negotiations for an individual country, that observation is ap-
plicable. The gamble that the United States has taken with the Kingdom had better pay
off, for the Kingdom-not to mention Kansas-will suffer if it does not.
If this risk does not yield the anticipated return, then the result could be ironic. Perhaps
because of all the negative media attention during the oil crises of 1973 and 1978-79, the
ad nauseum repetition on twenty-four hour news networks that fifteen of the nineteen Sep-
tember 11 th terrorists were Saudi citizens, the publication of books with titillating tides
about what the Central Intelligence Agency knew or did not know,2 and the half-comical
stories about seizures of Barbie dolls by the mutawwain (the religious police, whose official
tide is the "Commission for the Protection of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice") in local
souks (markets),z2 many aspects of the Kingdom remain a mystery to outsiders." As sum-
marized in Part VI, the mystery is yet deeper with respect to how American pressure in
trade negotiations is perceived within the Kingdom, and the implications of the Kingdom's
concessions in response to those demands. The irony could be that the United States prides
itself on its post-9/11 efforts to understand the Muslim World, especially the Arab World.
Worse yet, if the American gamble does not pay off, then the result could be dangerous.
The danger could be worse anti-American sentiments that are deleterious to the interests
of all well-intentioned traders, whether Saudi or Kansan-a backlash catalyzed byAmerican
trade law.
B. WHY Focus ON THE KINGDOM?
Aside from the confines of space, why "limit" oneself to Saudi Arabia? Surely, this thesis
could be reinforced by arguing the Bush Administration's May 2003 proposal for a "Middle
East Free Trade Area" (MEFTA) is likely rhetorical, maybe disingenuous, and perhaps both.
True, though that would be dreadfully easy.2 4 It should be evident to any reasonably im-
21. ROBERT BAER, SLEEPING WITH THE DEVIL: How WASHINGTON SOLD OUR SOUL FOR SAUDI CRUDE (Three
Rivers Press 2003) (arguing the dependence of the United States on Saudi oil renders the United States
vulnerable to economic and security risks).
22. Paul Martin, Religious Police Take After Barbie, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 3, 2004, at A6.
23. As an illustration, how many westerners appreciate the significance of the volte-face of Sheikh Ali al-
Khodeir? (An excellent account, on which I draw, of this remarkable event is in Who Gains?, EcoNoMIST, Nov.
22, 2003, at 45.) This Sheikh had extolled the virtues of suicide attacks as theologically acceptable acts ofjihid,
characterized as a religious duty the chasing of Jews from the Arabian Peninsula, branded Muslims infidels if
they aided infidels, and issued a fatwa prohibiting Saudis from helping law enforcement authorities find ter-
rorists responsible for bombing in Riyadh. In November 2003, on Saudi television, the Sheikh renounced
completely his pedagogy onjihd. He explained an attack on a non-Muslim who is not directly involved in a
war against Islam is wrong (and, in any event, needs approval from a legitimate Muslim ruler), and demanded
Al-Qaeda and its sympathizers not only shed their weapons, but also remember the inevitable Day of Final
Judgment, when they must account for the unjustified bloodshed they caused.
24. This Administration does not allow any and all Arab countries into the MEFTA fold immediately, which
if it did would suggest a dramatic effort to stimulate trade with and among them, and more generally a profound
interest in their economic development. James Drunmond & Roula Khalaf, Trade Reform to Dominate Agenda in
Jordan, FIN. TIMES, June 21-22, 2003, at 5 (discussing the pre-condition of VTO accession and the large, im-
portant Arab countries that are only observers, or lack even that status). For additional information on MEFTA,
Edward Alden & Roula Khalaf, Mideast Trade Plan a Leap of Faith for Bush, FIN. TIMES, May 10-11, 2003, at 3;
James Harding & Edward Alden, Bush to Call.for Trade Pact with Middle East, FIN. TIMES, May 9, 2003, at 1.
Of the twenty-two countries in the Arab League, only Jordan has run this gauntlet although Bahrain and
Morocco may be nearing completion of passage through it as well. The Kingdom aside, commercially signifi-
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partial observer that, in reality, the United States puts countries in the Middle East into
categories of "good" and "evil," and agrees to commercially insignificant bilateral trade
deals, making few compromises itself. Bahrain, Jordan, and Morocco are "good guys," Iran
and Syria remain "bad guys," and Libya may be switching camps.
Economic significance, specifically oil, is one reason for focusing on the Kingdom. Oil
accounts for 40 percent of global energy consumption, and this share is not likely to decline
during the next two decades." Over 60 percent of proven world oil reserves are in the
Persian Gulf, and the Kingdom has 25 percent of these deposits-roughly double the next
highest depositary (Iraq, with 11 percent), and roughly triple the third rung of depositaries
(Iran, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates, with 9 percent each).2 6 The Kingdom itself
produces approximately 40 percent of the world's petroleum." Projections for 2010-2020
indicate all major increases in oil production will come from the Persian Gulf, and only the
Kingdom (which has spare production capacity Russia lacks) will have the ability to affect
spikes in prices and production by boosting or cutting its output.2" The United States
obtains roughly half of its oil from abroad, and 15 percent of its oil from the Kingdom, but
just 2.3 percent from Russia and the Caspian States.2 9
These facts not only adduce the significance of the Kingdom, but also implicate the
credibility of the WTO. While China stood in queue for accession, it was said that the
"W" in the acronym was nearly meaningless. 30 This author would suggest that the "W" is
a small letter until the Kingdom is an active participant, as a full Member, of the WTO.
The accessions ofJordan in 2000 and Oman in 2001 were positive developments, and raised
the number of Arab WTO Members to eleven. But, there are twenty-two countries in the
Arab League, so half of the League-including Algeria, Lebanon, Libya, Syria, Sudan, and
Yemen-has yet to be admitted (even though all of these countries have applied).' More
cant Arab countries like Egypt are far from completion, as are two key non-Arab Middle Eastern countries,
Iran and Turkey. Surely, the fact is not lost on the Arab World that the Administration has yet to push Israel
(the first country to have an FTA with the United States) to join in a MEFTA with Jordan.
In February 2004, the USTR announced the signature of Trade and Investment Framework Agreements
with Kuwait and Yemen. See Offc. of the U.S. Trade Representative, Press Release, United States and Kuwait
Sign Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (Feb. 6, 2004), available at http://www.ustr.gov. While
Kuwait is a WTO Member, Yemen is in the process of accession (having applied in April 2000), thus suggesting
some flexibility by the United States with respect to the order of the first two pre-conditions.
25. Shibley Telhami & Fiona Hill, Does Saudi Arabia Still Matter?-America's Vital Stakes in Saudi Arabia,
81 FOREIGN ArF. 167-68 (Nov./Dec. 2002) [hereinafter Telhami & Hill] (presenting these statistics).
26. See id. (presenting these statistics and observing that by contrast, Russia has five percent of the world's
proven oil reserves); Al-Ammari, supra note 7, at 1 (stating that "the Kingdom possesses one-fourth of the
world's proven oil reserves"); Robin Allen, Saudis Blame "Unique Status"for Delays in Joining WTO, FIN. TIMEs,
June 14, 2000, at 8 [hereinafter Allen, Saudis Blame] (noting that the Kingdom has twenty-five percent of the
world's proven oil reserves).
27. Allen, Saudis Blame, supra note 26, at 8 (mentioning this statistic).
28. See Telhami & Hill, supra note 25 (presenting these statistics).
29. See The American Petroleum Institute, at http://api-ec.api.org/filelibrary/acf49B.pdf (last visited Sept.
20, 2004) (presenting statistics on American oil imports); Telhami & Hill, supra note 25 (presenting statistics
on oil import dependence from Russia and the Caspian states).
30. See Raj Bhala, Enter the Dragon: An Essay on Cbina's WTO Accession Saga, 15 Am. U. IrT'L L. Rev. 1469-
1538 (2000) (discussing the legitimacy of the WTO before China's entry). A similar argument about the "V"
in VTO without Russia could be made.
31. See Daniel Pruzin, U.S., Others Urge Saudis to Make Proposals to Reinvigorate Efforts for Accession to WTO,
19 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 334 (Feb. 21, 2002) [hereinafter Pruzin, U.S., Others Urge Saudis] (discussing WTO
accession and Arab countries). See generally Raj Bhala, Poverty, Islam, and Doba, 36 INr'L LAw. 159-96 (2002)
(considering perceptions of the V/TO in the Muslim World).
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importantly, without the consistent, active involvement of the Kingdom, the Arab World
is not really "in" the Club.
A second reason for examining American trade policy toward the Kingdom connects the
economic significance of the Persian Gulf with the national security interests of the United
States. In the assessment of two Brookings Institution scholars, "[for haifa century, the
United States has made Persian Gulf oil a primary security interest, and this emphasis is
unlikely to dissipate this decade." 2 What is refreshing about their assessment is the first
clause. It implies the folly of believing America's security interest in the Gulf increased on
September 11 th. The attacks sickeningly highlighted a long-standing interest."
President Truman and his national security planners developed a policy of "denial,"
meaning they sought to safeguard oil flow from the Persian Gulf to the United States, but
keep the oil supply out of the hands of hostile powers. A 1949 National Security Council
directive (called "26/2," which was supplemented by other orders) articulated this policy.
In coordination with Great Britain, but without the knowledge of Arab governments, the
United States stored explosives near oil fields in the Gulf, to be used to blow up installations
and refineries if they fell into the wrong hands (particularly those in the Kremlin).3a Fol-
lowing the Suez Crisis, in 1957, President Eisenhower enlarged the "denial" policy to
include countries in the Middle East as potentially "hostile."35 In other words, a second
answer is American trade policy toward the Kingdom matters because the Kingdom is
preeminent in the Gulf, and oil from the Gulf has been, and continues to be, a preeminent
national security concern.
However potent the economic and strategic logic, focus on the Kingdom may be justified
on a third ground. The problem with the first two rationales is their ethnocentrism. The
rationales look at the Kingdom from an American perspective, viewing it as a large gas
pump.36 A possible answer to the question "Why focus on the Kingdom?" is the profound
importance of the Saudi experience to every Arab, indeed, to every Muslim. Of course, not
every Muslim is Sunni. Roughly 20 percent of the world's 1.3 billion Muslims believe the
proper line of succession for the Islamic community passed through blood-related descen-
dants of the Prophet Muhammad (Peace Be Unto Him), namely, the Prophet's cousin and
son-in-law, 'Ali, and, therefore, are Shi'a. Even among the Sunnis, not every one follows
the Hanbali School, with which Wahhdhism is prevalent in the Kingdom, but there are also
followers of the Hanafi, Malaki, and Shafi'I Schools.
Regardless, the fact remains that no Muslim credibly proclaims total disinterest in Saudi
Arabia. To do so would be to turn his back on the land in which the Prophet received his
revelation that was, and is, the Qur'an, the first of the fundamental sources of the Shari'a
(Islamic Law). The Hejaz region of the Arabian Peninsula is even more than where the
32. Telhami & Hill, supra note 25 (emphasis added).
33. For a discussion of this history, see DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE Epic QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY &
POWER (Free Press 1991).
34. See Telhami & Hill, supra note 25, at 170, 81 (discussing the declassified documents).
35. See id. at 171, 81 (discussing the declassified documents). For accounts of the Suez Crisis, see,for example,
DONALD NEFF, WARRIORS AT SUEZ: EISENHOWER TAKES AMERICA INTO THE MIDDLE EAST IN 1956 (Amana
1982), and HUGH THOMAS, SUEZ (Harper Collins 1967).
36. I do not mean to suggest that this economic and strategic logic would apply only to the United States.
For example, it would also apply to China. Oil represents thirty percent of Chinese energy consumption, and
China imports sixty percent of its oil from the Gulf (with projections showing this figure will rise to ninety
percent in the next two decades. See Telhami & Hill, supra note 25, at 170 (presenting these statistics).
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Prophet heard God's Message. It is where the Prophet himself walked, delivered sayings
compiled in the Hadditb, and lived an exemplary life recounted in the Sunnab. For every
Muslim, it is to Mecca and Medina he must endeavor to go, to fulfill the fifth of the Five
Pillars of Islam, the .-aj. The very tide of the King of Saudi Arabia, King Fahd Bin 'Abd
al-'Aziz, reflects the importance of these sites, as it means "Custodian of the Two Holy
Places."37 In sum, Saudi Arabia holds for all time unique significance to Muslims." How
they perceive it as treated by the United States is of unparalleled interest. To them, the
accession of the Kingdom, and its participation in the WVTO, takes on significance far
beyond the commercial significance that arises from WTO entry terms set for other Muslim
countries.
C. EMPATHIZING WITH THE KINGDOM IN ITS WTO AcCESSION ODYSSEY
On June 13, 1993, the Kingdom applied to join the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), yet up through the founding of the WNTO on January 1, 1995, and until
quite recently, ittle progress was made towards accession.3 9 That was true with respect to
both of the parallel tracks on which any application must proceed: bilateral agreements
between the applicant and any extant WVTO Member seeking specific trade-liberalizing
concessions on access to the applicant's goods and services markets; and multilateral talks
in the context of a working group, which ensure consistency of the applicant's trade laws
with WTO standards, and which yield a final schedule of goods and services concessions
by "multilateralizing" the best treatment agreed to in the bilateral accords.- To be fair to
the Kingdom, the length of its odyssey was not for want of its interest in exportation. At
the time of the first meeting of the WTO Working Party on the Kingdom's accession, in
1996, the Kingdom was the world's twenty-sixth largest exporter.4' In fact, as of December
2003, the Kingdom was the second largest economy in the world (after Russia) not repre-
sented in the WTO.
42
To be fair to the WTO, the long odyssey also was not for want of meetings of the
Working Party. This Working Party, established onJuly 21, 1993, has been chaired in recent
37. See Allen, Saudis Blame, supra note 26 (noting the meaning of the title).
38. Id. (discussing the concern the Kingdom's unique status hindered its entry to the WTO).
39. See World Trade Organization, Accessions-Saudi Arabia, available at http://www.wto.org. (specifying
June 13, 1993, as the date the Kingdom's application was received) (last visited Sept. 20, 2004). Occasionally,
the application date is reported asJuly 1993. See, e.g., Frances Williams, Saudis Start Talks on Joining the WTO,
FIN. TIMES, May 3, 1996, at 4 (stating "Saudi Arabia applied to join GATT, the V/TO's predecessor, injuly
1993, but these negotiations had made little progress by the time the WTO was created in January last year").
The GATT, along with the WTO agreements to which I refer, is available on the Web site of the VWTO,
http://www.wto.org. These texts are widely reprinted, including in RAI BHALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
HANDBOOK (Lexis 2001).
40. This process is described in the context of China's WTO accession in chapter 3 of RAI BeA.LA, INTER-
NATIONAL TRADE LAW: THEORY AND PR.ACTICE (Lexis 2d ed. 2001).
41. See Frances Williams, Saudis Start Talks on Joining the WTO, FIN. TIMES, May 3, 1996, at 4 (presenting
this statistic).
42. See Daniel Pruzin, After Long Hiatus, Saudi Arabia Set to Revitalize WTO Accession Negotiations, 20 Irr'L
TRADE REPORTER (BNA) 1146 (Jul. 3, 2003) (mentioning that the Kingdom is the largest trading nation aside
from Russia outside of the V/TO); Pruzin, supra note 31 (also noting this fact). See also The Saudi Arabian
General Investment Authority (SAGIA), at http://www.sagia.gov.sa (last visited Sept. 20, 2004) (discussing this
fact).
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years by Mr. Munir Akram, Pakistan's Ambassador to the United Nations.4 By the end of
2000, the party had met eight times, typically biannually (in the late spring and late fall):
" In 1996, on May 2-3 and November 6-8.
" In 1997, on May 29-30 and December 2-4.
" In 1998, on November 17-19.
" In 1999, on 22 September 22
" In 2000, on April and 17 October 17.
In connection with these meetings, the Kingdom submitted a large amount of documen-
tation.- Although, the Working Party failed to convene for three years after its October
2000 meeting, it did start up on October 23-24, 2003. 41 Meetings continued in December
2003, and well into 2004.46
How might this odyssey of more than ten years be characterized? One way is to see it as
ebbs and flows of zeal in the Kingdom for trade liberalization. This characterization is
preferred by the United States because blame for a lack of progress in accession negotiations
can be put on Riyadh, that is, on the failure of public and private sector officials in the
Kingdom to embrace free-market principles of Adam Smith and David Ricardo. It is ir-
relevant that those principles occasionally get adulterated with mercantilism at the nego-
43. See U.S., EU Criticize Saudi Arabia's Efforts to Achieve H'TO-Mandated Trade Reforms, 15 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1988 (Nov. 25, 1998). Ambassador Akram replaced John Weekes, the former Canadian Ambassador to
the WTO, in early 2002. See Pruzin, supra note 31.
44. See World Trade Organization, supra note 39. (listing the meeting dates, as well as the dates of docu-
mentary replies from the Kingdom.) With regard to goods, the Kingdom made tariff concession offers on
September 24, 1997, and again on June 29, 1999. As of November 2003, the Kingdom had not presented a
draft Schedule of Tariff Concessions for goods. With regard to services, the Kingdom filed documentation on
September 23, 1997, and a draft Schedule of Services with the WTO Working Party on September 24, 1997,
and again on June 28, 1999.
The Kingdom filed documentation on agriculture with the WTO Working Party on May 23, 1997, March
20, 1997, and October 17, 2000, and documentation on sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures and technical
barriers to trade (TBT) on June 24, 1999. The Kingdom filed documentation with the V/TO Working Party
on the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on June 24, 1999.
By May 2000, the Kingdom presented the Working Party with "an action plan covering all aspects of WTO
rules that must eventually form the basis for a single membership protocol agreement." Warren Giles, "Turning
Point"for SaudiArabia, FIN. TMES, May 5, 2000, at 6. However, as of January 2004, it appeared the Kingdom
had yet to file a detailed legislative action plan.
45. The Working Party produced a report on the status of the Kingdom's accession, and submitted it to
the WTO, on October 2, 2000. It produced a new report following its meeting on October 23-24, 2003. See
also Daniel Pruzin, Saudi WPTO Accession "On Track" But Issue of Israeli Boycott Remains, 20 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1809 (Oct. 30, 2003) [hereinafter Pruzin, Saudi WITO Accession] (mentioning the October 2003 report).
46. See Daniel Pruzin, Officials Report Further Progress with Saudis on 14,TO Accession Talks, 21 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 412, 413 (Mar. 4, 2004) [hereinafter Pruzin, Officials Report] (reporting the results of bilateral and
Working Party meetings held in late February 2004, and plans for talks in the second half of 2004); Daniel
Pruzin, WTO Chief Says Saudi WF TO Accession "Imminent"; Talks with U.S. Scheduled, 21 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
145 (Jan. 22, 2004) [hereinafter Pruzin, Talks With U.S Scheduled] (noting meetings of the V/TO Working
Party scheduled for 23-27 February, negotiations between Saudi and American trade officials on a bilateral
agreement scheduled for lateJanuary, and the view of the WTO Director-General, Dr. SupachaiPanitchpakdi,
of a "realistic chance" for accession before the end of 2004); Daniel Pruzin, WTO Sets January Date for Further
Talks 'on Accession of Saudi Arabia to Trade Body, 21 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 70 (Jan. 8, 2004) (noting meetings
scheduled forJanuary 21-22, 2004); Daniel Pruzin, In Push to Finalize 14.TO Accession Deal in 2004, Saudis May
Hold Talks Past Dec. 19, 20 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 2077 (Dec. 18, 2003) [hereinafter Pruzin, In Push to Finalize]
(discussing the meetings in late December 2003).
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iating table, particularly when on one side of the table sits a trading power with major
market access demands for its businesses.
47
This characterization also sits well with the American self-image as an even-handed,
honest broker in the Middle East. It is an image associated not only with the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, but also controversies between Arabs and western countries, such as
the boundary dispute in the 1950s over Buraymi, an oasis on the eastern fringe of the
Arabian peninsula, between the Kingdom and the British-backed Sultanates in Oman and
Abu Dhabi.4 Accordingly, from the American perspective, its trade policy is to ask of the
Kingdom only what it requests of other Middle Eastern countries in WTO accession ne-
gotiations. 49 However, from the perspective of many Arabs, the American self-image of
even-handedness is a study in self-deception and denial. Interestingly, in a survey conducted
in the Kingdom in early 2002, "86 percent of Saudi elites and 59 percent of the general
public indicated that their frustrations with the United States were based on its policies,
not on American values.
'50
The point is that there is another way to characterize that policy, especially as it relates
to the Kingdom's WTO accession odyssey. It is a tale of ever-increasing demands, driven
often by the United States, for market access and trade liberalization. The odyssey is really
a cycle of "demand-concede," with the United States firmly asking, and the Kingdom
typically giving in. The demands cover all aspects of commercial relations-goods, services,
intellectual property rights (IPR), and FDI. Over the years, some American demands have
been consistent. Perhaps a few may have dropped away (though that is not apparent from
publicly available sources), particularly if met stiffly by the Kingdom. Is it, then, fair to
47. Lest there be any doubt about the ability of the United States to press relentlessly for market access,
consider the new Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). The United States successfully pried
open markets in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, particularly with respect to banking,
insurance, and telecommunications services, but simultaneously: (1) extended the phase out of agricultural trade
barriers to twenty years (five more than the maximum fifteen-year period under the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA)); (2) declined to substantially open the American market to the products of keenest
export interest to the Central American countries, namely, sugar and textiles; and (3) built product-specific
safeguards into the deal with a view to imposing them should a pesky CAFTA partner actually develop a
competitive foothold in the American market. Not surprisingly, Costa Rica balked at this lopsided deal. See
Edward Alden, U.S. Agrees Trade Deal with Central American Nations, FIN. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2003, at 6 (sum-
marizing some of the terms of CAFTA, and noting Costa Rican objections). Thus, media accounts of CAFTA
have all but called it a mercantilist bargain. For example, as The Washington Post observed,
American exporters will benefit from CAFTA, perhaps to a fault; the deal is distinctly tilted in favor
of the United States. While Central American markets would be flly open to U.S. financial services,
telecommunications and technology exporters, protections for the uncompetitive American sugar and
textile industries will be preserved indefinitely.... The overall effect on U.S. employment would be tiny:
The total yearly exports to the United States of the CAFTA countries currently amount to about two days' worth
of American imports.
CentralAmerica's Progress, WASH. POST, Dec. 30, 2003, at A18 (emphasis added).
48. For an engaging account of American diplomatic efforts in the Buraymi dispute to steer a course between
the territorial claims of the Kingdom and the interests of the British in the Gulf region, see NAr^AsJ. CrrINO,
FROM ARAB NATIONALISM TO OPEC: EISENHOWER, KING SA'uD, AND THE MAmNG OF U.S.-SAuDI RELATIONS
19-37 (2002).
49. Pruzin, U.S., Others Urge Saudis, supra note 31 (observing that "critics counter that Saudi Arabia is only
being asked to make the same concessions that other Middle Eastern countries have already agreed to as the
price for membership").
50. Telhami & Hill, supra note 25, at 173 (summarizing the poll results).
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characterize American demands as "ever increasing?" If the focus was put on one particular
topic, then the answer probably would be "no." But, WTO accession is never confined to
one matter, so a characterization of the process cannot be inferred from a single demand
by the United States and associated response by the Kingdom. Rather, it is the overall
pattern of demands and responses from which a characterization must be drawn.
The author's sense is that this pattern can be reasonably characterized not as a negotia-
tion, but something more akin to a dictation.5' Put bluntly, with a few exceptions (discussed
later, relating to the petrochemical and natural gas sectors), the Americans told the Saudis
the price they must pay for WTO entry, essentially in a "take-it-or-leave-it" fashion, and
the price has risen since 1996. Adopted here is the second characterization.
It may not be right, in the sense of Absolute Truth, but it is important to present the
Kingdom's status as a WVTO Member through the eyes of the Kingdom. Empathy, this author
believes, is the single most important forte of an international lawyer, whether in the academy or in
practice. That strength is needed to understand and interpret, if only a bit better, the inter-
national trade experience of the Kingdom.
D. ISRAEL is NOT A PROBLEM
It is impossible to discuss trade with the Arab World without having thrust on oneself
the question of Israel and the Occupied Territories. 2 It should be noted that the Kingdom
agreed to drop the secondary boycott of Israel. It did so no later than October 2000.11 Also
significant is the point that Israel has agreed not to block the Kingdom's entry into the
ITO and neither country is invoking the non-application provisions of article XXXV of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and Article XII of the Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization (WTO Agreement). 4 Further, Israel has ac-
cepted its legal inability to combat a voluntary, private-sector boycott of trade relations.5"
Surely, the Kingdom had little choice but to deal with this matter. Israel is a member of
the WA/TO Working Group on the accession of the Kingdom. 6 So blatant a violation of the
most favored nation (MFN) rule in Article 1:1 of the GAIT could not be tolerated by the
51. I am confident that this view is neither extreme nor unique. See, e.g., AI-Ammari, supra note 7, at 3
(stating "excessive demands on Saudi Arabia both in the negotiations on market access and on protocol issues
temporarily slowed down accession negotiations." (emphasis added)).
52. For a clear and comprehensive, yet succinct, cartographic account of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
see MARTIN GILBERT, THE RouTLEDGE ATLAS OF THE ARAB-IsRAELI CONFLICT (7th ed. 2002). The map at page
121 explains the Arab boycott of companies trading with Israel.
53. Daniel Pruzin, Working Party Cbair Predicts Saudi Accession by End of 2001, 17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
1616, 1617 (Oct. 19, 2000) (reporting "Saudi officials have told the WTO that they have terminated the
application of secondary and tertiary boycotts affecting Israeli goods").
54. Pruzin, Saudi WTO Accession, supra note 45 (reporting "[trade officials said the Saudis would also be
expected to refrain from invoking the" non-application rules, "with the understanding that Israel would also
refrain from making such a move").
55. Id. at 1810 (reporting "Israeli officials admit that there is little they can do about such nonbinding
'voluntary' campaigns against trade with Israel, but said they would expect Saudi officials to stop attending
meetings of the Central Office [for the Boycott of Israel, in Damascus] after joining the WTO, as other Arab
[WTO] members.., have done").
56. There are roughly fifty-three members of the Working Group.
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world trading community. 7 Never mind the hypocrisy of the United States exerting pres-
sure on the Kingdom on this point, given its own secondary boycott of Cuba, Iran, and
Libya under the Helms-Burton Act and Iran and Libya Sanctions Act." They can be ex-
cused because neither Iran nor Libya is yet a WTO Member and the President routinely
acquiesces to demands from the European Union (EU) and waives the most irksome pro-
visions of the sanctions on Cuba. For the Kingdom to join the WTO with a secondary
boycott of Israel in place would have meant it would bar trade with any foreign country
that trades with Israel.
Even an average trade law student could spot the MFN violation of preferring imports
from countries that do not trade with Israel over imports from countries that do. The
Kingdom could try the legalistic last resort of invoking the GATT national security excep-
tion in Article XXI-and then, probably, witness WATO Members skittish about, or hostile
to, the Arab World invoke the same exception against the Kingdom. In brief, for good
reason, the Kingdom and Israel have gotten along well enough in accession negotiations.
To put it more grandly, where world peace through world law (the quixotic vision of a
generation of public international law scholars after the Second World War) has failed thus
far in the context of Palestine, there may be hope for world peace through world trade.
II. Why Kansas Cares
"The basic links that bind us [the United States and the Kingdom] make for almost a Catholic
marriage."
Prince Turki al-Faisal, Ambassador of Saudi Arabia to the United Kingdom. 5
A. ABoUr TRADE WITH THE MUSLIM WORLD
For students at the University of Kansas, it is of decreasing necessity to ask why Kansas
cares, or ought to, about the Arab and Muslim worlds. Particularly, since September 11 th,
enrollments in Arabic language and studies courses have jumped dramatically (though stu-
dents credit curiosity and job possibilities, not just terrorist attacks, for their interest).60
However, asking about trade between the United States and the Kingdom, and why Kansas
ought to care, is not the same inquiry. To this pointed question, hard data is needed.
6 1
57. See U.S. Wants Saudis to Cut Tariffi on Drugs, Chemicals, Info Tech Items, and Agriculture, 17 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 1281 (observing correctly a measure barring imports from a third party that trades with Israel
would violate WTO rules on non-discrimination); See generally Eugene Kontorovich, The Arab League Boycott
and WTO Accession: Can Foreign Policy Eccuse Discriminatory Sanctions?, 4 Cm. J. INT'L L. 283-304 (Fall 2003)
(arguing there is no implicit exception in the GATT for sanctions undertaken purely for foreign policy pur-
poses, i.e., for political ends, and the absence of such an exception advances the goal of promoting amicable
trade relations).
58. See Raj Bhala, Fighting Bad Guys with International Trade Law, 31 U. C. DAvs L. REv. 1-121 (Fall 1997)
(analyzing these Acts).
59. Quoted in Guy Dinmore & Roula Khalaf, The U.S. National Interest is Caught Up with the Saudis in a
Very Complex Way. They Are More than a Gas Pump, FIN. TIMEs, Nov. 19, 2003, at 13.
60. See Meghan Brune, Interest in Arabic Studies Growing at KU, LAWRENCE J.-WORLD, Jan. 19, 2004, at B 1
(discussing the Arabic Department, and the University's programs located in the Middle East).
61. Unless otherwise noted, all data in Part H are from the web site of the Office of Trade and Economic
Analysis (OTEA), Trade Development, International Trade Administration, United States Department of
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Readily apparent from statistics is the importance of the United States to the Kingdom.
America is the second largest export market for Saudi products, and the largest source of
imports into Saudi Arabia. Table One presents the Kingdom's major trading partners. But,
again, why would Kansans bother about trade with the Kingdom or American trade law
toward it? This question should be answered with a progressively narrower focus, from the
trade relations of Kansas around the globe, with the Muslim World, with the Arab World,
and finally with the Kingdom itself. This approach reveals the breadth and depth of the
interest of Kansas in a constructive trade policy toward the Kingdom, and this approach
while likely would work for much of the American heartland, with the same outcome.
To begin, one misconception about exports from Kansas is that there are not a lot of
them, and what little there are go to a handful of countries. Kansas trades with 175 of the
199 countries in the world, exporting nearly $5 billion annually to customers in these
countries. 62 Kansas accounts for a bit less than 1 percent of America's exports to the world,
and it has about one percent of the country's population.63 (Among the twenty-five countries
Commerce, available at http://ese.export.gov/SCRIPTS/hsrun.exe/Distributed/ITA2003-STATES/StateID
(last visited Sept. 20, 2004). See especially the following tables and charts constructed using this Web site:
(1) 2003 Exports of Total to World.
(2) Percent Change 1999 to 2003 Exports of Total to World.
(3) Percent Change 1999 to 2002 Exports of Total to World.
(4) 2003 Exports of HS. Total-TotalAll Merchandise.
(5) Percent Change 1999 to 2003 Exports of HS. Total-Total All Merchandise.
(6) Percent Change 1999 to 2002 Exports of HS.Total-Total All Merchandise.
(7) 2003 Exports of Total from Kansas.
(8) Percent Change 1999 to 2003 Exports of Total from Kansas.
(9) Percent Change 1999 to 2002 Exports of Total from Kansas.
(10) 2003 Exports of Total to Middle East.
(11) Percent Change 1999 to 2003 Exports of Total to Middle East.
(12) 2002 Exports to Middle East (including Percent Change 1999 to 2000).
(13) 2003 Exports from Kansas to Middle East.
(14) 2002 Exports from Kansas to Middle East.
(15) 2003 Exports of Total to Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
(16) Percent Change 1999 to 2003 Exports of Total to Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
(17) 2002 Exports to Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) (including Percent Change 1999 to 2002).
(18) 2003 Exports from Kansas to Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
(19) 2002 Exports from Kansas to Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC).
(20) 2003 Exports of Total to Saudi Arabia.
(21) 2003 Exports to SaudiArabia (including Percent Change 1999 to 2003).
(22) 2002 Exports to Saudi Arabia (including Percent Change 1999 to 2002).
(23) 2003 Exports from Kansas to Saudi Arabia.
(24) 2002 Exports from Kansas to Saudi Arabia.
(25) Percent Change 1999 to 2003 Exports of Total to Saudi Arabia.
(26) Percent Change 1999 to 2002 Exports of Total to Saudi Arabia.
62. The exact dollar figure in 2003 was $4,553,334,000 and in 2002 it was $4,988,410,000. Of the 175
countries, one is listed as "Unidentified Countries," which count as a single country.
63. The population of Kansas as of 2002 is 2,715,884. See Economic Research Service, U.S. Dep't of Ag-
riculture, Data-Kansas State Fact Sheet: Population, Income and Employment, available at http://www.ers.
usda.gov/statefacts/ks.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2004). The population of the United States is about 270 million,
and heading towards 300 million.
Kansas ranked thirty-first in 2003, and 28th in 2002, among the fifty states in total dollar value of exports.
In 2003, the United States exported $723,743,177,000 to the world, and in 2002 the figure was $693,257,300,000
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Table One 64
Top 5 Trading Partners of the Kingdom
(Along with Total Value and Major Products)
Percentage of Exports
from the Kingdom to Percentage of Imports
that Market, into the Kingdom
Leading Export 2002 versus 1998 (based Leading Import from that Source,
Markets on U.S. dollar value) Sources 2002 versus 1998
Japan 16.0% (2002 data), United States 18.6% (2002 data,
17.0% (1998 data) worth $5 bil.),
21.0% (1998 data,
worth $10.5 bil.)
United States 16.6% (2002 data, United Kingdom 6.1% (2002 data),
worth $13.15 bil.), 9.0% (1998 data)
15.0% (1998 data,
worth $6.4 bil.)
Soutb Korea 10.3% (2002 data), Japan 11.0% (2002 data),
11.0% (1998 data) 9.0% (1998 data)
Singapore 5.4% (2002 data), Germany 7.4% (2002 data),
8.0% (1998 data) 6.0% (1998 data)
India 3.5% (2002 data) France 5.0% (1998 data only)
4.0% (1998 data)
Total Value of $48 billion $28 billion
Exports or (f.o.b. prices 1999) (f.o.b. prices 1999)
Imports
Major Products Petroleum and petro- Machinery and equip-
Exported or leum products (90%) ment, foodstuffs,
Imported chemicals, motor
vehicles, and textiles
to the world. In 2003, Kansan goods accounted for $4,553,334,000 of this total, and in 2002 they accounted
for $4,988,410,000 of this total.
The states exporting more in 2003 (n value terms) than Kansas also were states with higher (typically,
considerably higher) populations. For example, not surprisingly the top three exporting states were Texas
($98,846,083,000); California ($93,994,882,000), and New York ($39,180,708,000). Kansas ranked just ahead
of Utah, which exported $4,114,540,000 in 2003.
64. The data in this Table is compiled from TradeStats Express, available at http://www.ese.export.gov(last
visited Sept. 20, 2004), The Saudi Arabian Information Resource, available at http://www.saudinf.com (last
visited Sept. 20, 2004), and http://geography.about.com/?once = true& (last visited Sept. 20, 2004) (material
posted about the Kingdom). Obviously, the EU looms large if statistics from its member states are aggregated.
The Directorate General of Trade of the European Commission states the EU is the Kingdom's major trading
partner with Euro twenty-seven billion of trade in 2002. See the web site of the Directorate General of Trade
of the European Communities, at http://wwweuropa.eu.int/commn/trade/issues/bilateral/regions/gcc/pr010903.
hon (last visited Sept. 20, 2004). Unfortunately, statistical information on Saudi exports to Kansas was not
available.
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Kansas did not ship goods to in 2003 are infamous examples like Burma and Sudan, both
of which had been Kansan export destinations in recent years-Burma in 1999, and Sudan
in 2000-01). Similarly, depending on the time period selected, exports from Kansas have
been growing faster than the national average. For example, from 1999 to2002, the dollar
value of America's exports to the world was essentially flat (the precise growth rate was 0.06
percent). During the same period, exports from Kansas to the world grew by a robust 6.8
percent. In contrast, however, 2003 figures reveal Kansan exports falling by 2.49 percent
between 1999 and 2003, and American exports in the same period rising by 4.5 percent.6 )
Of the 175 countries with which Kansas trades, the state's largest trading partners mirror
the nation's largest trading partners-the NAFTA Parties, Canada and Mexico. Table Two
presents the "Top Third Export Value List." That is, of the 199 countries in the world to
which Kansas potentially could export its products, Table Two lists the top one-third of these
countries (sixty-seven of the 199 countries) in terms of the dollar value of their imports
from Kansas, and it highlights Muslim countries in bold.66 Not surprisingly, Canadians and
Mexicans combine to buy 35.6 percent of exports from Kansas. 67 That fact reflects a national
phenomenon, namely, America's top two export destinations are within NAFTA. What
may be surprising is the importance of Muslim countries as export markets for Kansan
products. Twelve Islamic countries appear in the Top Third Value List. These export sta-
tistics help explain the importance to Kansas of the Muslim World.
To pluck just a few highlights from the Top Third Export Value List, observe Kansas
exports slightly more to Nigeria than to Taiwan, and likewise a bit more to Egypt than to
Spain. Perhaps, for Kansans, the political spotlight on America's support for Israel and
America's troubled alliance with the EU overshadow the economic facts the state exports
roughly the same range of values to Saudi Arabia, Ireland, and Israel (with Kansas shipping
nearly two-thirds as much to the Kingdom as to the other two countries). While the new
American free trade agreement (FTA) with Chile (which took effect on January 1, 2004) is
a noteworthy negotiating success for the United States, from a Kansan perspective, the state
exports more to Indonesia than to Chile.
68
The disparities in export market growth rates are perhaps even more telling. Table Three
presents the "Top Third Export Growth Rates List." That is, of the 199 potential export
destinations, Table Three lists the sixty-seven fastest growing export markets for products
shipped from Kansas measured by dollar value growth from 1999 to 2003, again, with
Muslim countries in bold. To be sure, countries in the Far East and EU figure prominently
if the measurement criterion is the dollar value of exports (as in Table Two). But, if the
65. Consequently, during 1999-2003, Kansas ranked fortieth among the fifty states in terms of the per-
centage growth rate of exports (measured by dollar value). Nevada led the way with 90.5 percent, followed by
South Carolina, at 64.7 percent. California followed Kansas, with a decline of 2.5 percent.
66. Muslim countries are identified as such on the basis of an Islamic population equal to or exceeding fifty
percent of the country's total population. For certain African countries, the Muslim population figures come
from Princeton N. Lyman & J. Stephen Morrison, The Terrorist Threat in Africa, 83 FOREIGN AFF. 75-86 (Jan./
Feb. 2004), who constructed a table entitled "Muslim Populations in Selected African Countries, 2003," using
data from the CIA World Factbook.
67. Of the $4,553,334 exported by Kansas to the world in 2003, Canada bought $1,020,855, and Mexico
bought $602,032,000.
68. See Presidential Proclamations Implement Chile, Singapore Free Trade Agreements, 21 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
49 (Jan. 8, 2004) (reporting on the effective dates for the FTAs with Chile and Singapore-both took effect
the same day).
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Table Two
The "Top Third Export Value List"
(67 of the 199 Most Important Export Markets for Kansas Products, 2003)
Rank Among 199 Potential Country of Importation
Export Markets for of Kansan Products
































































































760 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
Table Two
Continued
Rank Among 199 Potential Country of Importation
Export Markets for of Kansan Products









56 Czech Republic 4,195,000
57 Pakistan 3,937,000










Total to World $4,553,334,000
(175 of 199 Countries to
which Kansas exported
goods in 2003)
criterion changes to export market growth rates (as in Table Three), then their significance
diminishes. In sharp contrast, many Muslim countries boast explosive growth rates. To be
sure, growth rate statistics need to be treated with some caution, because they can vary
depending on the period selected in which to measure growth, and because high rates can
result from a low value of exports in the initial year. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to say
that many Muslim countries are significant customers for Kansan exporters, and their im-
portance is growing. In fact, only five western European countries (Greece, Italy, Malta,
Portugal, and Spain) figure among the top third fastest growth markets for Kansan exports.
For growing export markets, Kansas is looking to the Muslim World (for example, Ban-
gladesh, Jordan, Malaysia, Morocco, Pakistan, and Nigeria), and to the Third World (for
example, Costa Rica, Jamaica, Tanzania, Thailand, and Vietnam).
B. ABOUT TRADE WITH THE ARAB WORLD AND WITH THE KINGDOM
Data on export value and growth rates, presented in Tables Two and Three, respectively,
show that trade with Muslim World matters to Kansas. However, these data do not focus
exclusively on Muslim countries in the Middle East, much less on the Arab World or Saudi
Arabia. These countries have received plenty of attention from the western media since
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Table Three
The "Top Third Growth Rate List"
(67 Fastest Growing Export Markets for Kansas Products, 1999-2003)
Rank Among 199 Potential Country of Importation
Export Markets for of Kansan Products Percent Change in
Kansan Products (Muslim countries in bold) U.S. Dollar Value
1 Dominica 22,385.9%
2 Romania 16,495.2
















19 Central African Republic 451.2
20 Bahamas 441.6
21 Thailand 386.7





27 Ivory Coast 262.7
28 Benin 244.9
29 Latvia 230.6




34 Saint Lucia 171.3
35 Turkmenistan 170.8
36 Mozambique 156.5
37 Costa Rica 154.5
38 Nepal 154.3
39 Brunei 150.7
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Table Three
Continued
Rank Among 199 Potential Country of Importation
Export Markets for of Kansan Products Percent Change in

















64 New Zealand 24.3
65 Honduras 20.2
66 Estonia 19.1
67 French Polynesia 19.1
Total to World -2.49%
(175 of 199 Countries to
which Kansas exported
goods during 1999-2003)
September 11 th. However, little of it deals with the business-to-business relationships be-
tween exporters from the American heartland and importers in the Muslim heartland.
To the entire Middle East in 2002, Kansas exported $92,746,187 (accounting for about
one-half of one percent of exports to the Middle East from the United States, which totaled
$18,942,506,000). In 2003, Kansas suffered a decline in export performance to this region,
with the value falling to $43,126,000 (accounting for hardly a quarter of one percent of the
American total of $19,364,881). 6o Between 1999 and 2002, Kansan exports to the Middle
East grew by 29.7 percent, though measured between 1999 and 2003 they fell by 39.7
percent. The positive trend between 1999 and 2002 contrasted sharply with the national
average, as American exports to the Middle East fell by 9.49 percent in the same period.
The 39.7 percent drop between 1999 and 2003 was steeper than the national average, which
was a decline of 7.47 percent.
69. Of the states, in both 2002 and 2003, New York boasted the highest value of exports to the Middle East,
shipping $2,892,113,000 in 2002 and $3,148,194,000 in 2003. Texas ranked second in both years, with
$2,655,546,000 in 2002 and $2,531,901,000 in 2003.
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Table Four °
Values and Growth Rates for Kansas Exports to the Arab World
Arab Country
(Arab League
members, excluding Value of Exports
Iraq, on which from Kansas Growth Rate of Exports from Kansas
sanctions were in (U.S. dollars (Percentage growth rates
















Saudi Arabia 5,141,000 -75.8





United Arab Emirates 14,960,000 2.1
Yemen 3,186,000 -56.2
Of the twenty-two members of the Arab League, Saudi Arabia itself was the largest
importer of American products in 2002. 1 Table Four presents data on Kansan exports, in
U.S. dollars as of 2003 and growth rates in that value between 1999 and 2003, to the Arab
World, that is, it reveals country-by-country statistics. Table Four shows several Arab coun-
tries as prominent customers of Kansan exporters, and shows the trends in them. Aside
from Saudi Arabia, nine Arab League members (Algeria, Bahrain, Djibouti, Egypt, Leba-
non, Somalia, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen) have negative growth rates. However, war, civil
unrest and instability, or unacceptably high business risks, might explain the declines in
most of those members (save Bahrain, Egypt, and Tunisia), and there is the hopeful chance
of a fresh positive trend in Iraq.
70. The dollar values for all countries other than the Kingdom are rounded to the nearest thousand. The
growth rate for Kansan exports to Libya pertains to 2001-2002, because available data indicate no such exports
in 1999, 2000, and 2003. The growth rate for Kansan exports to Sudan pertains to 2000-2001, because the
data show no such exports in 1999, 2002, or 2003.
71. See Daniel Pruzin, Sen. Grassley Opposes Saudi Arabia's Entry into WTO because of Role in Gas Price Hike,
17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 372 (Mar. 2, 2000) (mentioning this statistic).
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Interestingly, during 1999-2003, negative export growth rates for Kansan products oc-
curred in Canada (- 19.0 percent), France (-28.8 percent), Japan (-21.3 percent), Ger-
many (- 17.4 percent), Switzerland (-40.8 percent), Taiwan (- 31.1 percent), and the
United Kingdom (- 23.1 percent). In none of these mature markets does the explanation
lie in war or terrorism. It is tempting to add the United States has not advanced significantly
toward an FTA with any Arab League member in which trends are negative (though it is
negotiating a pact with Bahrain, and in March 2004 announced completion of negotiations
for an FTA with Morocco), and toys with tighter economic sanctions on desperately poor
Syria.72 However, exploring the consistency (or lack thereof) of American FTA policy with
the interests of Kansas is not at issue here.
72. The highlights of the FTA between the United States and Morocco are as follows:
(1) Trade in Goods:
* Immediate tariff-free treatment for over ninety-five percent of trade in consumer and industrial prod-
ucts, with remaining tariffs eliminated within nine years.
(2) Trade in Agricultural Product.
* Coverage of all agricultural products, with Morocco granting immediate duty-free treatment for
breakfast cereals, pecans, pistachios, pizza cheese, processed poultry, and whey products, and phasing
out tariffs in five years on cherries, corn, grapes, ground turkeys, pears, soybeans, and walnuts, and
the United States phasing out all agricultural tariffs, though mostly in fifteen years.
* A mechanism to allow for increased shipments of wheat from the United States to Morocco similar
to the mechanism in the free trade pact between the EU and Morocco, specifically, for non-durum
wheat, allowing for annual shipments from the United States to Morocco of 700,000 tons if Morocco
produces less than 2.1 million tons, and 280,000 tons if Morocco produces three million tons or more.
* A preference clause for all agricultural products allowing American exporters to sell amounts equal to
other countries.
* A tariff rate quota (TRQ) for high-quality beef used by hotels and restaurants of 4,000 tons a year
that increases over time, with the in-quota tariff eliminated over five years and the out-of-quota tariff
phased out over eighteen years.
* A phase out of Moroccan tariffs on American poultry exports over five, ten, or fifteen years, depending
on the poultry part, except for the two most sensitive poultry products for Morocco, leg quarters and
whole birds, where TRQs are set at 4,000 tons and 1,250 tons respectively, and for which tariffs are
to be eliminated over twenty years and nineteen years respectively.
* An agricultural safeguard remedy for use in the event of significant price declines on horticultural
products.
(3) Trade in Services:
* Liberalization of trade in services, with Morocco offering enhanced market access for American audi-
ovisual services, banks, computer and related services, construction and engineering services, distri-
bution services, express delivery services, insurance companies, and telecommunications firms.
(4) Labor and the Environment:
- A commitment to enforce existing environmental and labor laws in each country, and a mechanism
for cooperation on disputes about such enforcement.
See Gary G. Yerkey, U.S., Morocco Conclude Free Trade Pact with Most Ag Tariffi Scrapped Over 15 Years, 21 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 411-12 (Mar. 4, 2004) (reporting the announcement of this FTA and summarizing its
terms).
As for sanctions on Syria, see Gary G. Yerkey, President Signs Syria Sanctions Bill But Offers No Clue on Possible
Waiver, 20 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 2079, Dec. 18, 2003 (reporting that President Bush signed the Syria
Accountability and Lebanese Restoration Act of 2003, passed by the House 408-8 as H.R. 1828, and earlier by the
Senate, which requires the President to impose economic sanctions on Syria if it does not cease support for
terrorism and withdraw its troops from Lebanon, and gives the President authority to waive sanctions if it is
in the national interest of the United States).
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Table Five





Commodity (millions of U.S. United States
(in order of importance) dollars, 2002) (2002)
Airplanes 941.0 18.86%
Meat of Bovine Animals (boneless, fresh) 437.6 8.77
Passenger Vehicles 363.2 7.28
Raw Hides and Skins (bovine) 256.2 5.14
Wheat and Meslin 237.6 4.76
Meat of Bovine Animals (boneless, frozen) 191.0 3.83
Parts of Airplanes or Helicopters 173.3 3.47
Dog and Cat Food 126.0 2.53
Radio Navigational Aid Apparatuses 77.1 1.54
Grain Sorghum 66.8 1.34
Rather, one inference that should be drawn is that trade with the Arab World is significant
to Kansas. That inference is evident simply from a cursory glance at the figures in Table
Four. A second inference is that trade with the Kingdom, in particular, is of some importance
to Kansas. Kansas exported $31.5 million worth of products there in 2002 (accounting for
about 0.66 percent of exports to the Kingdom from the United States, which totaled
$4,778,472,000), though this figure declined steeply to $5.1 million in 2003 (accounting
for just 1 of one percent of exports from the United States, which were $4,595,968,000)." 3
Much of the change between 2002 and 2003 resulted from a decline in exports of trans-
portation equipment from Kansas to Saudi Arabia. In 2002, Kansas exported $25,466,297
worth of transportation equipment to the Kingdom, and those exports accounted for 80.8
percent of Kansan shipments to the Kingdom. In 2003, Kansan exports of transportation
equipment to the Kingdom dropped to just $2,198,235, accounting for 42.7 percent of the
state's exports to the Kingdom. It is not yet possible to know whether the decline in the
transportation equipment sector, as well as the overall drop in exports, are outlying data
points, the beginning of a new trend, or possibly statistical errors. If past is prologue, then
it would seem the 2003 figures are not representative, because statistics from 1999 through
2002 indicate considerably more robust export values than from 2003.14
73. Of the states, Texas boasted the highest value in both 2003 and 2002, shipping the Kingdom
$897,095,000 in 2003 and $931,301,000 in 2002. New York placed a distant second in both years, with
$347,535,000 worth of exports to the Kingdom in 2003 and $313,236,000 in 2002. For Kansas, the exact figure
for 2003 was $5,141,145, and for 2002, it was $31,482,000 worth of goods to the Kingdom.
74. In previous years, the values of all Kansan exports to the Kingdom were: $22,829,000 in 2001;
$21,145,000 in 2000; and $21,285,000 in 1999. The values for transportation equipment were: $25,466,000 in
2002; $14,665,000 in 2001; $13,153,000 in 2000; and $16,401,000 in 1999. Proceeding on the hunch that the
2003 data are outliers, I have treated figures from that year with some caution, and where appropriate focused
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Not surprisingly, then, the growth rate between 1999 and 2002 of Kansan exports to
Saudi Arabia was the converse of the national average. Exports from Kansas grew by 47.9
percent. In contrast, the country's average declined by 39.53 percent. Between 1999 and
2003, the national average was a 41.8 percent drop in exports to the Kingdom, and Kansan
exports fell by 75.8 percent (again, owing to the steep decline in 2003). What, then, can be
said about the trade link between Kansas and the Kingdom? At the very least, the Kingdom
matters to Kansan exporters, and it could matter even more so in years to come.75
In connection with these statistical insights, it is worth remedying a misconception about
the diversity of Kansan exports. In a state in which the likes of Boeing, Hallmark, and Sprint
play important roles, Kansas has a present, and future, interest in exports well beyond the
agricultural sector. Table Five lists the top ten commodities Kansas exported to the world
in 2002 in terms of value. 76 Table Five also shows the percentage share of the total exports
of those commodities from the United States. For a state rightly famed for wheat, Kansas
figures even more prominently in America's role in the world's transportation equipment
markets.
That connotation is reinforced by looking at data on product-types exported by Kansas
to the Middle East, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, and the Kingdom."
Table Six presents these statistics. While Kansan farmers certainly do export some of their
output to the Middle East region, agricultural products are nowhere near the most impor-
tant merchandise Kansans ship there. That pattern holds true for the Kingdom. In sum,
Tables One through Four explain the depth of the interests of Kansas in trade with the Muslim
and Arab Worlds, and with the Kingdom. By contrast, Tables Five and Six suggest the
breadth of these interests, namely, it is not confined to the agriculture sector. Put bluntly,
Kansans are increasingly inclined to trade a broad array of products with some countries
they are being told, by a few prominent professional pundits, are the very ones with which
their civilization clashes.
7 s
m. Argument #1: Ever Increasing Demands?
"Until we have all the information it would be premature to say what our position would be,
other than the fact that from the President down we are extremely supportive of accession [to
75. I hasten to add a caveat about these inferences. I have not ventured a complete trade profile of Kansas.
Thus, I do not mean to imply trade with the Arab World, or with the Kingdom, is more valuable than with
other regions or countries. I stipulate to the fact that, depending on the export destinations and time periods
selected, there are groupings of greater statistical significance to Kansas (such as the EU, in terms of dollar
value, or sub-Saharan Africa, in terms of growth rates) than the Arab World. There are stories yet to be told,
and consequent policy implications to be considered, about the relative trade importance of other trade blocks
to Kansas.
76. The data in this Table are from Total U.S. Exports (Origin of Movement) via Kansas-Top 25 Com-
modities Based on 2002 Dollar Value, available at http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/state/hs/2002/
ks.txt (last visited Sept. 20, 2004).
77. The GCC is comprised of the Kingdom, Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.
The GCC's Economic Agreement, formally entitled The Economic Agreement of the Cooperation Council
of the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC), was signed in Muscat, Sultanate of Oman, on October 31, 2001 (on file
with author). This Agreement built on a 1981 economic accord among the GCC member states by calling for
the creation of a customs union byJanuary 1, 2003.
78. See, e.g., SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER
109-20 (1996) (discussing Islamic resurgence and its relationship to Western civilization).
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the WATO of the Kingdom]. We think it is very important for Saudi Arabia to be fully embraced
and recognized by the family of trading nations."
William Lash, U.S. Assistant Secretary of Commerce, December 2003.19
A. THREE DEMANDS IN 1996-97: IP PROTECTION, AGRICULTURAL MARKET ACCESS, AND
SUBSIDY ELIMINATION
As suggested in the first part, the WTO accession odyssey of the Kingdom should be
considered from the Saudi perspective. It is now time to do just that. The following sketches
out the demands placed on the Kingdom principally by the United States and the corre-
sponding responses of the Kingdom. To be sure, it is not a "blow-by-blow" account; how-
ever, it is an endeavor to tell as true a story as possible in a manner that highlights the
enormous pressures on Riyadh for American-style capitalistic reforms in the area of trade
and investment liberalization.
It is well established that trade negotiations that involve reciprocal give-and-take. This
author is no less aware of the historical fact that the Arabs have centuries more experience
at this kind of bargaining than the Americans. Yet, in telling an empathetic story, a central
question emerges, whether American trade law toward the Kingdom has been constructive.
Asked differently, in the post-9/1 1 world, would it have been more in the interests of Kansas,
and the American Heartland, for American trade negotiators not to press the Desert King-
dom almost mercilessly for more market access, but rather to emphasize the importance of
long-term, trusting trade relationships? In brief, has the United States demanded too much
of the Kingdom?
During the first two years in which negotiations were held, 1996 and 1997, the United
States presented the Kingdom with three key demands: (1) improve IP protection; (2) pro-
vide better agricultural market access; and (3) eliminate export subsidies. s° Before the first
meeting of the WTO Working Party, in 1996, the United States fired its Special 301
weapon at the Kingdom, placing the Kingdom on its "Watch List." The watch list is es-
sentially is a "black list" of countries alleged by the United States to violate IPR.11 Of
particular concern was copyright law in the Kingdom, that is, protection against counterfeit
goods. The Business Software Alliance (an industry association in Washington, D.C.) es-
timated 80 percent of business software, and 40 percent of cassettes and CDs, were pirated
copies.0 2
On market access, the United States cited an array of tariff and non-tariff barriers im-
peding or blocking imports into the Kingdom. As of 1997, for most products, the Kingdom
79. Kingdom Makes "Outstanding Progress" Toward Trade Deal with U.S., RIYA H DAILY, Dec. 8, 2003, at 6.
80. See Saudi Arabia Faces Questions in WTO on Intellectual Property, 13 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1756 (Nov.
13, 1996) (reporting "heavy questioning from World Trade Organization members, led by the United States
and the European Union, on the question of intellectual property rights"); Frances Williams, SaudisStart Talks
on Joining the WTO, FIN. TIMES, May 3, 1996, at 4 (stating "trading partners ... raised various concerns,
including access for farm goods, non-tariff barriers to imports and export subsidies," and discussing also the
American concern about IPR).
81. See Frances Williams, Saudis Start Talks on Joining the WTO, FIN. TIMES, May 3, 1964 (stating the United
States put the Kingdom on the Watch List "for violations of intellectual property rights [and] is expected to
press Riyadh to adopt tough legislation to enforce copyrights, patents and trademarks"). For an explanation of
Special 301, see chapter 19 of RAj Bi-ALA, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE (Lexis 2d ed.
2001).
82. See Enter the Saudis?, ECONOMIST, May 17, 1997, at 82, 83 (reporting these statistics).
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imposed a tariff rate of 12 percent, and applied a 20 percent duty on merchandise competing
with a good made in the Kingdom. 3 The United States charged these figures, were higher
than in 1987.84 Non-tariff measures included import licensing requirements, restrictions on
eye glasses and breeding horses, and an import ban on pasteurized milk.8" Accordingly, the
United States demanded of the Kingdom a comprehensive offer to open its market to
imported goods.
As for export subsidies provided by the Kingdom, they were linked to the difficulty of
obtaining market access in the agricultural sector. Drawing on data from the International
Grains Council, the United States observed the Kingdom had provided agricultural sub-
sidies so generous that, from 1992-93, the Kingdom was the sixth largest exporter of wheat
in the world.
86
The Kingdom's initial response to the demands of 1996 and 1997 was to seek entry into
the WTO as a developing country. The Kingdom was far too well off economically to
qualify as a least developed country. Developing countries are self-identified, and the King-
dom eyed the benefits of special and differential treatment provisions in the WTO texts,
namely, dilated periods for phasing out restrictions and phasing in obligations.8 7 Unfortu-
nately for the Kingdom, the United States was never was inclined to allow it longer tran-
sition times than were available for fully developed countries, particularly with respect to
IP protection.88 Given the American opposition, the Kingdom essentially abandoned hope
for special and differential treatment as a developing country.
The response of the Kingdom in 1996-97 to the specific American demands was hardly
was negative. It was in the process of developing and implementing new IP protection rules.
Market access was linked to the changing structure of the Kingdom's economy. Most of
the productive resources were engaged in oil and petrochemical activities, and were owned
by the government.89 Nevertheless, for many enterprises, privatization was underway or
planned. 90
The difficulty, articulated by the Kingdom, was that the fledgling Saudi private sector
needed temporary tariff and non-tariff barrier protection and subsidies. 91 If the industries
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See Frances Williams, Saudi Arabia Urged to Open Up to Imports, FIN.L TIMES, May 30, 1997, at 4 (men-
tioning these points).
86. See WTO Pressures Saudi Arabia to Detail Market-Opening Measures, 14 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1007
(June 4, 1997) (reporting this statistic from the International Grains Council); Frances Williams, SaudiArabia
Urged to Open Up to Imports, FIN. TIMES, May 30, 1997, at 4 (mentioning this statistic); Enter the Saudis?,
ECONOMIST, May 17, 1997, at 82, 83 (also mentioning this statistic).
87. See Williams, supra note 81 at 4 (stating "Saudi Arabia hopes to join the WTO as a developing coun-
try .... "). For an accounting of the special and differential treatment provisions in these texts, see BHAL, TRADE,
DEVELOPMETcr, AND SocIAL JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 179-90.
88. See Williams, supra note 81, at 4 (reporting "the U.S. and other WTO members are expected to insist
on early compliance with fair trade rules on such issues as intellectual property, where copyright piracy is
rampant, and agriculture, where generous farm subsidies enabled the desert kingdom in 1992-93 to become
the world's sixth-biggest wheat exporter").
89. Id. (discussing state-owned oil and chemical companies).
90. The skeptical conclusion of The Economist, namely, "it is hard to say where the government ends and
the private sector begins," is based on its observation that "much 'private' industry is in the hands of the royal
family." Enter the Saudis?, supra note 81, at 82-83. The Economist might fairly have compared and contrasted
this situation with privatization efforts in China and Russia.
91. See Williams, supra note 81 at 4 (discussing protections afforded to the private sector).
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being built in the private sector did not survive infancy, and the "Saudization" program
(whereby Saudis were replacing expatriate workers) failed, then social instability could oc-
cur. In the meantime, the Kingdom could not simply drop tariff revenues to insignificant
levels, because of the threat posed to government finances. The drop in world oil prices in
the mid and late 1990's heightened the importance of import duties as a source of funds
for government-sponsored social and other programs, and surely a jarring cancellation of
some of the programs would be both unfair and unwise.92
The Kingdom explained that agricultural subsidies as a percentage of the value of output
were falling. In 1992, they had been worth 25 percent of agricultural output, whereas by
1994 they had dropped to 19 percent of output. With the phase out of wheat subsidies, the
volume of wheat output from the Kingdom had fallen, and the Kingdom no longer was a
major exporter of the product." At the same time, the Kingdom pointed to a critical purpose
of its agricultural subsidy programs was food security for its burgeoning population.94 That
is, the Kingdom sought what countries as diverse as India and Japan believed important a
reduced dependence on food imports.
In brief, the Kingdom did not respond by saying "no" to the American demands placed
on it between 1996-97. It did not respond by saying "if' or "maybe" it will protect intel-
lectual property, open its goods markets, or cut agricultural subsidies. Rather, it responded
by saying "yes, but the question is when and how." From its perspective, the Kingdom
needed time. From the American perspective, time was what the Kingdom did not, nor
could not, have. 95 Indeed, in 1997 the United States appears to have added a major item to
its list of demands: wider non-discriminatory access to the Kingdom's government pro-
curement market.96
The United States well appreciated the importance of government contracting in the
Kingdom whose economy still largely was state owned, and took aim at regulations in the
Kingdom giving explicit preference to Saudi enterprises in the award of public contracts.
The United States also looked askance at a regulation in the Kingdom requiring a foreign
business winning a government contract to sub-contract at least 30 percent of the work
associated with that contract to Saudi businesses. So, the United States pressed, why not
join the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA)?
The Kingdom's legally correct response to this demand was the GPA is a plurilateral
accord, not part of the single undertaking required by founding or new WTO Members.
92. See Enter the Saudis?, supra note 82, at 82-83 (linking the Kingdom's tariff levels, and their increase over
the previous decade, to "low oil prices [that] have left the government desperate for cash" (emphasis added)).
93. See WTO Pressures, supra note 86 (reporting the phase-out).
94. See Enter the Saudis?, supra note 82, at 82-83, ("[a]gainst all climatic odds, Saudi Arabia threw huge
subsidies into farming to reduce dependence on food imports" (emphasis added)).
95. See WTO Pressures, supra note 86, at 1007 (reporting that at the May 29-30, 1997, meeting of the WTO
Working Party "Saudi Arabia had asked for a longer transition time for reducing the high tariff walls protecting
its state-owned and chemical industries, but there has been reluctance on the part of the United States and other
countries to treat oil-rich Saudi Arabia as a developing country," and also reporting "the United States, the
European Union, and other WTO members pressed the Saudis for quick compliance with WTO norms on such
issues as the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights and agriculture" (emphasis
added)); Enter the Saudis?, supra note 82, at 82-83 (stating "the Saudis want to be treated as a developing
country, which would give them more time to conform with some WTO rules. Not likely, say the Americans").
96. See Enter the Saudis?, supra note 82, at 82-83 (mentioning this demand, which does not appear to have
been reported in 1996 in other major American or British news sources, stating "[g]overnment contracts figure
large in the Saudi economy," and mentioning the preferences for local businesses).
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Here, as to other demands, the Kingdom never has said "never," rather it has asked for
time. Also, the Kingdom's response is practically sensible. Negotiations on liberalizing
government procurement are complex and involve two levels of interactive debate.
First, internally, the Kingdom has to decide which types of contracts, and from which
government agencies, will be subject to the GPA disciplines. The result of that internal
debate is a "Positive List," which the Kingdom then must take to the second level-the
WATO accession negotiations. No doubt, during multilateral discussions in the Working
Party, and in bilateral talks with the United States, the Positive List will be criticized. The
Kingdom assuredly will have to revise it, based on the reaction at the second level, and
based on what it can negotiate internally. This two-level process may well be economically
salubrious and certainly the baseline rule in the GPA of national treatment for scheduled
sectors is economically unassailable. However, whether the Kingdom ought to concede to
the American demand had to be gauged in the context of the other demands placed on it,
which involve WTO texts that are part of a single undertaking, and the limited, strained
negotiating resources of the Kingdom.
B. THE 1998 PRICE HIKES: MARKET ACCESS FOR AGRICULTURAL AND INDUSTRIAL GOODS,
SERVICES, AND GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS
In 1998, surprise, frustration, and even a bit of exasperation would all have been under-
standable reactions of any official in the Kingdom who thought the United States would
not lengthen the list of demands. In August 1998, the Kingdom submitted a revised set of
proposed concessions. Along with the EU, the United States castigated the proposal. 97 Not
surprisingly, the November 1998 meeting of the WTO Working Party was a debacle. The
Kingdom found support not only from fellow Muslim countries, principally Egypt, Kuwait,
and Pakistan, but also from prominent non-Muslim countries such as India. 9s Japan, with
the world's second largest economy, urged the United States to be flexible. 99
Over what American demands was all the fuss? First, the Kingdom had to drop yet more
its tariff rates on agricultural and industrial products. How could the Kingdom expect the
United States to agree to bound tariff concessions set at levels above the Kingdom's applied
rates? The Kingdom could then raise its applied rates after joining the WTO, which would
impede market access.,o Second, argued the United States, the Kingdom would have to
improve its service sector commitments. The Kingdom had yet to agree to enhanced access
for foreign services providers in commercially significant sectors like telecommunications. 0 1
Third, the Kingdom would have to rethink its refusal to join the GPA. In brief, the price
of WTO entry went up in 1998.
97. See U.S., EU Criticize Saudi Arabia's Efforts to Achieve WTO-Mandated Trade Reforms, 15 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 1988 (Nov. 25, 1998) (mentioning the Aug. 1998 offers from the Kingdom on both goods and
services, the heavy criticism of them by the U.S. and EU, which also was "voiced by Canada, Australia, New
Zealand, and Switzerland").
98. See id. (noting this support).
99. See id.
100. See U.S., EU Criticize, supra note 97 (discussing this topic, and reporting "Dorothy Dwoskin of the
Office of the U.S. Trade Representative ... said the United States could not accept a pledge that could result in
an increase in tariffs" (emphasis added)).
101. See id. (discussing this topic, and reporting "Dwoskin also criticized the Saudi services offer for excluding
certain key sectors such as telecommunications, adding that there is stillprogress to be made in this area" (emphasis
added)).
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To be sure, the first and third issues were not unprecedented in the accession negotiations.
Market access had been a topic in 1996-97. The Kingdom might well have anticipated the
third issue, as the United States had just raised it in 1997. Yet, from the Kingdom's per-
spective, it appeared the list had become longer in 1998-or at least some items on it had
changed. Moreover, from that standpoint, the Kingdom's progress at trade liberalization
on the 1996-97 issues seemed unappreciated by the United States. For instance, the King-
dom had established a distinguished committee to review its protection of copyrights, pat-
ents, and trademarks in accordance with the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of In-
tellectual Property Rights (TRIP).102
Vhat, precisely, did the Kingdom offer in response to the revised demand list? First, on
market access, the Kingdom improved its earlier offer to cut the bound tariff rate on most
agricultural products to 50 percent. The new offer was 35 percent. 03 Similarly, it sweetened
its previous offer of a reduction to 33 percent as the bound rate imposed on most industrial
goods. The new offer was a bound rate of 25 percent. °4 The Kingdom moved to address
sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures, and technical barriers to trade (TBT), by re-
moving measures offensive to the WTO, SPS, and TBT Agreements, respectively.0
Second, the Kingdom agreed to certain "WTO Plus" commitments by agreeing to join
the Information Technology Agreement (ITA), plus the side agreement on chemicals,
known as the Chemical Tariff Harmonization Agreement."' 6 These concessions meant the
Kingdom would provide duty-free access to approximately 180 IT products, and reduce
tariffs on chemical products to, if not zero, then between 5.5 and 6.5 percent by 2004.10
Such access was not mandated, because neither of these accords was part of the single
undertaking package from the Uruguay Round (hence the rubric "WTO Plus").
Regarding services, the Kingdom offered to remove restrictions on the temporary move-
ment of natural persons (Mode IV in the categories created by the General Agreement on
Trade in Services (GATS) for supplying services across a border). Contrary to American
protestations, the Kingdom also agreed to include new services sectors for trade liberalizing
commitments, including legal services.
What about the Kingdom's effort to be treated as a developing country upon accession?
In the face of American opposition in 1997-98, it appears that it changed track. Rather
than be treated as a developing country for purposes of all WTO texts, it would try to
obtain the benefits of special and differential treatment under the accords of greatest rele-
vance to its circumstances. In the 1998 negotiations, the Kingdom identified these as the
Agreement on Customs Valuation and the TRIPs Agreement.
Immediately, the EU blasted the Kingdom's more limited strategy. In a nearly ad hominem
attack on the Kingdom's trade negotiators, the EU said talks with the Kingdom were "not
very fruitful," "their efforts have been disappointing," and the Kingdom's trade negotiators
were "making excessive demands for transition periods to implement 'WTO agreements.""'
102. See id. (reporting on the establishment of a government committee for this purpose).
103. See id. (reporting on this concession).
104. See id.
105. See id. (reporting on this development).
106. See id. (reporting on these concessions).
107. See Daniel Pruzin, U.S., EU Push Saudis to Improve Market Access Offers for W7O Entry, 17 Int'l Trade
Rep. (BNA) 1654 (Oct. 26, 2000) (outlining the obligations under the ITA and ChemicalAgreement) [hereinafter
Pruzin, U.S., EUPushl.
108. Id. (quoting an EU official).
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The EU condescendingly opined that the Kingdom had no basis for seeking any kind of
special and differential treatment. After all, the Kingdom could have spent the mid and late
1990s implementing the WTO texts, all of which had been in existence since January 1,
1995.109 (The Kingdom politely declined to point out the EU had plenty of implementing
of its own to do, not the least of which related to the Agreement on Agriculture.' 10)
C. THE KINGDOM PAYS IN 1999
Whatever the merits of the Kingdom's responses to the American demands (and Euro-
pean attack), there was little it could do except suffer the increased price of WTO admission.
Thus, in June 1999, the Kingdom produced another offer on market access for goods,'
paying a higher price than the preceding year.
The Kingdom agreed to bind its tariff rate for almost all agricultural goods. For 75
percent of these goods, that rate would be 15 percent or less. Likewise, it agreed to bind
its tariff rate for most industrial goods. It would decrease the weighted average bound tariff
rate on industrial goods from 21 percent to 14.4 percent. The bound rate would be 15
percent or less on 60 percent of industrial goods, and it would be 7 percent on 21 percent
of industrial goods. The Kingdom reaffirmed its acceptance of the ITA, binding its rate of
zero on most IT goods. It also reaffirmed its acceptance of the Chemical Agreement, bind-
ing its rates on most chemicals in the bands of zero, 5.5 percent, or 6.5 percent.
In June 1999, the Kingdom also produced a new offer on market access for services,"
2
which covered not only telecommunications, but also maritime and railway transport. In
banking and finance, a sector in which the Kingdom already had put on the negotiating
table, it opened six more sub-sectors for bargaining. The offer also included new sub-sectors
in other service areas-medical and dental services, franchising, travel and tourism, archi-
tectural services for urban planning, and landscaping. Across all services sectors the King-
dom agreed to loosen equity limitations on foreign ownership of Saudi services businesses
allowing, in most instances, foreigners to hold majority stakes."' The Kingdom also agreed
to abolish economic needs testing for the provision of a service, thereby removing an im-
pediment to foreign service providers establishing a commercial presence." 4 On one point
the Kingdom remained firm: treatment as a developing country for implementation of the
TRIPs Agreement and Customs Valuation Agreement; however, even on this point the
Kingdom offered a modest concession- it would implement both deals byJanuary 1, 2002.1'"
109. See id. Stating:
"The EU also criticized the Saudi's request for a transition period to implement the WTO agreements
on customs valuation and Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, arguing that the
country has no reason not to implement the agreements immediately upon accession to the WTO because they
have been in existence since 1995."
(Emphasis added).
110. See generally Raj Bhala, World Agricultural Trade in Purgatory, 79 N. D. L. Rev., issue 4 (2004) (analyzing
the provisions of this Agreement).
111. See Daniel Pruzin, Saudis' Market Access Offer Praised by WTO Trading Partners, 16 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1585, 1586 (Sept. 29, 1999) (summarizing the agricultural and industrial tariff concessions).
112. See id. (summarizing the services concessions).
113. See id. (noting this concession).
114. See id. (noting this concession).
115. See id. (explaining this position).
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Japan pronounced the June 1999 offer was satisfactory, at least on goods, Australia cred-
ited the Kingdom with considerable progress, and Canada and the EU agreed the accession
negotiations had reached an advanced stage.1"6 But none of these opinions mattered in
Washington, D.C., because the United States half-heartedly and perfunctorily remarked it
was "encouraged by the Saudi offer on liberalizing its services market," and then warned
"further improvements were needed on the goods side.""' 7
If the negotiating method of the United States was the extraction of ever-better conces-
sions through ever-higher demands, then that method not only was well in play, but also
producing gains for American enterprise. By 1999, the two sides were locked in a process
akin to haggling over a carpet in a bazaar, whereby-as Captain Sir Richard Francis Burton
remarks in the first chapter of the first of his two-volume Personal Narrative of a Pilgrimage
to Al-Madinah & Meccah (1893)-the loser is the one whose patience is first exhausted. Of
course, in a rug deal between a small merchant and an individual buyer there are unlikely
to be implications for the global trading system, the wealth of nations, or the national
security of many countries.
In retrospect, the Kingdom's 1999 offer might well have been the basis for WTO ac-
cession. It would be ludicrous to suggest that, had the Kingdom acceded shortly thereafter,
the evils of September 11 th and what followed would not have occurred. Maybe, however,
through a few more years of shared experience in the world's leading international economic
organization, the United States would have seen the Kingdom less as a threat and more as
a partner.
D. NEw DEMANDS IN 2000: ESPECIALLY FDI
Unfortunately, neither trade law nor geopolitical history unfolded in quite such a pleasant
manner. True, in May 2000, the Kingdom reached bilateral accords with Japan and Aus-
tralia, and by October 2000 it could boast of deals finalized with Argentina, Brazil, Canada,
Malaysia, Mexico, Pakistan, South Korea, Uruguay, and Venezuela, but the Kingdom had
yet to reach deals with roughly twenty WTO Members, most notably, the United States.
The Americans were serious in their assessment that the Kingdom still had not paid enough
for a WTO admission. Thus, negotiations continued into the new millennium, both through
bilateral talks and within the Working Party.
In bilateral talks in the summer and fall of 2000, as well as Working Party meetings in
April and October 2000, the United States continued to push the Kingdom for assurances
on IP protection"81 despite the fact that the Kingdom had made substantial strides to comply
with the TRIPs Agreement." 9 It had drafted amendments to its existing laws on copyrights,
116. See id. (summarizing the reactions to the Kingdom's offer, and adding the Canadian critique that the
Kingdom needed to add merchandise to its schedule for duty-free treatment under the IT and chemicals
accords).
117. Id.
118. See Daniel Pruzin, Working Party Chair Predicts Saudi Accession by End of 2001, 17 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1616, 1617 (Oct. 19, 2000) [hereinafter Working Parrty (reporting on this pressure, and the Kingdom's
response that the United States would do well to strengthen its domestic IP enforcement efforts); Warren
Giles, "Turning Point"for Saudi Arabia, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2000, at 6 (reporting that "[o]utstanding issues with
remaining [WTO] members [with which the Kingdom had not yet reached a bilateral agreement, including
the United States] center on tariff rates, intellectual property rights, and investment rules").
119. See Working Party, supra note 119, at 1616 (reporting on the developments mentioned above).
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patents, and trademarks. It had drafted new IP laws to cover industrial designs, integrated
circuits, plant varieties, and unfair competition, all of which were reviewed not only by its
own Council of Ministers, but also by the World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) in Geneva. It had issued new regulations to its Customs Department to stop in-
fringing goods at its borders. For the United States-and, therefore, for the Kingdom-
the strides were steps. The kingdom continued its efforts. Between the April and October
2000 Working Party meetings, the Kingdom had developed new, WTO-consistent rules
on import licensing and SPS measures, and issued a directive to implement the TBT Agree-
ment. 120 Unfortunately, "fine, but ... " appeared to be the American response. On market
access for goods, the United States demanded the Kingdom cut agricultural subsidies, sub-
stantially reduce tariffs on agricultural products to a range of between 5 and 10 percent,
drop import bans on milk and tobacco, lower tariffs on cars and certain other industrial
products, and guarantee duty-free access for all information technology, chemical, and phar-
maceutical products.'
On services, the United States (along with the EU) continued to press the Kingdom to
liberalize access for foreign banks, insurance firms, and telecommunications providers, and
upped the ante with calls for removing restrictions on foreign participation in certain pro-
fessional services and pledges on distribution rights for foreign films (notwithstanding the
prohibition on public movie theaters in the Kingdom).122 The Kingdom pointed out, ap-
parently to no avail, its state-owned telecommunications carrier had a monopoly until 2008,
but it had agreed to foreign ownership of that carrier up to a limit of 49 percent. 2 Even
though as of mid-2000 only twenty-six of the then 138 WTO Members had signed the
GPA, the United States not only renewed its call for the Kingdom to join it, but also the
EU and Canada demanded the Kingdom commit to participation in negotiations on a
separate accord on transparency in government procurement.2 4 Not surprisingly, the King-
dom "chafed" at the latter demand.'2 5 It was a naked attempt to inject into the accession
negotiations an issue from the 1996 WTO Ministerial Conference in Singapore that, to
this day, remains a sore point for many Members.
Most significantly, to its list of demands, the United States added a "crucial" item: FDI. 1 6
By no means had the Kingdom been ignorant of the importance of FDI to WTO accession
and in early 2000, the Kingdom's Supreme Economic Council drafted new FDI legisla-
tion. "' 7 In March 2000, the Shura approved a new FDI law, called the "Foreign Investment
120. See id. (reporting these developments).
121. See id. at 1617 (reporting on these demands); U.S. Wants Saudis to Cut Tariffs on Drugs, Chemicals, Info
Tech Items, and Agriculture, 17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1281 (Aug. 17, 2000) (summarizing what "Washington
had spelled out" (emphasis added)).
122. See Pruzin, U.S., EU Push, supra note 107 (reporting on American demands for access for insurance
firms, as well as EU pressure that foreign companies be allowed to hold a majority stake in Saudi telecom-
munication services); Working Party, supra note 119 (reporting on these demands); U.S. Wants Saudis to Cut
Tariffi on Drugs, Chemicals, Info Tech Items, and Agriculture, 17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1281 (Aug. 17, 2000)
(dubbing services trade liberalization as likely "Saudi Arabia's biggest difficulty," given what "the United States
and major European countries want...." (emphasis added)).
123. See Pruzin, U.S., EUPush, supra note 107 (discussing the telecommunications issue).
124. See Working Party, supra note 119 (reporting on the GPA issue).
125. Id.
126. Warren Giles, "Turning Point"for Saudi Arabia, FIN. TrMES, Apr. 5, 2000, at 6.
127. This Council was formed in August 1999 by Royal Decree. See Al-Ammari, supra note 7, at 2.
FALL 2004
776 THE INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
Law," and in April 2000, the Kingdom's Council of Ministers ratified the Law.12 Indeed,
for the Kingdom, more than VTO accession was at stake. The Kingdom needed these
reforms to reverse its poor FDI record. 29 Between 1984 and 1997, the Kingdom attracted
a net inflow of $4.32 billion in private investment from overseas, which was just eighteen
percent of the amount during the same period into Indonesia ($24 billion), 12 percent of
the amount into Malaysia ($36 billion), and 8.4 percent of the amount into Singapore ($51.4
billion).Y0 Of the $4 billion, only 20 percent went to the private sector in the Kingdom,
the rest of it flowing to government infrastructure project investments, which in comparison
with private investments in other countries, generate lower returns.' By 2000, the King-
dom was experiencing an average annual capital outflow of $16 billionY32
Naturally, the Kingdom, along with independent analysts, believed the Foreign Invest-
ment Law would enhance its VVTO application."' The United States did not react with
the same degree of optimism. Rather, American scrutiny of the Foreign Investment Law
added a substantial dimension to the external assessment of the Kingdom's progress. The
United States would judge the Law on more than just the usual criteria, such as transpar-
ency, the extent to which that law granted equal treatment to foreign and domestic investors,
the protections it provided against expropriation (including the definition of "expropria-
tion"), and the formula it utilized for compensating foreign investors in the event of an
expropriation. The United States also would examine the new legislation to see whether it
greatly expanded the number of sectors open to foreign investment.
The Foreign Investment Law appeared to fare well based on some of the familiar criteria.
Part One of the Law provided for 100 percent foreign ownership of any project or industrial
company (other than those on the Negative List, discussed below), thus also eliminating
the technical necessity of a Saudi sponsor of a project. 34 The Law guaranteed national
treatment for foreign investors on tax matters including tax holiday periods (generally abol-
ishing them and the old rule that foreign ownership of 49 percent or more would disqualify
a business from a tax holiday), and tax rates (reducing the highest income tax rate on
businesses, specifically, on their distributed profits, from 45 to 30 percent, and treating
128. See Robin Allen, Guarded Business Welcome for Saudi Incentives on Investment, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2000,
at 4 (noting the rubric of the legislation); Robin Allen, Foreign Investors Get Same Rights as Saudis, FIN. TIMES,
Apr. 11, 2000, at 8 (reporting on the actions of the Supreme Economic Council, Sbura and Council of Min-
isters); Robin Allen, Saudi Arabia Set to Ease Foreign Investor Curbs, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2000, at 3 (reporting
on the Council's impending ratification). For a brief discussion of that Law, see Middle Eastern CommercialLaw,
36 Ir'L LAw. 901, 935-37 (2002).
129. See Robin Alen, Guarded Business Welcome for Saudi Incentives on Investment, FIN. TIMEs, Apr. 12, 2000,
at 4 [hereinafter Allen, Guarded Business] (containing the statistics presented above).
130. See A-Ammari, supra note 7, at 1 (discussing FDI statistics).
131. See id. (making this comparison).
132. See Allen, Guarded Business, supra note 129.
133. A-Ammari, supra note 7, at 2 (calling the Foreign Investment Law "the most significant reform in
Saudi Arabia's investment climate"); Allen, Guarded Business, supra note 129, at 8 (reporting reactions to the
Law).
134. See SAGIA Web site, at http://www.sagia.gov.sa (last visited Sept. 20, 2 04) (explaining equity interests);
Al-Ammari, supra note 7, at 2, 4 (noting the Foreign Investment Law allows 100 percent ownership of local
entities, observing there are seventy-two companies listed on the Saudi stock exchange, and explaining that
since October 1999 foreigners have been able to invest in the exchange through eleven open-ended funds and
a twelfth close-end fund, the "Saudi Arabian Investment Fund," which is listed on the London Stock Exchange);
Allen, Guarded Business, supra note 129, at 4 (mentioning ownership reforms).
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foreign and domestic businesses and joint ventures, equally).'35 Some provisions of Part
One even indicated better treatment for foreign over domestic businesses. For example,
foreign companies could defray (in part) one year's worth of losses until they are recouped,
and the government would pay 15 percent of the tax owed by any foreign company on
profit in excess of 100,000 Saudi riyals (equivalent in April 2000 to about $26,700).36 Part
One of the Law granted foreign business enterprises the right to own land in the Kingdom
(other than in the Holy cities of Mecca and Medina), not only for a project but also for
housing personnel, and it eased rules for getting business visas (specifically, sponsors for
these visas).13 7
No less important than these reforms in Part One of the Foreign Investment Law were
the contents of Part Two. It established a single, powerful government agency to deal with
FDI, namely, the Saudi Arabian General Investment Authority (SAGIA). 138 SAGIA was
required to decide on an investment application within thirty days of receiving the com-
pleted package, or the application would be deemed approved, and it had to give reasons
for any rejection. 3 9 To be sure, even measured by conventional criteria, the new Law is not
unassailable. Regarding transparency, the law was to take effect thirty days after publication
in the Official Gazette.'I' Apparently, publication was to have been in May 2000, but delays
of a few months ensued. 14' Regarding taxation, rules on how (if at all) dividends would be
taxed were ambiguous. 142 Nonetheless, the Law was a watershed in the history of the King-
dom's economic and legal development.
The degree to which the Foreign Investment Law liberalized access for foreign capitalists
is also meaningful. Part One of the Law suggested foreign business enterprises would be
able to bid for at least some government contracts. 143 Part Two of the Law charged SAGIA
with attracting FDI, which hardly sounded like a mandate to reject ideas from foreign
capitalists. The Law did connote a change in mentality from "a foreign investment [is]
prohibited unless specifically sanctioned" to a foreign investment "is specifically authorized
by" SAGIA.'" Still, the precise powers of SAGIA were unclear-would it be able only to
135. See SAGIA web site, at http://www.sagia.gov.sa (last visited Sept. 20, 2004) (explaining equity interests);
Al-Ammari, supra note 7, at 2 (discussing tax law changes, and pointing out that the tax rate falls to twenty-
five percent for a business earning a profit of less than US$100,000); Allen, Guarded Business, supra note 129,
at 4 (mentioning these reforms).
136. See Al-Ammari~supra note 7, at 2 (mentioning rules on carrying losses forward); Allen, Guarded Business,
supra note 129, at 4 (mentioning these reforms).
137. See SAGIA Web site, at http://www.sagia.gov.sa (last visited Sept. 20, 2004) (explaining real estate
ownership); Al-Ammari, supra note 7, at 2 (noting the Foreign Investment Law allows non-Saudis to own real
estate); Allen, Saudi Arabia Set to Ease Foreign Investor Curbs, FIN. TMES, Apr. 3, 2000, at 3 (mentioning these
reforms).
138. See id. SAGIA superseded the Kingdom's Foreign Capital Investment Committee. Id.
139. See Al-Ammari, supra note 7, at 2 (explaining SAGIA's licensing process).
140. See Allen, Guarded Business, supra note 129, at 8 (discussing publication).
141. See Allen, Saudis Blame, supra note 26, at 8 (observing the Foreign Investment Law had not been
published in the Official Gazette as of mid-June 2000).
142. See Allen, Guarded Business, supra note 129, at 4(discussing ambiguities in the Foreign InvestmentLaw).
143. See id. at 3 (reporting on the content of the Foreign Investment Law).
144. See id. at 8 (quoting a prominent lawyer in the Kingdom on this "fundamental shift in official Saudi
attitudes to foreign investors"). See also SAGIA Web site, at http://www.sagia.gov.sa (last visited Sept. 20,2004)
(identifying all sectors, except those on the Negative List, as open to FDI).
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issue licenses to foreign capitalists to do business in the Kingdom, or would it be a one-
stop shop for all their needs? 14 Perhaps even more importantly, foreign capitalists lacked
the certainty and predictability of a detailed list of sectors open to FDI.
E. THE KINGDOM PAYS AGAIN, A BIT, IN 2001
Thus began negotiations between the Kingdom and United States over drawing bound-
aries and delineating sectors open to FDI from sectors on the "Negative List," which would
be closed to foreigners. One of the boundaries to be drawn, according to the United States,
was to circumscribe monopoly agency and distribution requirements. After all, how much
practical benefit would follow from opening a sector to foreign investment if the output
associated with that investment had to be channeled through a Saudi agent or distributor
and worse yet, if a foreign investor could have only one agent and distributor in the King-
dom? 146 Of course, from the Kingdom's perspective, drawing boundaries-be they around
closed sectors or exclusive agency and distributorship arrangements-meant a correspond-
ing set of internal negotiations among constituencies with prospective or vested political
and business interests.
To chalk up to avarice the American motive for scrutinizing the Negative List, and the
subsequent iteration of "demand-response," would be unfair. Such scrutiny was justified
by economic data from the post-Second World War era showing the more open an economy
to FDI and trade, the better the economy performs (measured principally by growth in
GDP or per capita GDP). 47 At the same time, the perspective of the Kingdom amidst this
cycle must be remembered. Might too short a Negative List mean the Kingdom's economy
would be swallowed by American businesses? If so, then what employment opportunities
would exist for the Kingdom's youth-and under what terms and conditions? What might
the Kingdom's man-made landscape look like in a decade or two-yet more fast-food
145. See Al-Ammari, supra note 7, at 2 (opining SAGIA has sufficiently wide-ranging powers to be a one-
stop shop); Allen, Guarded Business, supra note 129 at 4 (discussing ambiguities in the Foreign Investment Law).
146. See Allen, Saudis Blame, supra note 26, at 8 (recounting the western criticism that vested conservative
interests in the Kingdom, not external pressure, were to blame for the slow process of accession negotiations,
and mentioning the issue of monopoly agencies).
From a competitive standpoint, in terms of advancing the goals of price competition, quality enhancement,
and consumer satisfaction, external pressure on the Kingdom to eschew exclusive agency and distribution
agreements is appropriate. Interestingly, that pressure has not been entirely resisted by leading private sector
businesses. Some of them responded positively, appreciating well they not only can withstand, but indeed
prosper, in an internationally competitive environment. They understand that revenues lost from customers
buying through other agents and distributors are likely to be made up through higher sales volumes, customer
bases inevitably fluctuate, and they appreciate they have a "head start" on new agents and distributors by virtue
of their experience. Discussions, supra note 15. To be sure, agency and distribution rights are of great moment
to a select few who have long held exclusive agency and distribution rights granted by prominent multinational
corporations. After all, millions (or billions) of dollars (or riyal) in annual sales revenue can be at stake. The
point is simply it would be misleading to believe all Saudi agents and distributors fear FDI liberalization, and
the attendant changes in their private contractual arrangements.
147. See, e.g., BAtLA, TRADE, DEVELOPMENT, AND SOCIAL JUSTICE, supra note 19, at 51-53 (citing, in footnotes
1-8, the large number of studies documenting the stimulatory effects of trade on growth); M.A.B. Siddique,
Economic Development: Then and Now, (Univ. of W. Austl. Dep't of Econ. 1997), available at http://www.
econs.ecel.uwa.edu.au/economics/research/1997/dp975.pdf (highlighting there is a positive link between trade
and growth).
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restaurants and shopping malls? Into what might the cultural milieu of Riyadh evolve (or
devolve)-one ever-less distinguishable from that of Beirut or Los Angeles?
To its credit, given these uncertainties, the Kingdom eschewed a siege mentality. It con-
sidered at least some candidates for the Negative List not in terms of whether to open, but
when and how to open. Still, even being solicitous to the Kingdom, the number of sectors
and sub-sectors on the Negative List it proposed in February 2001 was incongruous with
the reforms promised by the Foreign Investment Law. Table Seven summarizes the bound-
aries established by the Kingdom via the List. 48
The boundaries in the initial Negative List cordoned off from American (and other
overseas) businesses projects of keen interest-from insurance policies offered by AIG to
Slurpees sold by 7-Eleven. The United States objected to the extent to which the Kingdom
sought to protect its economy, and more generally inquired whether the List was a device
to take away what the Foreign Investment Law had given. Not surprisingly, therefore, the
demand-concede cycle continued.
F. THE KINGDOM PAYS MORE IN 2003-04
By July 2003, when bilateral negotiations with the United States and EU again took
place, the Kingdom agreed to lower its tariff rates on goods to the levels of the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC). 49 It should not go unnoticed that the latter concession lessens
the value of the GCC as a customs union. That is because the lower the MFN duty rates
the Kingdom charges, the lesser the margin of preference resulting from duty-free treat-
ment for products originating in the GCC. Moreover, the Kingdom pledged full compli-
ance upon WTO accession with the WTO SPS, TBT, and TRIPs Agreements, as well as
the Agreements on Rules of Origin and Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIM).150 It
dropped its request for entry as a developing country, with just one exception: it sought
two extra years to comply with the Customs Valuation Agreement, during which it would
phase out minimum valuations on certain imported merchandise.' If there was one point
on which the Kingdom remained resolute, then it was on joining the GPA.5 2
Of course, the key topic of the new demand-concede cycle of 2002-2003 was FDI. What
concessions did the Kingdom make? By the October 2003 meeting of the WTO Working
Party-the first one in three years-the Kingdom cut back on the boundaries, that is, it
reduced the length of the Negative List by specifying the sub-sectors in which foreign
148. The Table is based on accounts rendered in Pruzin, supra note 31; and Daniel Pruzin, Trade Offiials
Express Disappointment with Saudi Foreign Investment Exclusion List, 18 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 446 (Mar. 15,
2001). In addition, I infer from various sources (including the Web site of SAGIA, at http://www.sagia.gov.sa
(last visited Sept. 20, 2004)), that the sub-sectors listed in the manufacturing sector likely were on the List.
The Table represents a partial account, as nineteen sectors were on the initial Negative List. See Frances
Williams, WTO Entry Closer for Saudi Arabia, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 25-26, 2003, at 3 (discussing the original list).
149. See Pruzin, supra note 42, 20 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1146 (July 3, 2003) (reporting on the Kingdom's
"new concessions").
150. See Daniel Pruzin, WTO Working Party on Saudi Arabia to Meet Oct. 23-24: First Formal Talks in Three
Years, 20 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1763-64 (Oct. 23, 2003) [hereinafter Pruzin, WVTO Working Party] (reporting
on these concessions).




Partial Summary of February 2001 Negative List Proposed by Kingdom
Sub-Sectors Off Limits
Sector (Specific Areas Not Open to Foreign Investors)
Agriculture Fisheries
Audiovisual Services Cinemas




• Video production and distribution
Banking and Financial • Certain commercial and investment banking activities
Services
Construction * Construction services
Distribution Services • Auto dealerships
(including Agency) Auto parts outlets
* Commercial agency, including services of commission agents
• Food retailing
• Non-food retailing, including medical retail and private
pharmacies
* Wholesale trade
Education Services • Adult education
• Primary education
* Secondary education
Employment Services • Recruitment and employment services, including local
recruitment offices
Energy and Energy Oil exploration, drilling, and production
Services • Natural gas exploration, drilling, and production
* Pipeline transportation
* Services incidental to electrical energy distribution
* Services related to the mining sector
Environmental Services * All environmental services
Health Care Services * Blood Banks, poison centers, and quarantine facilities
• Services rendered by midwives, nurses, paramedics, and
physio-therapists
Insurance Services • All insurance products, other than health care
* All insurance-related products, including re-insurance
Manufacturing ° Civilian explosives
• Military equipment, devices, and uniforms
Printing and Publishing * All printing and publishing services
Continued




Sector (Specific Areas Not Open to Foreign Investors)
Real Estate • Real estate brokerage activities, including commission
services
• Real estate investment in Mecca and Medina
Security and Security- Catering to military sectors
Related Services Security and detective services
Telecommunications Data and message transmission
* Business network services
* Public telecommunications services
Tourism • Tourist orientation and guidance services related to H-aj and
Umrah
Transportation Courier services
• Freight transport by land or air
* Passenger transport by land or air
* Space transport
investment could be directed. Table Eight summarizes the revised Negative List (highlight-
ing these areas in the third column, with the language "except for ...).13
The Kingdom's new concessions on FDI were consistent with the declaration of Crown
Prince and First Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud, who explained
"the Saudi state can no longer assume the burden for economic development and welfare
in the country." 5 4 In other words, the concessions were needed for the Kingdom to privatize
large state-owned monopolies, and for it to increase the share of GDP accounted for by
the private sector (which, in 2002, was around 25 percent).' Among the enterprises slated
for full or partial privatization, or in the midst of being privatized, were domestic aviation
153. This Table provides a partial summary of the October 2003 Negative List. It is drawn from the SAGIA
Web site at http://www.sagia.gov.sa (last visited Sept. 20, 2004), as well as from Daniel Pruzin, Saudis Flexible
on Easing Investment Curbs During W'TO Accession Talks, Report States, 21 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 288 (Feb. 12,
2004); Pruzin, supra note 45, at 1809- 10; Pruzin, supra note 151.
The source from which the Kingdom derives its classifications is not apparent, but presumably is based on
the United Nations Standard Industrial Classification (SITC) system. I encountered difficulties with respect
to classification in two sectors. First, regarding mining services, the SITC does not contain a listing for services
related to the mining sector. However, chapter 5, which deals with chemicals and related products, marks as
subheading 511 organic chemicals, mainly hydrocarbons, n.e.s., and their halogenated, sulphonated, nitrated,
or nitrosated derivatives. That subheading, along with its location in the chapter, suggests the exception deals
with mining. See http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/sitc 1/2002/5170.htnl (last visited Sept. 20, 2004). Sec-
ond, concerning printing and publishing, the SITC system, as well as the North American Industrial Classi-
fication code system, lists this sector as heading 2221 (or a number close to 2221). See id.
154. Al-Ammari, supra note 7, at 4. See also Enter the Saudis?, supra note 82, at 82-83. (observing "Saudi
Arabia and China present the W'TO with a similar problem: the state is everywhere").
155. See CIA FACTBOOK, supra note 2.
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Table Eight
Partial Summary of October 2003 Revised Negative List Proposed by
the Kingdom
Except for ...
(that is, Sub-Sectors Open to
Sector Sub-Sectors Off Limits 100 Percent Foreign Ownership,
(General (Specific Areas Not Open Unless a Specific Limit is
Classification) to Foreign Investors) Set Forth)
Agriculture • Fisheries
Audiovisual • Cinemas





• Video production and
distribution
Banking and Most commercial and invest-
Financial ment banking activities, subject






Distribution * Auto dealerships * Franchise rights (internation-
Services • Auto parts outlets ally classified at 8929), with
(including * Commercial agency, including foreign ownership not to
Agency) services of commission agents exceed 49 percent, and a limit
• Food retailing on grants of franchises to one
• Non-food retailing services, per geographic area
including medical retail and Full trading rights (equal to
private pharmacies those of Saudis)
* Wholesale trade
Education • Adult education
Services Primary education
* Secondary education
Employment • Recruitment and employment • Eased restrictions on Mode IV






(that is, Sub-Sectors Open to
Sector Sub-Sectors Off Limits 100 Percent Foreign Ownership,
(General (Specific Areas Not Open Unless a Specific Limit is
Classification) to Foreign Investors) Set Forth)
Energy and Oil exploration, drilling, Electricity sector being
Energy Services extraction, and production privatized
* Pipeline transportation Natural gas development
• Services incidental to electrical projects, such as exploration,
energy distribution drilling, and production, could
be opened, pending further
review
Services related to mining (as
listed at 5115 + 883 of the
International Industrial Classi-
fication Code)
Environmental Certain environmental services
Services
Health Care Blood Banks, poison centers,
Services and quarantine facilities
* Services rendered by midwives,
nurses, paramedics, and physio-
therapists (internationally
classified at 93191)
Insurance All insurance products, other Foreign investment in insur-
Services than health care ance and re-insurance, in line
* All insurance-related products, with Islamic legal doctrine of
including re-insurance cooperative insurance, new
Insurance Act, and imple-
menting decrees
Manufacturing Civilian explosives
* Military equipment, devices,
and uniforms
Printing and Drawing and calligraphy (inter- Foreign media offices and
Publishing nationally classified at 87501) correspondents (internationally
* Photography (internationally classified at 962)
classified at 875) Media consultancies and
* Pre-printing services (interna- studies (internationally classi-
tionally classified at 88442) fled at 853)
* Printing presses (internation- News agency services
ally classified at 88442) Press and publication services
* Promotion and advertising (internationally classified at
(internationally classified at 88442)
871) Public relations (internationally
* Production, selling and renting classified at 86506)
of computer software (interna- Studios for radio and television
tionally classified at 88) broadcasting (internationally





(that is, Sub-Sectors Open to
Sector Sub-Sectors Off Limits 100 Percent Foreign Ownership,
(General (Specific Areas Not Open Unless a Specific Limit is
Classification) to Foreign Investors) Set Forth)
Real Estate • Real estate brokerage
Real estate investment in
Mecca and Medina
Security and Catering to military sectors






* Electronic Data Interchange
(EDI) (internationally classified
at 7523)







• Fax services (internationally
classified at 7529 + 7521)
• GMPCS services (internation-
ally classified at 75299)





• Internet Service Provider (ISP)
services (internationally classi-
fied at 75299)
* Online information and data-
base retrieval services to
overseas operators (internation-
ally classified at 7523)
* Telegraph services (interna-
tionally classified at 7522)
• Telex services (internationally
classified at 7523)
* VSAT services (internationally
classified at 75291)
Tourism • Tourist orientation and guid-
ance services related to Haj
and Umrah
Transportation Freight transport by land or air All courier services
• Passenger transport by land or
air
• Space transport
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services (including Saudi Arabian Airlines), education services, postal services, the Saline
Water Conversion Corporation (that is, water desalination services), the Saudi electricity
company (that is, generation and distribution, as well as other power companies), SABIC,
sewage services, certain banking and telecommunications services, railways, and seaports
(that is, port authorities).'5 6 Concomitantly, the Kingdom made concessions on the tem-
porary movement of persons (Mode IV in the GATS scheme for providing cross-border
services), thereby easing further restrictions on the entry of foreign professionals. 7
Interestingly, and to the pleasant surprise of many observers, these concessions satisfied
the EU. In August 2003, the Kingdom finalized its bilateral agreement with the EU for
VTO accession. That accord included lower duty rates on agricultural and industrial prod-
ucts (with an average industrial tariff of 12 percent, and a correspondingly low level on
agricultural imports) and the elimination of bans on certain food imports. In services sectors,
the accord also provided for enhanced market access for foreign providers of banking,
construction, courier, distribution, environmental, insurance, news agency, telecommuni-
cation, and transportation services, and better access for foreign government contractors
interested in bidding on the Kingdom's $42 billion worth of projects to modernize is elec-
tricity, telecommunications, and water infrastructure.' 8 Apparently, the Kingdom also agreed,
or reaffirmed its commitment to, full compliance with all W%7TO rules by the date of WTO
accession.
In retrospect, there ought not to have been much surprise. By almost any measure, the
Kingdom's October 2003 Negative List was a dramatic manifestation of intent to liberalize
with as few restrictions as possible.'5 9 The List not only continued the presumption of
openness unless a sub-sector was articulated therein, but also allowed for 100 percent for-
eign ownership, absent an equity limit for a particular sub-sector. Also, the Kingdom itself,
through the Minister of Commerce, explained that while it would take some time, the
eventual goal was to do away with the List entirely-including the previously "unthinkable"
opening up of upstream petroleum services (for example, oil exploration).160
156. SAGIA Priviation Announcements, at http://www.sagia.gov.sa/innerpage.asp?ContentlD = 191&
Lag= en (last visited Sept. 20, 2004) [hereinafter Privitation announcements]; Pruzin, Saudi HTO Accession,
supra note 45, at 1809, 1810 (reporting on privatizations).
The Kingdom has an established and sophisticated telecommunications system. In its air, sea, and land
transportation network, the Kingdom has approximately seventy airports with paved runways, several seaports
and harbors, and many unpaved roads (about 102,000 kIn). See Country Profile: Saudi Arabia, BBC News, May
29, 2004, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hii/world/middle-east/country-profiles/791936.stm (last visited Sept. 20,
2004).
157. See Pruzin, WTO Working Party, supra note 150, at 1763 (noting the concession on the temporary
movement of persons).
158. See Robert Bailey, Rules of Engagement, GULF Bus., Nov. 5, 2003, at 2 (quoting EU Trade Commissioner
Pascal Lamy on the terms of the agreement); Tobias Buck, EU Deal Likely to Smooth Saudi Path to WTO Enty,
FIN. TIMwEs, Sept. 1, 2003, at 5 (reporting on the terms of the agreement, which also included the elimination
of certain obstacles to foreign professionals settling in the Kingdom and, apparently, a clause in which the
Kingdom reputedly "agreed to end its practice of selling gas at cheaper rates to domestic businesses than to
the world market"). As of early 2004, the agreement was not made public. See also the Web site of the Direc-
torate General of Trade of the European Commission, available at europa.eu.int/comm/trade/issues/bilateralU
regions/gcc/prO0903.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2004) (announcing the deal).
159. See, e.g., SAGIA Web site, at http://www.sagia.gov.sa (citing Arab News, Oct. 25, 2003).
160. Pruzin, Saudi WTO Accession, supra note 45, at 1809, 1810 (quoting a statement by the Commerce
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Among the noteworthy features of the List was the willingness of the Kingdom to open
its natural gas sector to development. 16 Candidly, that flexibility followed the collapse of
the Saudi Natural Gas Initiative, which would have included power, water, petrochemicals
and gas exploration and development.'16 The Kingdom reached agreement on a joint ven-
ture gas deal with Royal Dutch Shell, and the French giant Total Fina Elf, in which Shell
holds 40 percent, and Total and the Kingdom, 30 percent equity interest. 163 Furthermore,
the List had to be read with an entrepreneurial spirit, because even ostensibly closed sectors
could be unraveled on a sub-sectoral basis. For example, the Kingdom has announced it
will privatize all airports, and it eschewed putting airport ownership and operation on the
List.1M Consequently, while foreigners are not allowed to participate in land and air trans-
portation generally, at least after a certain period they may be able to run, and perhaps own,
airports.'
In concluding its bilateral deal with the Kingdom, was the strategy of the EU to isolate
the United States as the hardest bargainer in the rug negotiations, as well as bolster its
efforts to forge an FTA with the GCC?'66 If so, then the EU succeeded-though the EU
was not alone in isolating the United States. By January 2004, the Kingdom had signed
bilateral agreements towards WTO membership with sixteen countries, namely Australia,
Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Czech Republic, EU, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand,
Pakistan, Slovakia, South Korea, Turkey, Uruguay, and Venezuela.6 7 This list is hardly
dominated by "light weights."
Along with the EU, Canada, and Japan are members of the Quad. Australia has played
an important role in multilateral trade talks ever since the preparatory conferences in 1946
and 1947 in London and Geneva, respectively, which led to the GATT, and leads the Cairns
Group on agricultural trade issues. Brazil, Mexico, and South Korea have emerged as
prominent global trading forces, and Mexico, in particular, showed its negotiating prowess
in bilateral talks with China on the Middle Kingdom's accession to the WTO. Pakistan
and Turkey are (to say the least) important powers in the Muslim World. Venezuela is an
OPEC country, and New Zealand boasts innovative trade-liberalizing policies (including,
for example, the elimination of tariffs on all products, including textiles, clothing, and
Minister). See also Pruzin, In Push to Finalize, supra note 46, at A-4 (repeating the Minister's statement about
the Kingdom's intention eventually to "eliminate the list altogether").
Mexico, which became a GATT contracting party in 1986, but which is not an OPEC member, provides
an interesting comparison. In the near future Mexico is unlikely to privatize PEMEX (PetroleosMexicanos), and
Mexican presidential candidates even remotely suggesting privatization have fared unsuccessfully in campaigns.
Only recently has the government of President Vicente Fox considered opening up distribution of natural gas
(but not oil) to the private sector, including to foreign investors, but thus far the results are mixed. SeeJos6 de
C6rdoba, Mexico's Auction of Natural-Gas Pacts Draws Few Major Bidders, WM.L ST. J., Jan. 15, 2004, at A12.




165. It appears for the time being, airport ownership and security will be open to Saudi nationals, but in the
short- or medium-term, the Kingdom will privatize all aspects of airport control. See SAGIA Web site, at http://
www.sagia.gov.sa (last visited Sept. 20, 2004).
166. After reaching the deal, the EU Trade Commissioner, Pascal Lamy, expressed optimism it would lead
to similar pacts in the Middle East region. See Bailey, supra note 159 (paraphrasing Commissioner Lamy).
167. See Pruzin, Talks with U.S. Scheduled, supra note 46, at 145. Pruzin, Saudi H'TO Accession, supra note
45; Frances Williams, WTO Ent7y Closer for Saudi Arabia, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 25-26, 2003, at 3 (noting the
success of the Kingdom in negotiating bilateral accords).
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footwear, for least developed countries). From the Kingdom's perspective, the refusal of
the United States to join this list showed that a price acceptable to trade negotiators from
a diverse group of significant countries was not high for the Americans. The difference was
all the more poignant just over one month later. By early March 2004, the Kingdom an-
nounced that in February, it had finalized fourteen bilateral agreements during February,
with countries such as India, Norway, Switzerland, and Thailand.'68 In other words, the
Kingdom had struck thirty bilateral deals, and "the last major obstacle remaining in the
accession process" was striking one with the United States.
69
True, the United States was not the only country with which the Kingdom had yet to
conclude a bilateral accord. In the spring 2004, negotiations were underway with China,
Indonesia, Panama, and the Philippines, and a few other countries, but trade diplomats
reported them to be progressing swiftly. 7° The reports were correct. In April 2004, Saudi
Arabia finalized bilateral agreements not only with Indonesia, Kyrgyzstan, and the Philip-
pines, but also with China and India.' It is true that in July 2003 the Kingdom and United
States signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA).17 2 However, any TIFA
is a minimalist document, basically stipulating that the United States and the other country
will try to expand the trade of goods and services between the two. It sets up a Council on
Trade and Investment, which monitors trade and investment and identifies new opportu-
nities for the expansion of both. As for broad, deep, substantive concessions, they are not
found in a TIFA, which contains non-committal language like "will seek to ... " (in the
chapeau to article One, referring to expanding trade and investment), "shall consider..."
(in article Four, referring to whether further trade and trade-related agreements "would be
desirable"), and "shall endeavor to provide.. ." (in article Five, paragraph two, referring to
the opportunity for consultations). Rather, the real terms are haggled over in bilateral trade
talks in the context of WTO accession. Thus, the haggling continued not only on some
old matters, but also on new demands.
As for the terms the two countries had debated about for years, the United States con-
tinued to press the Kingdom about its commitment to WTO rules on non-tariff measures,
particularly import licensing, SPS measures, and TBTs. The United States questioned the
Kingdom for not having a law on the protection of sound recordings, broadcast transmis-
168. See Pruzin, Officials Report, supra note 46, at 412, 413 (reporting on the bilateral deals).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. See Daniel Pruzin, Saudi Arabia Makes Progress on Finalizing Trade Deals; U.S. Likely to Be Last Barrier,
21 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 660 (Apr. 15, 2004)[hereinafter Saudi Arabia Makes Progress] (reporting on these
deals, observing the United States and Panama were the only countries yet to conclude bilateral accords, and
stating the only issue in the talks with Panama "concerned the tax-exempt status of Panamanian service pro-
viders in the Kingdom," whereas "problems remained in the U.S.-Saudi talks regarding Saudi commitments
in the areas of financial services, telecommunications, the protection of intellectual property rights, and non-
tariff measures"). See also Daniel Pruzin, Saudi Ofials Arrive in Washington to Finalize WTO Deal with United
States, 21 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 793 (May 6, 2004) (reporting American officials "complained in particular
about a backlog of patent applications," which the Saudis attributed to delays in promulgating new imple-
menting regulations).
172. See Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Concerning the Development of Trade and Investment Relations, July 31, 2003,
U.S.-Saudi Arabia, at http://www.ustr.gov/regions/eu-mad/middleeast/saudiarabia/tifa.pdf. Working Party, so-
pra note 158 (reporting that the TIFA was signed on July 31, 2003, and it was expected to lead to a Bilateral
Investment Treaty).
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sions, and satellite transmissions. It pointed out that the Kingdom protected audiovisual
works for twenty-five years, whereas the TRIPs Agreement standard was fifty years, and
characterized the Kingdom's penalties to deter copyright piracy as weak.' From the King-
dom's perspective, this pressure surely belied any profession of trust the Americans pro-
fessed to have in their Saudi counterparts. After all, the Saudis pledged to fulfill upon entry
the obligations in the SPS, TBT, and TRIPs Agreements. The pressure must have also
seemed unfair. Notwithstanding the fact that a country like New Zealand (which, as any
traveler to it well appreciates, understands the importance of fresh fruit, vegetables, dairy
products, meat, poultry, and seafood) was satisfied with the Kingdom's shelf-life require-
ments, the United States queried whether they were unduly short.'14 Were the Americans
trying to push frozen foods, or foods loaded with preservatives on the Kingdom?
Some of the American pressure appeared to smack of mercantilism. The United States
remained unpersuaded by the market access commitments the Kingdom had made on
goods. It also unsatisfied it's the Kingdom's concessions on services, particularly in the
banking, insurance, and telecommunications sectors. 75 Also, the United States could not
let go of the GPA issue, continuing to insist that the Kingdom join this plurilateral accord.' 6
The United States objected even to the Kingdom's request for developing country status
under the Agreement on Customs Valuation, pressing for complete implementation of cus-
toms valuation rules upon entry.'77 The Kingdom argued for a two-year transition period
to phase out minimum customs valuations on certain imports because of chronic under-
valuation of those products. The United States countered the Kingdom could try a method
other than minimum valuation, and thus drop its demand for a phase out period."78 By April
2004, the United States won the point, as the Kingdom agreed to drop its request for a
post-accession transition period for compliance with the ban in the Agreement on the use
of minimum values to determine tariff liability.'79
If the United States disappointed the Kingdom with its lack of enthusiasm for the King-
dom's revised Negative List, or frustrated the Kingdom with its renewed concerns about
the old terms, then it must have exasperated the Kingdom with two new demands. First,
the United States (through the Working Party) expressed concern about the precedence of
WTO obligations in the Kingdom's legal system. 80 Was the United States oblivious to the
importance of the Qur'dn and Sunnah in the Kingdom's legal system? Had it forgotten basic
173. See Pruzin, Officials Report, supra note 46 (reporting on the non-tariff measures and IP problems);
Working Party, supra note 158.
174. Pruzin, Saudi WTO Accession, supra note 45 (reporting on this controversy).
175. See Pruzin, Officials Report, supra note 46 (reporting on the financial services, insurance, and telecom-
munications problems); Pruzin, In Push to Finalize, supra note 46 (reporting "Saudi Arabia's market access
commitments for foreign financial services and insurance firms" remained an "outstanding issue[ ]" in negotiations
with the United States (emphasis added)); Pruzin, Saudi WTO Accession, supra note 45 (reporting "[t]he United
States is still negotiating with Riyadh in both the goods and services sectors" and "Washington wanted to know what the
Saudis were now able to offer in the telecommunications sector [in] light of the recent privatization of its state phone
operator" (emphasis added)).
176. See Working Party, supra note 158.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Saudi Arabia Makes Progress, supra note 172.
180. See Pruzin, Saudi WTO Accession, supra note 45 (reporting "U.S. officials also told the working party
meeting that they wanted clarification from Riyadh on whether international law would take precedent [sic] over
domestic law" (emphasis added)); Working Party, supra note 158.
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American legal principles about the precedence of its Constitution? And, what about the
content of section 102 of the American Uruguay Round Agreements Act, which intones
American law and takes priority over any inconsistent provision of a WTO text?
Second, on trade remedies, the United States essentially demanded to review the King-
dom's draft antidumping (AD) law.'8 ' Did the United States not care about offending Saudi
sensibilities? Apparently, the Kingdom was too polite to point out (publicly, anyway) the
blatant hypocrisy of the American demand; contemporaneous with it was the American loss
in WTO litigation over the Byrd Amendment, an AD law enacted without review by other
WTO Members (much less the Saudis), and held by the Appellate Body to be inconsistent
with America's VVTO obligations."8 2 It seemed the United States simply ignored (or did
not put any faith in) the Kingdom's agreement not to impose any AD, countervailing duty,
or safeguard remedy until it had implemented INTO-compatible legislation in these areas.''
Amidst these controversies, and notwithstanding the Kingdom's testimony that it had
terminated the secondary boycott of Israel, the United States Department of the Treasury
listed the Kingdom in its October 15, 2003, Federal Register notice as one of the countries
supposedly requiring participation or cooperation in a boycott against Israel, and did so
again in its April 13, 2004 notice. 84 Ironically, and probably maddeningly to the Saudis,
"U.S. and Israeli officials ... said they were not aware of any direct boycott against Israel
being written into Saudi legislation..'. ."I" Were different parts of the American govern-
ment not communicating with one another, or was the Kingdom being singled out as
untrustworthy?
IV. Argument #2: How Accommodating of Islamic
Concerns?
"[T]he key role that Saudi Arabia plays psychologically and symbolically in the lives of Muslims
worldwide cannot be underestimated. It is one thing to have radical non-state groups that
advocate and employ violence against the United States; it would be a very different matter to
have a radical government employ the pulpit of Mecca, where millions come every year on
pilgrimage, to set a hostile tone in the name of Islam."''1
6
Accession to the INTO for any Muslim country poses religious issues, no less so for the
Kingdom, which (as explained at the outset) holds a special-sacred-trust in the minds
and hearts of Muslims around the world. Consequently, the way in which the Kingdom is
treated by the United States in VTO accession negotiations on Islamic issues, and the
181. See Pruzin, Saudi WTO Accession, supra note 45 (reporting "U.S. officials... wanted ... details about a
new antidumping law the Saudis were now drafting" (emphasis added)); Working Party, supra note 158.
182. This Amendment is reviewed in Raj Bhala & David Gantz, 9TO Case Review 2003, 21 ARIZ. J. INT'L
& CoMP. L. 317 (Summer 2004).
183. See Working Party, supra note 151, at 1763.
184. See U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, List of Countries Requiring Cooperation with an Intemational Boycott,
68 Fed. Reg. 59, 444 (Oct. 15, 2003) (stating "[o]n the basis of the best information currently available to the
Department of the Treasury, the following countries may require participation in, or cooperation with, an
international boycott...," and listing Saudi Arabia). See also Treasury Department Issues Boycott List, 21 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 662 (Apr. 15, 2004) (discussing the matter); Treasury Department Issues Boycott List, 20 Int'l
Trade Rep. (BNA) 1764 (Oct. 23, 2003) (discussing the matter).
185. Pruzin, Saudi WTO Accession, supra note 45, at 1809.
186. Does Saudi Arabia Still Matter?, supra note 25, at 172.
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solutions for these issues, are more important for far more than commercial reasons. What
are those issues, and is the United States sufficiently appreciative of the unique perspectives
of the Kingdom on them?
Essentially, there are three issues arising under the Shan'a in connection with the King-
dom's accession negotiations:
" Must the Kingdom remove its ban on importation of alcohol, pork, pork products, and
pornography?
" Must the Kingdom relieve Saudi business associations of their obligation to pay a zakdt
tax?
" Must the Kingdom allow foreign service providers to offer products reprehensible (even
forbidden) from a religious perspective, such as life and wage insurance policies sold
by insurance companies, and financial products involving interest sold by banks?
Happily for the Kingdom and Muslims generally, the answer to each question is "no."
That is, to join the WTO no compromise need be made on any basic Shari'a principle. (I
might add that if the opposite were true, then the price of admission would be too high.)
However, to reach this answer takes skillful negotiation. The Kingdom ought never to be
under significant pressure from the United States to preserve Islamic values in ways the
Kingdom finds less than pure.
A. FORBIDDEN GOODS
Consider, first, the ban in the Kingdom on imports of alcohol, pork, pork products, and
pornography."7 Each of these items is forbidden to Muslims (with an exception, known as
dar-ra, for necessity, which could be relevant in extreme circumstances).' s Never mind that
some medicines contain alcohol, that some soaps have oil from pigs, or that some easily-
available magazines contain "soft" pornography. The fact is, serious practice of Islam entails
forswearing these products.
That fact can be squared with VTO obligations. There is no affirmative duty in mul-
tilateral trade law to import any product, least of all merchandise forbidden on religious or
moral grounds.8 9 Most (if not all) Muslim countries in the WTO-including the two latest
Arab Members, Jordan (in 2000) and Oman (also in 2000) content themselves with applying
a "prohibitive" tariff on alcohol, pork, and pork products, and with making use of the GATT
article XX:(a) exception for immoral articles for pornographic materials. Aside from the
possibility of garnering tariff revenues from an honest importer willing to pay the tariff, in
certain circumstances, there is a certain rather surprising logic for this methodology.
187. The Kingdom bans importation of seventy-three products, including the above-mentioned items for
religious reasons. The other products, which are banned for various reasons (e.g., SPS protection, security
concerns, social preferences, etc.) include animal fertilizer, asbestos, electronic greeting cards, mobile phones
fitted with cameras, mobile phone chips, prepaid mobile phone cards, satellite Internet receivers, used tires,
video boosters. See Pruzin, Saudis Flexible, supra note 154, at 288 (summarizing the banned imports).
188. See Allen, Saudis Blame, supra note 26, at 8 (quoting the Kingdom's former Minister of Commerce,
Osama Jafar al-Faqih, as follows: "Under no circumstances will we allow the importation of pork, pork items or
akohol which are traditionally prohibited according to our religion and our culture, nor will we allow access of audio-
visuals which offend our public morals" (emphasis added)). For an overview of goods that are forbidden (harjm),
see JAMILA HUSSAIN, IsLAMIC LAW AND SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION 114-16 (1999) [hereinafter HUSSAIN]. On
the darfra exception, see JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO Is.AMIc LAW 84, 298 (1982) [hereinafter
ScuACHT].
189. See Allen, Saudis Blame, supra note 26, at 8 (citing VWTO officials on this point).
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Consider Algeria, which applied to join the GATT in June 1987, but is not yet a WTO
Member.1 9 It maintains a government monopoly on the production, sale, and export of
wine, and permits production of beer in both state-owned and private breweries. For al-
coholic beverage imports, Algeria uses a system of reference prices. In 2003, the National
People's Assembly attempted to enact an outright ban in these imports (via an amendment
to the 2004 budget bill), despite the admonition of the Finance Minister that accession
negotiations would be jeopardized. In the Algerian context, the logic against the ban is it
would be vulnerable to the charge of protectionism, that is, the real aim of the ban is to
insulate the government monopoly on wine from foreign competitors, and preserve lucra-
tive tax revenues on beer sales.
This logic does not apply to the Kingdom. From a strict Islamic perspective, with respect
to alcohol, pork, and pork products, this resolution is not satisfying. A tariff, even one set
at a very high rate, is not a ban. It remains technically lawful to import the product, as long
as the importer is willing to pay the tariff. That being so, it would be difficult for the
Kingdom to proclaim to the Muslim World it "bans" alcohol, pork, and pork products in
accordance with the Shari'a. Moreover, there might well be importers in the Kingdom
willing to pay, for example, a duty of 2,000 percent (or more) on alcoholic beverages from
abroad. In other words, the tariff is not "prohibitive," merely an expensive impediment.
Worse yet, the more expensive an impediment is, that is, the higher a duty rate, the greater
the incentive to avoid it by smuggling alcohol (or pork or pork products). Put differently,
an extraordinary tariff creates an extraordinary customs enforcement headache.
One resolution to this matter would be to urge the Kingdom to accept a distinction
between banning importation and banning consumption. Notwithstanding the practical
problem of encouraging a "black market," a "prohibitive" tariff would not alter the truly
key Islamic precept, which is not to consume alcohol, pork, or pork products. The problem
with this resolution is it may not be persuasive from a strict Islamic perspective, and it could
lead to a proverbial "slippery slope," that is, the presence of foreign alcoholic beverages,
pork, and pork products could encourage their consumption. Accordingly, the Kingdom
would do well to argue in its accession negotiations that alcohol, pork, and pork products
are immoral articles within the meaning of GATT article XX:(a).19' In other words, from
a strict Islamic perspective, why not urge that these products are no different from por-
nography? My point is not this argument is correct; rather, that it is neither reasonable nor
respectful to disregard it.92
That said, there is one appropriate rebuttal. The Kingdom's definition of "immoral ar-
ticle" could redound to its detriment in the future. The more expansive, or elastic, the
definition of this term, the greater the likelihood some other WTO Member may one day
ban an export from the Kingdom it dubs "immoral." Not surprisingly, some WTO Mem-
190. My discussion of the Algerian case is drawn from Lawrence Speer, Algerian Parliament's Approval of
Total Ban on Alcohol Imports May Threaten WTO Talks, 20 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1932, 1933 (Nov. 20, 2003).
See also Daniel Pruzin, WTO Members Discuss Accession of Algeria, Lebanon; Iraq Eeplores Membership Process, 20
Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA), 2079-80 (Dec. 18, 2003) (reporting the ban would expire at the end of 2004).
191. This provision authorizes derogations from GATT obligations "necessary to protect public morals,"
so long as the requirements of the chapeau to article XX also are met. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
Oct. 30, 1947, art. XX, 55 U.N.T.S. 187.
192. The United States may have done so as early as Oct. 2000. See Pruzin, U.S., EUPush, supra note 107,
at 1654 (reporting "[t]he Saudis have also taken offense at what they see as efforts by some WTO members to
force them to make commitments on the import of alcohol and pork products ...." (emphasis added)).
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bers feared a broad definition would create a precedent for import bans on religious or
moral grounds that were, in fact, protectionist abuses.' Consider four examples, all of
which are or could be shipped from the Kingdom: an iqal, a guttral (sometimes called a
"kaffia"), a thobe, and a Bedouin dagger. The first three items are articles of clothing typical
in the wardrobes of Saudi men, and the fourth item is common in Saudi souks as a souvenir.
Might a foreign country say terrorists don these clothes, and they and their garb are im-
moral? Might another country say a dagger is a weapon to which children ought not be
exposed? To be sure, the foreign country would have to ban these items in its own territory
(that is, not allow them to be manufactured there), and the ban on importing them would
have to be non-discriminatory (for example, apply to iqals from Jordan and daggers from
Yemen). Still, the Kingdom ought to think carefully about the elasticity of the definition of
"immoral article."
B. THE ZAKT TAx
The zakdt tax is the second issue relating to the Shari'a arising in the context of the
Kingdom's WTO accession negotiations. This "religious tax" is an Islamic obligation,
and the Third of the Five Pillars of Islam (the others being the recitation of the faith, or
shahada, daily prayer, as-salaam, the Ramadan fast, and the pilgrimage, or HI-ajj). The pro-
ceeds from zakdt collections are contributed to the poor. In brief, the zakdt "tax" is a form
of almsgiving.' 94
Philanthropy is its own justification, and the practice of corporate giving hardly needs
explaining in Kansas. Kansas City consistently ranks at the top of the list of American cities
measured by philanthropic and foundation giving, number of foundations and charitable
organizations, and volunteering. 95 However, in the American media the noble Islamic prac-
tice has been conflated with a good deal of adverse publicity about possible connections
between charitable foundations (known as waqfs), on the one hand, and funding terrorist
activities, on the other.196 To some degree, that conflation is unfortunate-not because there
never were any such links, but because there is another side to the story. The Financial
Action Task Force (FATF) of the Organization for Co-operation and Development (OECD)
reports that the Kingdom now has world-class laws to combat terrorist financing (including,
for example, banning cash collections at mosques and the transfer of charitable funds over-
seas without approval from the Foreign Ministry).97 Moreover, as the United Nations
Development Program duly notes in its Arab Human Development Report 2002, the Arab
193. See Pruzin, U.S., Others Urge Saudis, supra note 31, at 334 (discussing taboo goods); Pruzin, U.S.-EU
Push, supra notel07, at 1654 (also discussing taboo goods).
194. This discussion of zakat is drawn from BHALA, TRADE, DEVELOPMENT, AND SOCIAL. JUSTICE, supra note
19, at 172-75 (discussing almsgiving and zakit, and contrasting it with sadaqa, which is voluntary almsgiving);
HUSSAIN, supra note 188, at 169-70 (discussing zakdt and taxation).
195. See Patrick McLarney, What is Kansas City's Greatest Asset?, INGRAM'S, Dec. 2003, at 19 (mentioning
this statistic).
196. See, e.g., Glenn R. Simpson & John Carreyrou, Saudis GotFunding Warning, WA.LL ST.J.,Jan. 13, 2004,
at A4 (reporting that in 1994, the former French interior minister told rulers in the Kingdom of links between
charities and extremism). For an overview of the waqf see HUSSAIN, supra note 188, at 114-16, and for an in-
depth explanation, see chapter 19 of AsAF A.A. FYZEE, OtrrLINEs OF MUH.AMMADAN LAw (4th ed.1999). The
evolution of the waqf is treated in various parts of NJ. CouLsoN, A HISTORY OF ISLAMIC LAW (1964).
197. See Edward Alden, Saudis Meet Anti-Terror Finance Benchmarks, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 8, 2004, at 3 (dis-
cussing the FATF report on these laws).
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World is home to less abject poverty (defined as daily income of less than US$1.00) than
any other developing region. 98 The Economist rightly observed this fact "is in part a tribute
to Arab and Islamic traditions of charitable giving to the destitute." 9
In general, the zakdt contribution on the part of each Muslim is 2.5 percent of income,
with a deduction for essential needs of the individual and his family, and exceptions for
poor persons, or persons for whom payment would render them financially insecure or
bankrupt. Zakdt is expected of Muslim individuals and domestic business associations. The
amount to be contributed is calculated as 2.5 percent of the gross assets of the individual
or association, and typically it is paid before the end of the month of Ramadan.25 0 Thus, for
instance, cash, cattle and other farm animals, and real property, all would be considered
gross assets included in the "taxable asset base." Significantly, payment is expected of a
business association whether or not that entity earns a profit during the "tax period."
In the context of WTO accession, the issue posed by the zakdt is whether this tax runs
afoul of the national treatment obligation contained in article m: 1-2 of GATT, and possibly
also the equivalent provision in Article 2:1 of the TRIMs Agreement. 0 1 Depending on the
service commitments the Kingdom makes, specifically with respect to Mode I (FDI), a
national treatment issue also may arise under article XVII of the GATS. What, precisely,
is the possible incongruity? As a general matter, in all its textual manifestations, national
treatment demands equality of treatment, both in terms of procedural and substantive rules
(though not formally identical treatment). The multilateral trade law jurisprudence sur-
rounding this principle, particularly as it is manifest in GATT article III, dates from the
origins of the GATT itself in 1946-47. Through decisions of the WTO Appellate Body,
the case law on national treatment continues to evolve. Since the birth of the WTO on
January 1, 1995, the Appellate Body has issued major reports dealing with GATT article
M, most notably in Japan-Alcoholic Beverages and French--Asbestos.°2
Thus, while characterizing the large and growing body of national treatment law is risky,
suffice it for now to say the critical inquiry in any national treatment matter is about the
even-ness of the playing field on which imported goods (or services) and like domestic
products (or services) compete. That is, does the measure in question alter, in fact or po-
tentially, the conditions of competition between imported merchandise (or services) and a
like domestic product (or service)? (In the context of FDI, the question is put in terms of
198. See Self-Doomed to Failure, supra note 5, at 24-25 (discussing this Report).
199. Id.
200. By some anecdotal accounts, a higher rate (e.g., 12.5 percent) is expected from farms. Also by some
accounts, certain deductions are allowed from gross assets before reaching the taxable asset base. Discussions,
supra note 15.
201. Article 2:1 of the TRIMs Agreement states "no Member shall apply any TRIM that is inconsistent
with the provisions of article II ... of GATT." The first sentence of GATT article II:2 requires imported
products "shall not be subject, directly or indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in
excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products." The second sentence of GATT article
II:2, which applies to "directly competitive or substitutable product[s]" (as explained in the interpretative note,
at article mi, paragraph 2), forbids the application of "internal taxes or other internal charges to imported or
domestic products in a manner contrary to the principles set forth in" article 11: 1. In turn, article Im: 1 prohibits
"internal taxes and other internal charges, and laws, regulations, and requirements" affecting the sale, distri-
bution, or transportation of products, that "afford protection to domestic production." GATT art. In.
202. See Report of the Appellate Body, European Communities-MeasuresAffectingAsbestosandAsbestos-Containing
Products, WT/DS135/AB/R (adopted Apr. 5, 2001); Report of the Appellate Body Japan--Taxes on Akloholic Bev-
erages, WT/DS8/AB/R (adopted Nov. 1, 1996) (both available at http://www.wto.org).
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the competitive conditions affecting a foreign direct investor or service supplier and a do-
mestic company producing a like product or offering a like service.) The measure in ques-
tion for the Kingdom is the zakat tax.
If the zakdt tax were imposed on importers, and on foreign investors (and service sup-
pliers), then there would be no national treatment issue. To the contrary, all merchandise,
and all business associations, would be treated equally, as all would be asked to ante up the
2.5 percent contribution for charity. However, as a religiously based obligation, zakdt is
expected only of Muslims. Consequently, a foreign business association (or service supplier)
is not expected to pay the zakdt tax-only a Muslim entity, which in practice means only
domestic businesses. To be sure, foreign companies (and service suppliers) are obligated to
pay an income tax, and the rate is 30 percent, though it is being lowered to 25 percent.
Under the Kingdom's tax rules, that obligation is triggered only if the foreign entity makes
a profit, and they are entitled to carry over losses indefinitely into the future. Here, then,
is the potential national treatment problem: are foreign businesses (and service suppliers)
treated less favorably than their domestic competitors because they are subject to an income
tax, while their competitors bear a zakdt tax?
As a threshold point, the United States is well advised not to "attack" the zakdt tax,
whether in public or in private. Indeed, to do so would be nearly hypocritical. After its
defeat in the Foreign Sales Corporation case, whereby the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body
authorized retaliation by the EU of roughly $4 billion to counter America's unlawful tax-
based export subsidy, the United States surely is sensitive to attacks on "sovereign" domestic
tax matters. °3 Arguably, the sensitivity should be greater to the Kingdom's interest in pre-
serving the zakat scheme, because it is a matter of sacred law and has a bona fide charitable
purpose. However, aside from making its case to the media that "the Americans are trying
to interfere with the zakat tax," the Kingdom does have plausible legal arguments against
a challenge.
First, the Kingdom might urge the zakdt tax is more akin to an income (or direct) tax
than to an internal (or indirect) tax. If that were so, then GATPT article 111:1-2 would be
inapplicable, because it does not purport to reach income taxes. Any VWTO Member is at
liberty to maintain differential income taxation schemes for foreign and domestic businesses
(though to do so obviously can discourage FDI). Assuming the Kingdom was unsuccessful
in thwarting the application of the national treatment principle to the zakit tax, then it
could offer a second argument, namely, substantively equal treatment exists. To make this
argument, the Kingdom would have to show in practice that the tax burden is the same on
Muslim businesses and their foreign competitors. It also would have to show that there is
no potential for discrimination against the foreign businesses (and service suppliers). For proof
of both points, the Kingdom would need adequate financial data and expert testimony.5 4
What if neither argument works? Must the Kingdom scrap the zakat tax system? Abso-
lutely not. If the Kingdom were obliged to, then I would query whether the price of WTO
admission would be too high, because it would include destroying a Pillar of Islam. Rather,
the Kingdom's option would be to impose the same zakdt tax scheme on non-Muslim,
203. This case is excerpted and discussed in BHAs.A, INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE,
supra note 40, at 988-1008, and the authorized retaliation has been widely reported in The Financial Times and
International Trade Reporter.
204. By some anecdotal accounts, the zakat tax results in a higher burden on business associations in the
Kingdom than does the income tax on foreign business associations. Discussions, supra note 147.
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foreign business associations (and service suppliers). Foreign entities would pay it, as do
their domestic competitors, whether they make a profit or loss. The question for the King-
dom would be whether that response would be revenue neutral. Would imposing the zakat
tax on foreign businesses-and, presumably, simultaneously relieving them of the income
tax-result in a net loss in revenues to the treasury? If so, then absent corresponding cuts
in expenditures, the Kingdom would have to make up for the diminution.
C. PROBLEMATIC SERVICES
The third Sharia issue concerns market access for foreign service suppliers; specifically,
insurance companies and banks. As a general proposition, there is no Islamic legal precept
that would prohibit entry of these service suppliers from overseas into the Kingdom. To
the contrary, most, if not all, Muslim countries in the WTO permit-to one degree or
another, and with constraints varying from Member to Member-foreign insurance com-
panies and banks to offer services to their citizens. Indeed, Islamic financial engineering is
big business. At the 2003 International Islamic Finance Conference, the General Council
for Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions estimated Islamic banks and financial institu-
tions operating on Shari'a principles manage about $260 billion of assets, and another $200-
300 billion worth of assets are managed by the Islamic departments and subsidiaries of
international banks in financial centers like New York, London, and Tokyo.
0 5 The question,
then, under the Shari'a is what is the acceptable way to structure insurers and banks and,
even more importantly, the products they are permitted to offer?
With respect to structure, the Shari'a does not know the concept of a corporation, as a
legal person, in the Anglo-American legal sense.20 6 To be sure, the Shar'a provides for an
array of forms of business association, often akin to partnerships, and the generic Islamic
legal term for a partnership is "sharika" (also sometimes called a "shirka"). Essentially, a
sharika is a society involving joint association, that is, a general business association, and
each partner is called a "sharik." The general Islamic legal term for a "mercantile partner-
ship" is "sharikat 'akd," and there are various types of mercantile partnerships. In any mer-
cantile partnership, each partner owns a specified number of shares in the business.
07
The three most prominent types of business associations acknowledged by the Shari'a
are a mufawada, a sharikat 'inin, and a mudiraba.2 °8 In most instances, two partners are
205. See Drawing the Roadmap for Islamic Banking, BANKER MIDDLE EAST, Dec. 2003, 1 (mentioning these
statistics). See also Tom McCawley, Islam's Edicts, FAR E. EcoN. REv., Feb. 5, 2004, at 36-37 (reporting on the
growth in Islamic banking in Asia, and the opening of Islamic banking departments in multinational financial
institutions like the Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation).
206. This discussion of Islamic business association law is drawn from HUSSAiN, supra note 188, at 166-68,
178. SCHACHT, supra note 188, at 155-57.
207. In contrast, the general Islamic legal term for a partnership in which partners are joint owners is
"Sharikat mal." That is to say, it is possible under the Sharia to have a partnership in which the partners are
joint owners.
208. Among the other types of business associations contemplated by the Sbaria area sarikat al-sand'i'wal-
takabbul, a sharikat al-wujah, and a muzara'a. A sharikat al-sanai' wal-takabbul is a parmership among artisans
in the same line of business. The purpose is to pursue jointly a specific trade, or a series of allied trades. A
sbarikat al-wujfh is a credit cooperative. The partners do not contribute any capital to the business, but rather
pool the credit they have with lenders. The sharikat al-wujfh purchases goods by leveraging off of this pooled
credit, re-selling them immediately, and dividing up profits as per an agreed-upon ratio. A muzira'a (also called
a "musa t") is a special device for leasing agricultural land whereby profit-sharing is called for under the lease
contract.
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envisaged, though more than two are permissible. A mufa-wa4a is an unlimited mercantile
partnership, with each partner holding an equal share in the entity. Each partner has full
power to direct the affairs of the mufawada, and each partner is fully liable for the affairs
of each partner. All of the property of each partner, except for his food and clothing, and
that of his families, is engaged in the mufa-wada. All partners in a mufawada must be Muslim,
that is, it is not permissible to have a non-Muslim, or a dhimmi, as a partner.
A sharikat 'indn is a limited liability company. Each partner is responsible to third parties
for the transactions in which the partner has engaged. But, no partner is liable for the acts
of another partner. In fact, each partner has a right of recourse against the other partners,
up to the amount of the shares held by the first partner. Thus, unlike a mufwada, in a
sharikat 'indn, the partners can hold different amounts of shares. Consequently, partners
who do different amounts of work may receive portions of the profit commensurate with
their work. Also in contrast to a mufawada, which uses all of the assets of the partners except
for their food and clothes, a sharikat 'indn engages only the assets the partners choose to
bring into the business. Moreover, the partners can restrict the use of those assets to certain
kinds of transactions. Thus, the distribution of profits may be unequal not only because of
differing amounts of ownership stakes in the partnership, but also because it is rendered on
the basis of actual work, and assets contributed to that work, rather than just on initial
capital contributions.
The term "mudraba" is typically translated as a "sleeping" or "dormant" partnership.
Technically, a mudaraba is not a business association, but rather a fiduciary relationship,
that is, a relationship of trust, called an "amdna."209 Still, profits earned are split up as if a
mudaraba were a partnership. The mudaraba is of great practical significance because of its
use as a device to circumvent, in a lawful manner, the rule (discussed below) against ribi.
In a mudraba, the "sleeping partner" is called the "rabb al-mdl." (Frequently, this partner
is a bank contributing capital to the venture.) The sleeping partner is liable for any losses
incurred (up to its capital contribution), and receives a proportion, agreed upon in advance,
of any profits (but not a fixed return, as that would amount to ribd). The other partner (or
partners) is a (are) working partner(s), called "mu.drib." The mudaraba agreement specifies
in detail the sharing of expenses between the rabb al-mJ1 and working partner(s). As with
any business engagement, a mudaraba may experience profits in one year, but losses in
another year. The working partner does not bear any loss-again, that is for the sleeping
partner. Thus, if a loss occurs after a profitable year, then the mudraba behaves as if the
(non-existent) profit already had been distributed.
What relevance are these types of business association to the entry of foreign insurance
providers and banks? The short answer is that entry can be made through a structure
permissible under the Sharia. In other words, these types matter because they provide the
structure by which entry is both religiously and legally acceptable. From an American
perspective, it may be feared that these structures are a non-tariff barrier to entry of foreign
209. There are technical requirements to be followed in organizing a muo.raba. If they are not satisfied,
then the mudaraba is said to be "defective." In the event that the mudraba is defective in some way, the
arrangement is treated as a simple contract for the hire of services. Among these requirements are the three.
First, as suggested above, there should be no stipulation in the arrangement that a partner earns a fixed sum,
i.e., earnings should be specified in terms of a percentage of the profits. Second, it must be possible to determine
(calculate) the profit exactly. Third, there must be no stipulation that a working parmer bears the loss. Its only
downside risk is time and effort lost. See HUSSAIN, supra note 188. SCHACHT, supra note 188 at 155-57.
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insurers and banks. After all, one way to keep out foreign service providers is to negotiate
strict requirements they must satisfy for Mode IlI entry (FDI) into a sector or sub-sector.
From the Kingdom's perspective, however, using Sbarf'a business association rules are not
a veil for protectionism. Rather, to disrespect these structures, is to disrespect the Shar'a
itself.
Doubtless American trade negotiators have had to deal with business association laws of
countries in the civil law tradition, countries with inchoate and hybrid legal systems, and
countries with economies in transition from socialism to capitalism. It is no less important
to the Kingdom than in these other contexts that the United States defers to the interests
of the Kingdom with respect to the structure of foreign insurers and banks. Arguably, the
case of the Kingdom is more compelling than the others, because of the sacred character
of the Sbari'a in the eyes of Muslims.
The structure of a business association is, of course, about how an enterprise is permitted
to enter into the market of the Kingdom. To businessmen, what matters even more than
structure is what the enterprise can do once it is established in the Kingdom. Foreign
insurance companies would like to offer the full array of products they do in the United
States and other countries. That array includes life insurance, and non-life insurance prod-
ucts like real property, personal property, automobile, and casualty coverage, and insurance
for wages and pensions. Similarly, foreign banks would like to offer the vast array of com-
mercial and investment banking products they provide in the American and other markets.
Some of these financial products involve the charging or paying of interest. The key ques-
tion under the Sbari'a is whether some insurance and banking products are impermissible,
and hence cannot be offered by foreign (or domestic) providers.
As a general proposition, the Sharf'a forbids gambling.21° There are stated exceptions,
for example, for horse racing, or for tests of knowledge about the Qur'dn. Such exceptions
involve skill, not mere chance. Life insurance, and possibly also wage and pension insurance,
are analogous to gambling, as only God can know when a person will die, when his wages
will fall, or when his pension will lapse. Moreover, taking payments (premiums) from an
insured person for a policy can be unconscionable, particularly where no funds are returned
to the policyholder. Structuring an insurance carrier in a manner that contemplates the
return of at least some premiums paid is, therefore, necessary. In particular, insurers are to
operate according to the Islamic concept of cooperative insurance (takafid), "whereby re-
sources in a firm are pooled and policyholders act almost like shareholders, sharing in the
profits and paying into the pool in the event of losses."2'
As for banking products, it is widely appreciated the Shari'a forbids rihd, which while
typically translated as "interest," is more accurately considered excess (in the sense of unjust
enrichment), or usury.212 There are various devices (known as "biyar') for managing it-
that is, lawfully circumventing it-most notably, a muqdraba.213 In fact, the plethora of
210. See, e.g., HUSSAiN, supra note 188; SCHACHT, supra note 188 (all discussing the rules on games of hazard
and related insurance matters). By no means do I mean to suggest a complete analysis of the complex topic of
insurance products under the Sbaria.
211. Pruzin, Offiials Report, supra note 46.
212. See, e.g., HUSSAIN, supra note 188; NJ. Coulson, A History of Islamic Law 38-39, 41-46, 138-39 (1964)
(all explaining the meaning of the term and nature of the prohibition).
213. Generally, a hiyal device involves splitting an overall transaction, which would be forbidden, into sepa-
rate, distinct components, each one of which is permitted. See SCHACHT, supra note 188, at 200, 299; Tarek El
Diwany, Traveling the Wrong Road Patiently, BANKER MIDDLE E., Sept. 30, 2003, at 3.
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them prompted one Islamic law expert to bemoan "[w]e have arrived at a financial won-
derland in which there exists an Islamic equivalent to almost all the major products of the
interest-based sector, with quantitative and qualitative features that are frequently indistin-
guishable from them."'1 4 His concern is the decreasing distinction between conventional
and Islamic banking renders the latter an un-Islamic system of money creation, which "is
a sin that requires interest-based lending in order to make it profitable."' The "sin" is the
replacement of a true profit-sharing basis of lending with a search for fixed rate returns.'1 6
Obviously, it is for the Kingdom to decide the insurance and banking products that may
be offered in its market, and the manner in which they are to be offered. Here, again, the
United States risks offending Sbarf'a principles. The Kingdom is (and has been for years)
open to foreign providers of health care insurance.2' 7 But, at least as early as October 2000,
the United States began pressuring the Kingdom to allow foreign insurers to offer life
insurance and pension services.2 18 In early and mid 2004, the American insurance giant AIG
reportedly
expressed concern that [it] might be hindered from continuing to offer insurance services in
Saudi Arabia because its existing operations there are not completely in line with the new
cooperative insurance requirements [of the Kingdom, found in a new insurance law and two
implementing decrees allowing for provision of insurance services]. 2' 9
Would AIG demand its special position be grandfathered (as it had in the case of the
Chinese WATO accession talks, resulting in a delay in those talks), notwithstanding the
possibility that if it "won," it hardly would endear itself to prospective devout Muslim
policyholders?22°
To be sure, from an economic standpoint, there is little wrong with encouraging the
Kingdom to open its insurance and banking markets to products that could benefit its
citizens. But, economic logic and religious principle often interact. Aggressive negotiating
demands about foreign insurance companies and banks offering a full array of products,
insensitive to the Islamic issues some of the products they raise are (to say the least) dis-
respectful. From a religious perspective, surely the Kingdom is well-advised to resist in-
appropriate compromises.22" '
V. Argument #3: How Concerned About Comparative
Advantage?
"[T]he [VVTO] accession will produce both winners and losers with no particular fate as-
sured .... Joining the Organization is not the ultimate goal. It is only a way to a higher goal.
214. Diwany, supra note 213.
215. Id. at 3.
216. Id.
217. See Pruzin, U.S., EU Push, supra note 107 (mentioning this point).
218. See id. (observing "the United States is keen to see the Saudis open the sector further to life insurance
and pension services" (emphasis added)).
219. Pruzin, Officials Report, supra note 46. See also Saudi Officials Arrive, supra note 172 (mentioning the
issue).
220. See Pruzin, Officials Report, supra note 46 (discussing the AIG controversy).
221. See Pruzin, U.S., Others Urge Saudis, supra note 31 (noting the Saudi prohibition on certain lifeinsurance
services "on religious grounds"); Pruzin, U.S., EUPusb, supra note 107 (stating "[t]he Saudis ... are balking,
arguing that the insurance restrictions are justified on religious grounds").
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Our process, after full VTO membership, should be guided by only one credo: We need to
have a clear and controlled process in order to increase our gains from global trade."
Wabib Binzagr, prominent Saudi businessman, September 2003.222
A. THE PETROLEUM SECTOR AND OPEC
The Kingdom's participation in the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
(OPEC) seems an unlikely WTO issue, but for the fact that in 2000, the Chairman of the
Senate Finance Committee made one of it.221 In fact, Senator Charles E. Grassley (R-Iowa)
nearly single handedly raised the price of V/TO admission in February 2000. Until that
point, the Finance Committee Chairman had supported the Kingdom's entry, but switched
to adamant opposition because of what he claimed was the Kingdom's "pivotal role" in
causing world oil prices to rise224 (never mind the possibility of the Senator being unper-
turbed by a rise in the world market price of crops grown in Iowa).
Senator Grassley's focus was on the effect on Iowa farmers of higher diesel fuel and
petrol costs, which he said had been rising since March 1999 due to an OPEC agreement
to cut oil output and eliminate world excess supply.25 These increases essentially were a
"harsh duty" on American farmers of corn, soybeans, and other crops.2 6 The farmers faced
a devil's choice. They could pass on the higher input costs by raising the price of their
output, which would make that output less competitive on world markets. Or, they could
suffer the income loss if they did not pass on the higher cost. Disregarding the fact American
corn and soybean farmers were not alone in facing this choice, the cost hikes applied on a
most-favored nation basis. Blame had to be put somewhere, so why not the Kingdom and
OPEC?
To be fair, American leaders were not alone in wondering about the impact of the King-
dom's accession on its OPEC dealings.227 Early on in discussions about joining the WTO,
a fundamental and not altogether cynical question was posed by leading Saudi public and
private sector officials: why join the WTO, if it is an exporter's club, and if the Kingdom
has little to boast in the way of exports other than petroleum (that is, oil), petroleum
products, and natural gas? This question still resonates in influential circles in the Kingdom.
It has to, because the petroleum sector accounts for 34 percent of the Kingdom's GDP,
222. Mahmoud Sabbagh, WTO: Information Gap Blamed on Officials, Economists, AFAs NEws, Sept. 7, 2003,
at 1-2.
223. OPEC consists of eleven countries: Algeria, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela. See the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries at http:II
www.opec.org (last visited Sept. 20, 2004). Of these countries, six are members of the WTO; Indonesia, Kuwait,
Nigeria, Qatar, United Arab Emirates, and Venezuela. See World Trade Organization web site, at http://
www.wto.org. According to OPEC, its objective is to "coordinate and unify petroleum policies amongMember
Countries, in order to secure fair and stable prices for petroleum producers; an efficient, economic and regular
supply of petroleum to consuming nations; and a fair return on capital to those investing in the industry." See
OPEC, History, at http://www.opec.org (last visited Sept. 20, 2004).
224. See Daniel Prnzin, Sen. Grassley Opposes Saudi Arabia's Entry into WTO because of Role in Gas Price Hike,
17 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 372 (Mar. 2, 2000) (quoting the Senator).
225. See id. (recounting the Senator's views).
226. See id. (quoting the Senator).
227. To be clear, there is no publicly available information to support the proposition that OPEC countries
that hold membership in the WTO have reduced their participation in OPEC because of participation in the
WTO.
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which is less than the percentage 20 years ago-then it was 66 percent.22 Yet, the oil sector
still gives the Kingdom roughly 75 percent of its government revenues, and 85 percent of
its export earnings.129 In brief, now and for the foreseeable future, oil is its "life blood."230
At the root of the question about oil and multilateral tariff concessions is the fact (or
apparent reality) that since GATT entered into force on January 1, 1948, there has been a
tacit bargain among the GAIT contracting parties, and since January 1, 1995, among the
WTO Members, not to subject oil and natural gas to multilateral tariff concession nego-
tiations."' Yet, already, the Kingdom has set forth in writing its views that the Members
ought to consider at least some aspects of global oil trade. That is one illustration of positive
contributions by the Kingdom to the development of multilateral trade law and policy.
Pursuant to Paragraph 32(i) of the November 2001 Doha Ministerial Declaration con-
cerning negotiations on trade and the environment, in September 2002, the Kingdom cir-
culated a paper on taxes imposed by developed countries on energy sources. The paper
brought to light two key points: (1) the negative economic effects on poor countries of
taxes imposed by rich countries on the carbon content of fuels; and (2) the discrimination
in tax regimes of rich countries in favor of polluting energy sources. 232 On the first point,
the Kingdom showed in its paper that taxes in countries in the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) aimed at limiting carbon emissions inflict signifi-
cant losses (measured in terms of GDP declines) on oil-exporting developing countries. On
the second point, the Kingdom stressed the bias against oil and petroleum products created
by differential fossil fuel taxes in OECD countries, as well as by their subsidies for coal and
nuclear energy.
Unfortunately, the Kingdom's paper met with little response from the major trading
powers in the WTO. Logically, therefore, public and private sector officials in the Kingdom
ask, what market access benefits would the Kingdom obtain for its prize commodity by
joining the WTO, if there is an unwritten, unspoken deal to allow oil importing countries
to tax oil as they please, both at and after the border?
The short answer is "none." As long as oil importers seek to preserve their sovereignty
over oil consumption patterns, through the policy device of taxes of one form or another,
neither the Kingdom nor any other oil-exporting country will benefit from MFN tariff
commitments bound under GATT Article II in the Schedules of Concessions of oil im-
porting WTO Members. Indeed, it is inconceivable that in WTO accession negotiations
the Kingdom could have successfully demanded a roll back of this historic preserve of oil
importing countries. How, then, could the Kingdom respond?
Arguably, and speaking metaphorically, it needs to draw two lines in the sand: one for
oil, and the second for natural gas. First, the Kingdom, together with other OPEC mem-
bers, ought not to compromise on OPEC activities. They share a comparative advantage
228. See Al-Ammari, supra note 7, at 1 (mentioning these statistics).
229. See id. See also Enter the Saudis?, EcoNoMiST, May 17, 1997, at 82, 83 (reporting 40 percent of the
Kingdom's GDP, sevety-five percent of its government revenue, and ninety percent of its export revenue, came
from state-owned oil and chemical industries).
230. See Pruzin, Saudi WTO Accession, supra note 45 (quoting the Minister of Commerce).
231. Weaponry is the other major internationally traded commodity left off the tariff negotiating table.
232. The paper is summarized in Daniel Pruzin, Saudi Arabia Warns of Economic Impact from Developed
Countries' Carbon Taxes, 19 Int'l Trade Rep.(BNA) 1713 (Oct. 3, 2002). I draw on this account and on Dec.
2003 discussions with senior Saudi officials in Dhahran. Discussions, supra note 15.
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in the petroleum industry, they exploit it to their advantage through OPEC, and-from
their perspective-their sovereign interests lie in continuing this arrangement. Second, the
Kingdom ought not to surrender its comparative advantage on natural gas prices.
As for the first line in the sand, if the Kingdom cannot compel oil importers to bind
tariffs oil and subject oil as a commodity to GATT disciplines, then it ought not to be
subject to trade law constraints on its OPEC activities. The obvious difficulty arises because
of OPEC production quotas, which are set periodically by the OPEC members to influence
world price and quantity figures. These country-specific quotas call for restraints by each
OPEC member on exports of petroleum. GATT Article Xl: 1 contains a prophylactic ban
on quantitative restrictions that typically is thought of the context of imports. However, it
also applies to export limitations. What exception to this ban exists for the Kingdom and
its OPEC quotas?
There are three answers, custom, text, and special and differential treatment. The King-
dom can rely on the custom in accession negotiations involving oil exporting countries, at
least the most recent OPEC members to join the WATO-Qatar in 1996, and the United
Arab Emirates, also in 1996. In those deals, OPEC quotas appear not to have been raised
by the WTO Working Group, or in bilateral accession negotiations, at least not in an
explicit manner that imposed restraints on the OPEC activities of the acceding countries.2
Were the Kingdom's activities to be scrutinized more harshly than its predecessors in
OPEC, surely the reasonable response would be to press why it is singled out for unique
treatment.
The text of GAT itself contains the second answer, namely, a provision helpful to the
Kingdom. Article XX:(g) concerns the conservation of exhaustible natural resources. Like
article Xl: 1, it normally is thought of in terms of import limitations, yet both are applicable
to export restraints. Surely oil qualifies as an "exhaustible natural resource," and arguably,
a country-specific export restraint allocated by an international commodity organization
ought to fit within the listed exception in article XX paragraph (g). To be sure, applying
the jurisprudence of the WTO Appellate Body would not be the end of the legal inquiry.
The Kingdom would need to show its production and export quotas not only fit within the
exception, but also satisfy the criteria of the chapeau to article XX, namely, the quotas are
neither "a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination," nor "a disguised restriction
on international trade."
The third response to foreign pressure on the Kingdom and its OPEC activities arises
from the concept of special and differential treatment. No, the Kingdom does not enter
the WTO as a developing country. It sought this status early on in the accession negotia-
tions. But, it backed away from this demand in the late 1990s in the face of stiff resistance
from the United States and other countries. However, GATT article XX:(h) contains a
limited exception for international commodity agreements (that satisfy a review by the
IATO Members). True, it may seem better suited for products like coffee or cocoa from
countries like Colombia or Ghana than for petroleum from well-off Gulf states. However,
the Kingdom could still offer a plausible argument that many people within OPEC coun-
tries are poor, and without the careful management of the world's oil markets through
233. Discussions, supra note 15.
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supply-side constraints, those people would be considerably worse off. Adding they could
fall prey to extremist, violent messages would make the argument yet more poignant.
B. A WORD ON GATS AND ENERGY SERVICES
Before drawing the second line in the sand, on natural gas, a brief digression on a little-
publicized matter-energy services-is worthwhile. Among the many efficiency-based rea-
sons for the Kingdom joining the VeTO any international trade law teacher can trot out
(for example, increased market access for exports, improved competitiveness and the real-
ization of comparative advantages through production specialization, increased FDI and
technology flows, and improved consumer welfare resulting from expanded choices of
goods and services at lower prices), a legal rationale stands out as pre-eminent. It is the
ongoing potential to shape the broad contours, and specific details, of a rules-based system.
It is not just the benefit from greater certainty and predictability afforded by the GATS
and VVTO legal texts, the adjudication of disputes about provisions in these texts via set
procedures by VeTO panels and the Appellate Body, or the enforceability of adjudicatory
rulings through, if necessary, trade retaliation.3 4 It is also the influence on amending old,
and making new, laws by being in the arena in which they are crafted.
It is unlikely that there is an example of this potential more relevant to the Kingdom
than energy services. Presently, no comprehensive system exists in the GATS for classifying
the energy services sector and its many sub-sectors. Rather, these services come under three
disparate and incomplete sub-sector headings: 35
" Pipeline transportation of fuels
" Services incidental to energy distribution
" Services incidental to mining
Yet, energy services involve a far broader array of activities than these three sub-sectors
cover.
These services include nearly every transaction, from development to delivery, such as
upstream oil and gas exploration, mapping, drilling, construction and operation, transpor-
tation (through oil tankers at sea and trucks by road, and by pipeline), storage (in tanks),
building and maintaining power plants, distribution, marketing, auditing, and metering.
Depending on the particular transaction, energy services may be provided through cross-
border supply (known as "Mode I" in the GATS scheme, for example, where an engineering
firm in Kansas provides a study for a company in the Kingdom), by a commercial presence
(that is, FDI, known as "Mode III," for example , Royal Dutch Shell investing in a joint
venture project in the Kingdom), or from the temporary movement of persons (that is,
234. See Raj Bhala & Lucienne Attard, Austin's Ghost and DSU Reform, 37 INT'L LAw. 651 (Fall 2003)
(evaluating the WTO Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes according to
the strict legal positivist criterion of what "law" is as laid down by John Austin).
235. See World Trade Organization, Services Trade, available at http://www.wto.org/tratop-e/serv-e/
serv-e.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2004). With respect to mining, the Kingdom has gold, phosphates, aluminum,
copper, and zinc. Ma'aden is the major mining business in the Kingdom. It is approximately six years old, and
may be privatized in the future. The bulk of the minerals it mines (including about ninety percent ofphosphates
and aluminum) are exported. Discussions, supra note 15.
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business immigration, known as "Mode IV," for example, where a business in the Kingdom
hires employees from overseas).23 6
The lack of a unified, distinct, and commercially sensible classification framework for
energy services may be one reason for the slow progress of multilateral negotiations on
liberalizing trade in these services. As of November 2003, eight WTO Members offered
proposals for a classification system: Canada, Chile, Cuba, EU, Japan, Norway, United
States, and Venezuela. Their proposals could lead to a VITO reference paper on energy
services, which in turn could be a road map for liberalization in this sector. With their large
energy services markets, only Russia and Iran (both outside the WTO), and Mexico (which
acceded to the GATS in 1986), come close to the Kingdom as being a noteworthy omission
from this list of authoring countries.237
The American (and, to a lesser degree, the EU) proposal are for a definition of "Energy
Services" that would embrace all transactions, and it also boasts an Index for the Classifi-
cation of Energy Services.2 13 Thus, the American proposal covers all activities, from "up-
stream" endeavors like exploration, to downstream functions like marketing. In brief, the
236. Consumption abroad, or "Mode H," is not as relevant to energy services as the other three modes of
delivery. An example would be where an individual travels to the Kingdom to consume a service therein.
It is worth adding that negotiations to define energy services sub-categories are only the first step towards
the no less difficult talks about liberalizing trade in these services. Once that second step is taken, undoubtedly
disputes about interpreting the length and breadth of sub-categories, and the precise nature and timing of
concessions, will follow. Even the United States, with a large and sophisticated team of trade negotiators
sometimes runs into difficulty, as its dispute with Antigua over online gambling illustrates.
In 2003, Antigua and Barbuda challenged American federal, state, and local measures blocking the cross
border provision of gambling and betting services. These services happened to be provided from Antigua, and
Antigua experienced a decline in just two years (2001-03) in the number of its service providers from over 100
to around thirty-six. The United States argued that the WTO services sectoral classification list, which in
chapter 10.0 contains a category for "sporting and other recreational services," does not encompass online
gambling. If true, then the United States could not have made a commitment under the GATS to liberalize
trade in these services, and its restrictions do not violate the GATS. See Daniel Pruzin, U.S. Loses Preliminary
IVTO Ruling on Review of Gambling Restrictions, 20 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1883, 1884 (Nov. 13, 2003); Daniel
Pruzin, WTO Sets Up Panel at Antigua's Request to Rule on U.S. Online Gambling Restrictions, 20 Int'l Trade Rep.
(BNA) 1382 (Aug. 14, 2003).
The American trade negotiators might have avoided the controversy either by clarifying this definition during
GATS negotiations, or by stating in the services schedule for the United States words to the effect "Unbound"
(meaning no commitments are made in the category) or "None, except for online gambling services" (meaning
no limits are imposed on foreign service providers, except for the restrictions set forth). However, my point is
not to criticize them, but rather emphasize if they occasionally slip up, then afortiori the Kingdom will, too,
as it participates in WA/TO affairs.
237. A number of articles have appeared in The Financial Times and International Trade Reporter (BNA) on
the WTO accession negotiations for Russia, and I have written elsewhere on American policy toward the
accession of Iran. See Raj Bhala, Poverty, Islam, and Doha, 36 INT'L LAW. 159, 184 (Spring 2002). With respect
to Mexico's GATT accession, see htp://www.wto.org/english/thewto-e/countries-e/mexico-e.htm (post-
ing information about this accession). As for the Kingdom, its energy services market is lucrative. It is projected
to spend as much as $40 billion on energy services between 2003 and 2007. Discussions, supra note 15.
238. The EU proposal identifies eight specific energy services sub-sectors:
Services related to exploration and production.
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American proposal urges the combination of many sub-sectors into the single Energy Ser-
vices sector. In contrast, the Venezuelan proposal is circumspect. It distinguishes between
"core" and "non-core" energy services, and identifies certain upstream and downstream
activities that are core services. The Venezuelan proposal also differs from the American
(and EU) proposal in the way it disaggregates energy services into sub-sectors.
These contrasting approaches to defining "Energy Services" and classifying sub-sectors
in that definition reflect dramatically different commercial impulses. The Americans would
like businesses, such as Bechtel, Exxon, and Halliburton, to enjoy the broadest possible
access to the widest array of energy services markets in the Kingdom. After all, these com-
panies are world-class, even dominant, competitors in many energy services markets. In
contrast, the Venezuelan proposal reflects the commercial interests of energy-producing,
energy-exporting countries in the developing world. Under it, liberalization commitments
in GATS negotiations would be made in narrowly-defined sub-sectors. Consequently, the
negotiating dynamic created by the Venezuelan proposal would empower Venezuela to
preserve its sovereign right to grant limited market access to a select few foreign industries
and companies. The proposal might also increase the prospects for Venezuela to make
use of provisions in the GATS affording special and differential treatment to developing
countries.
Consider each approach from the perspective of the Kingdom. The American commer-
cial impulse could mean challenging the exclusive access of the Kingdom's flagship enter-
prise, Saudi Aramco, to the oil and gas infrastructure in the Kingdom, by calling upon the
Kingdom to grant third-party access to pipelines, storage facilities, and terminals. Were the
expansive American definition of "Energy Services" incorporated into the law of the GATS,
then the Kingdom would be on the defensive in future multilateral negotiations on energy
services trade. The Kingdom would have to choose between: (1) making all-encompassing
liberalization concession, which might put too much competitive pressure on its businesses,
and might infuriate constituencies in the Kingdom concerned about protecting sovereign
natural resources; and (2) making no concession at all, which might exasperate the Amer-
icans. In contrast, were the disaggregated, sub-sector approach embodied in the Venezuelan
approach to become the basis for classifying energy services, then the Kingdom would have
an easier time of making deliberate, calibrated concessions in specific markets.
This is not to imply the American strategy "reeks of neo-colonialism," and the Vene-
zuelan one "suffers from protectionism." Rather, I wish to highlight only the stakes asso-
ciated with WTO Membership. Sitting on the sidelines of a WTO debate on these pro-
posals is manifestly unwise. The specter of having to accept a WTO reference paper on
energy services-particularly one embodying the American approach-might not be in the
best interests of all energy-exporting countries. To put it bluntly, surely the Kingdom could
not be comfortable being represented by Venezuela (with respect!) to negotiate rules cov-
ering the key services sector in the Kingdom's economy.
* De-commissioning facilities and fuel
* Other related services
For the EU proposal, see http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/doclib/docs/2003/december/tradoc- 113105.pdf.Possibly,
the EU proposal is less elegant than the American one, in that it is neither as straightforward nor as holistic.
However, a fair comparison is difficult, because the American proposal is not posted on either the Web site of
the WTO or the United States Trade Representative, nor is it otherwise readily available.
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C. THE NATURAL GAs SECTOR AND FEED STOCK PRICING
As intimated above, the second line in the sand concerns natural gas, specifically, the
pricing of natural gas products.23 9 From the Kingdom's perspective, it ought to be clear to
the world trade community that the Kingdom will not be robbed of its comparative advan-
tage in providing such products cheaply-on a non-discriminatory basis-to businesses
that use them as "feed stock" (that is, raw materials, or inputs) in a finished good.
Methane and ethane are particularly important natural gas products in the Kingdom. 2 °
Methane is used as fuel for plants, such as petrochemical plants, power plants, and desali-
nation plants. Ethane is feed stock for other products. Typically, ethane is processed through
a methane-powered petrochemical plant to make end products. The Kingdom specializes
in "mid stream" petrochemical products, such as sheets and pellets of plastic, which the
Kingdom exports, for example, to China, where they are used in finished products. Ethane
is preferable to natural gasoline as a feedstock, in part because its productivity is superior,
in the sense that more output is possible from the same unit quantity of input. The pet-
rochemical industry is notable in the Kingdom, with the Kingdom accounting for roughly
ten to fourteen percent of global industry output.
41
Like oil, natural gas products are priced in U.S. dollars. The price at which methane and
ethane are sold in the Kingdom is seventy-five cents per million British thermal unit
(mbtu). 42 This price is offered to all buyers, whether foreign or Saudi business associations.
The Kingdom does not export methane or ethane. Interestingly, ethane is considered a
superior gas to methane, as ethane is "gas rich," whereas methane is "plain gas" and, there-
fore, can be used only for powering plants. The difference suggests that ethane ought to
be priced higher than methane. Significantly, the seventy-five cent per mbtu price is cheaper
than methane and ethane in other foreign countries. Therein lies a source of comparative
advantage for the Kingdom. It can provide these natural gas products to businesses oper-
ating in the Kingdom that need them as an input into mid-stream or finished products.
Unfortunately for the Kingdom, the United States (along with the EU) have focused on
this source of comparative advantage with a view to lessening, if not eradicating, it.243 The
239. The term "natural gas" refers to gas that occurs naturally in a gaseous state, and it may be "associated"
in that it comes from or with oil, "unassociated" in that it is unconnected with oil. Methane (Cl), also sometimes
called "sales gas," and ethane (C2) are the two kinds of natural gas. In addition, there are three natural gas
liquids (or NGL), which as their name suggests, occur naturally in a liquid form, namely, propane (C3), butane
(C4), and natural gasoline (C5). These five natural gas products represent a spectrum of weights, or more
specifically, density (which is mass divided by volume). Methane is the lightest and natural gasoline is the
heaviest. Discussions, supra note 15.
240. Two other natural gas products, propane and butane are sold locally to gas companies, which put them
in cylinders used by Saudi households for cooking. Id.
241. The Kingdom's single, state-owned petrochemical enterprise is the Saudi Arabian Basic Industries
Corporation (SABIC). See Enter the Saudis?, ECONOMIST, May 17, 1997, at 82, 83. SABIC is a holdingcompany
with roughly two to three wholly-owned subsidiaries, and four to five joint ventures with foreign companies
like Exxon and Shell. Seventy percent of the shares of SABIC are held by the Saudi government, and thirty
percent are in private hands and tradeable. Discussions, supra note 15.
242. This price is as of December 2003.
243. It was reported that the terms of the bilateral deal with the EU include a clause in which the Kingdom
"agreed to end its practice of selling gas at cheaper rates to domestic businesses than to the world market."
Tobias Buck, EU Deal Likely to Smooth Saudi Path to WTO Entry, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 1, 2003, at 5. The EU
Trade Commissioner, Pascal Lamy, declared: "We particularly value the decision that Saudi Arabia has taken
... to eliminate a number of obstacles to international trade like ... the dual pricing ofgas product." Quoted in
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major powers argue that the Kingdom should charge a higher price than seventy-five cents
per mbtu, which supposedly would correspond to a world market price, and as long as it
does not, the Kingdom is providing a subsidy of sorts. They seem to suggest a price between,
say, $1.50 and $2.50 per mbtu would be appropriate.
Aside from the fact that there is no single world market price for methane or ethane,
there are three major weaknesses in this argument. First, the Kingdom offers the same price
for natural gas products to all prospective buyers on a non-discriminatory basis. That is,
Saudi and foreign businesses operating in the Kingdom face the same cost for methane and
ethane. Second, this offer is not specific to any particular industry. Rather, any business
using methane to power its plants, and any business using ethane in its production process,
is offered the same price. The first two points suggest the Kingdom is not providing an
unlawful subsidy to domestic production.
Third, the Kingdom does not export methane or ethane. Thus, there should not be an
issue as to whether it subsidizes exports of these products. Furthermore, there should not
to be an issue concerning "dual pricing," because the Kingdom does not charge differential
prices for natural gas products shipped domestically and overseas. If these points indeed
are defects in an American (and European) effort to compel the Kingdom to raise natural
gas prices, then that effort is nothing more than an attack on precisely what the Kingdom
should always defend, and what David Ricardo would insist on-comparative advantage.
Indeed, reducing or defeating this comparative advantage could well be what the United
States, EU, and other major powers have in mind. The suggested price of $1.50 to $2.50
per mbtu would represent at least a 100 percent increase in methane and ethane costs to
businesses in the Kingdom. The higher price, apparently, would correspond to the price
for those products in other countries, for example, businesses in Europe. To the extent this
motive underlies the trade law of the major powers, and to the extent it lacks a compelling
justification, it should to be challenged. Put bluntly, the Kingdom should never give away
at the negotiating table the, few comparative advantages it has, which the major powers
cannot earn through hard work in the market place or cannot obtain because of the geo-
graphic distribution of natural gas reserves.2-
Robert Bailey, Rules of Engagement, GULF Bus., Nov. 5, 2003, at 2. See also Pruzin, WTO Working Party, supra
note 150, at 1763, 1764 (stating a WTO Working Party report noted "the Saudis amended legislation in
February 2002 allowing for discriminatory pricing of energy for domestic and foreign consumption and ...
the policy of dual pricing no longer exists"). However, I noted disagreements about the accuracy of this char-
acterization. Discussions, supra note 15.
244. Resistance on methane and ethane price hikes may be difficult because of a concession the Kingdom
apparently made on pricing the other natural gas products. Reportedly, with respect to propane, butane, and
natural gasoline, the Kingdom's past practice was to sell these products to any business (domestic or foreign)
at thirty percent below the lowest (i.e., best) market price in the world. See Enter the Saudis?, EcoNoMsIST, May
17, 1997, at 83, 84 (reiterating the complaint of European chemical firms that the Saudi Arabian Basic Industries
Corporation (SABIC) "is, in effect, subsidized because it is guaranteed gas feedstock (the basic ingredient of
petrochemicals) at thirty percent below world prices"). The EU complained about this practice, and apparently
the Kingdom agreed to a commercial, market based formula for pricing these products. That formula is based
on the price of these products in the cheapest market, with a deduction for transportation costs to that market.
For example, if the best price for butane were in Japan, then the price of butane in the Kingdom would be
computed on the basis of the price of butane injapan, minus the cost of transporting butane from the Kingdom
to Japan. The difficulty with this formula is the major trading powers could confront the Kingdom with the
argument that it is not substantively different than its former practice of choosing the lowest price in the world,
and subtracting a thirty percent discount. However, the precedent of a market-based formula leading to higher
natural gas product prices already may have been set.
VOL. 38, NO. 3
SAUDI ARABIA, THE WTO, AND AMERICAN TRADE LAW AND POLICY 807
Possibly, another motive lurks within American (and EU) trade officials. They may be
pursuing (whether they admit it or not, or even whether consciously appreciate it or not)
a "divide and conquer" strategy with respect to the Saudis and Russians.2 4 Businesses op-
erating in Russia benefit from inexpensive natural gas feed stock prices. If the United States
persuades the Saudis to raise their methane and ethane prices, then it could use that con-
cession as a precedent in VTO accession negotiations with Russia.24 The reverse scenario
also could be true. Indeed, in May 2004, Russia signed a bilateral accession accord with the
EU in which it agreed to double the prices of domestic gas to industrial companies by 2010,
in exchange for the EU dropping a challenge to the export monopoly held by the state
owned gas group, Gazprom. Specifically, Russia promised to set domestic gas prices based
on the sum of: (1) cost of production; (2) profit; and (3) investment, leading to a range of
$49 to $57 per thousand cubic meters of gas by the end of the decade.2 47 Of course, these
kinds of concessions potentially work to the detriment of American (and EU) businesses
operating in the Kingdom and Russia, which-like their Saudi and Russian counterparts-
benefit from inexpensive feedstock.
D. AGRICULTURE AND MARKET AcCESS2 4 s
In debating "why join the WTO if the Kingdom's chief export is not the subject of trade
negotiations," and in considering how to respond to foreign pressure on the Kingdom's oil
and natural gas policies, the Kingdom might do well to draw a third line in the sand. It
should to resist subjecting its infant industries to potentially ruinous competition from
overseas products. After all, as highlighted at the outset and suggested throughout, "[t]he
challenge for Saudi Arabia is... to generate economic growth outside of the oil sector and
to secure a steady rise in the standard of living of the Saudi people."
2 49
245. See, e.g., Anna Raff, Russian Offuial Questions Need for Gas Overbaul, WALL ST. J., Jan. 13, 2004, at Al2
(stating "the European Union, which says Russia's low gas prices at home represent a subsidy to industry, has
made gas-market liberalization a condition for entry to the World Trade Organization," and quoting the
Russian Prime Minister, Mikhail Kasyanov, that the government may reverse its policy of raising natural gas
prices "so that Russia's economy could enjoy its natural competitive advantage-cheap natural resources");
Pruzin, WTO Working Party, supra note 150, at 1763, 1764 (explaining the EU position, namely, "dual pricing
provides an unfair advantage to locally based firms and has been pushing for a similar concession from Russia,
so far without success").
246. According to the account rendered by the EU, the Kingdom agreed in its bilateral accord with the EU
to end its double-pricing scheme in the natural gas sector, and also drop exclusions of foreign companies from
the energy sector. See the web site of the Directorate General of Trade of the European Commission, available
at http://www.europa.eu.int/comnm/trade/issues/bilateral/regions/gcc/pr010 903.htm (last visited Sept. 20, 2004).
247. See Andrew Jack, Russia and EUAgree Terms for WTO Entry, FIN. TIMes, May 22 -23, 2004, at 5. The
other concessions made by Russia in its bilateral accord with the EU include (1) cutting tariffs to no more than
eight percent on industrial goods, eleven percent on fishery products, and thirteen percent on agricultural
commodities, and (2) opening the financial, telecommunications, and transportation services market to foreign
companies. See id.
248. See the web site of the Saudi Arabian General Investment Agency available at http://www.sagia.gov.sa.
CIA FACTBOOK, supra note 2.
249. AI-Ammari, supra note 7, at 1.
At the risk of sounding melodramatic, the efforts of a major trading power to thwart emerging competitive
advantages in a smaller country, in order to protect one of its own declining industries, should never to be
underestimated. Consider, for example, the April 2003 textile and apparel agreement signed by the United
States and Vietnam, contemporaneously with Vietnam's WTO accession process. Notwithstanding the duty-
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Unfortunately, to inquire "what can the Saudis export except oil?" is to invite sarcastic
comments or hopeless expressions. Those reactions are unlikely to be from individuals
familiar with the Kingdom's efforts in the agricultural sector, particularly those people who
have visited leading agricultural companies in the Kingdom. True, agriculture does not
loom large in the Kingdom's economy, which is not surprising given its harsh, desert climate
with limited arable land and water resources. By sectoral composition, the Kingdom's
GDP is 51.2 percent industry, 43.6 percent services, and 5.2 percent agriculture, and by
occupation, 25 percent of its labor force is employed in industry, 63 percent in services,
and 12 percent in agriculture. 250 However, there are agricultural products into which the
Kingdom is diversifying and can continue to do so if trade liberalization occurs at a
reasonable pace.
Presently, the Kingdom's major agricultural output consists not only of dates, but also
of chickens, mutton, citrus, melons, tomatoes, eggs, and milk.251 In fact, the Kingdom is
undergoing an aggressive de-desertification program in order to increase the amount of its
agriculture, reduce dependence on foreign food producers, and foster its own agricultural
industry. There are promising signs for the future of agriculture. To illustrate the point,
consider the impressive A] Safi Dairy, located roughly 100 kilometers outside of Riyadh in
the Al Kharj province.
The Al Safi Dairy is the largest integrated dairy farm in the world." 2 The Dairy is a joint
venture between the French multinational corporation, Groupe Danone, and the Al Fais-
aliah Holding Group, which was established in the Kingdom in 1969, and now boasts
operations throughout the Middle East in six sectors: (1) food and beverages; (2) consumer
electronics and computers; (3) medical, measurement, and media equipment; (4) informa-
tion technology and communications; (5) entertainment and multimedia; and, (6) petro-
chemicals and plastics. The Group is headed by His Royal Highness Prince Mohammed
free, quota-free world created by the WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC), the United States-
under pressure from its garment manufacturers-insisted on capping Vietnamese exports in this sector. Be-
tween January and October 2003, fifty-five percent of Viemam's global textile and apparel exports went to the
United States, an increase of 155 percent over the same period in 2002. Under the bilateral quota agreement,
which took effect on May 1, 2003, thirty-eight categories of garments (worth about $1.7 billion in 2003) are
subject to quotas. The permitted annual increases in quota volumes are small: seven percent for cotton items,
and two percent for wool items. While this quota regime benefits Mexico, and countries in the Caribbean and
Central America, which use American fabrics and obtain duty-free, quota-free access to the American market
for finished garments, it obviously impedes the development of Vietnam's textile and apparel (which, as Amer-
ican retailers unsuccessfully argued, could be a viable alternative source to China). See Margot Cohen, Thwarted
Potential, FAR E. EcoN. RFv., Feb. 5, 2004, at 40-41.
250. See CIA FAcTr3ooK, supra note 2 (material posted on the Kingdom's economy). Within industry, the
Kingdom's major activities are crude oil production, petroleum refining, basic petrochemical products, cement,
construction materials, fertilizers, and plastics. See id.
251. See geography.about.com/library/cia (last visited Sept. 20, 2004) (material posted on the Kingdom's
economy). To be sure, the Kingdom is aware it will have to avoid costly but ineffectual ventures of the past,
like subsidizing wheat production. Discussions, supra note 15.
252. It is certified as such by no less than the Guinness Book of World Records. The adjective "integrated" is
not so much limiting as impressive. It indicates the Dairy makes every item needed from hay and silage to
cartons and labels. As for water, the Dairy relies on an underground source.
All of the information about the Al Safi Dairy is based on a September 2003 Power Point Presentation about
the Al Faisaliah Group (on file with author), and my personal tour of the Dairy in December 2003. l am grateful
to His Royal Highness Prince Mohammed al Faisal for this tour, and more generally for the extraordinary
opportunities and insights I gained through his hospitality and that of his colleagues at the Group.
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al-Faisal, has roughly 5,000 employees, and an annual turnover of nearly half a billion
dollars.
The Dairy itself employs roughly 1,400 people from twenty-six countries, including thir-
teen full-time veterinarians. It began in 1979 with approximately 4,500 head of cattle im-
ported from countries, like the Netherlands, known for top-quality dairy cows. By 1981,
these imports were unnecessary, as the Dairy began breeding through artificial insemination
(using semen imported from Arizona bulls). Now, it has approximately 45,000 head, and
roughly thirty-five calves are born each day. The Dairy skillfully employs Swedish tech-
nology not only to milk the cattle and monitor by computer the milk output from each
cow, but also to package and label the finished products.
Not surprisingly, the Al Safi Dairy leads the Kingdom in fresh dairy products, which
include a full range of milk (skim, reduced fat, and whole, and regular and flavored), yogurt
and yogurt drinks, children's and sports beverages, and pudding. (One of the many salu-
brious opportunities the author had in the Kingdom in conducting international trade law
research was to sample this delicious product line.) It has a domestic market share of 30
percent, which results from annual production of 200,000 tons of these products, and daily
distribution to over 27,000 retail outlets (including about 145,000 liters of milk each day
carried via eighteen to twenty large trucks). The Dairy has twenty-six main distribution
centers in the Kingdom and Kuwait. About 90 percent of the Dairy's products are sold
within the Kingdom, and 10 percent are exported. Beyond Kuwait, it exports products to
the Gulf States of Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates, and to the Lev-
antine States of Lebanon and Syria.
In brief, the operations of Al Safi Dairy illustrate not only the Kingdom's potential for
a comparative advantage in certain agricultural areas, but are a microcosm of globalization
in the Kingdom. From the Kingdom's vantage point, then, one question is whether Amer-
ican trade law supports these kinds of operations. At least, American agricultural subsidies-
whether domestic support subject to Amber Box reduction commitments under the WTO
Agreement on Agriculture, or export credits exempt from the Agreement-should not to
hinder the Kingdom's efforts at building its agricultural sector.253 Indeed, it is a highly
significant fact that while the initial financing to establish the Al-Safi Dairy came from
government sources, the Dairy receives no government support, and has not for some time.
Despite its lack of government support, the Dairy is profitable. In fact, it is the largest
source of revenue among the divisions of the Al Faisaliah Group (larger than even the
Group's Sony distributorship, which enjoys a forty percent market share in the Kingdom).
Certainly, it is premature to gauge the success of the Kingdom's efforts to diversify its
economy by raising the profile of agriculture. However, the fact the Kingdom must literally
battle the elements, suggest that it has a large stake in a second trade law question: the
outcome of the global debate on genetically modified organisms (GMO). Indeed, the King-
dom would do well to participate actively in this debate. From its perspective, a worse
outcome scarcely can be imagined than import bans (whether official or by private action),
motivated by near-hysteria in major trading countries, against crops produced from safe
GM seeds resistant to hot, dry conditions and not requiring much water. In other words,
253. See Raj Bhala, World Agricultural Trade in Purgatory, 79 N. D. L. REv. (Feb. 2004) (explaining the
different "Boxes" of subsidies). To be sure, I do not mean to exempt the EU's Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP) from the same question. 0
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if the Kingdom is to develop a comparative advantage in certain primary products, then it
may well need the benefit of desert-friendly technology, the implementation and commer-
cial exploitation of which is not thwarted without a scientific basis in accordance with the
VTO SPS Agreement.
VI. It Had Better Be
As Oliver Cromwell spoke to England, so history speaks to all men: "I beseech you, in
the bowels of Christ, consider that ye may be mistaken.
' '54
It is not claimed that this article's characterization of American trade policy toward the
Kingdom comports with conventional wisdom. Rather than viewing the Kingdom through
suspicious American eyes as a recalcitrant partner with episodic enthusiasm for reform
accession, I have sought to portray the Kingdom's accession odyssey with empathy for the
Saudi perspective.
In questioning whether American trade law toward the Kingdom is constructive, in the
sense of the development of long-term, trusting trade relationships, this article has offered
three arguments. First, and most significantly, is the argument that the United States has
put on the Kingdom ever-increasing demands. The Kingdom's concessions appear im-
pressive, particularly given the infant state of many of its private sector enterprises, and its
bona fide concerns about social instability created or exacerbated by the adjustment costs
of trade liberalization. It has made deep cuts in tariff rates on agricultural and industrial
products, provided for much-improved protections of intellectual property rights, and re-
sponded with a Foreign Investment Law and a reasonable Negative List. Yet, it is too early
to judge the long-term implications of the ever-increasing American demands, and corre-
sponding Saudi concessions.
Second, is the argument that the United States may not have done all it can to accom-
modate the Kingdom's pre-eminent religious concerns. It seeks a theologically credible
prohibition on alcohol, pork, pork products, and pornography, support of the zaktt tax
obligation, and appropriate regulation of the provision of certain banking and insurance
products. Third, it has been argued that the United States does not seem to have supported
the Kingdom in its efforts to maintain its comparative advantages, and perhaps more im-
portantly, to develop new areas in which it can succeed in global competition.
Underlying all three arguments, and the thesis they are intended to support, is one basic
premise: trade with the Kingdom is about our security. One trade analyst astutely pointed
out with respect to the Middle East: "The biggest problem we have there is not lack of
market access. The biggest problem we have is that there's a tremendous amount of radicalism
and anger, and much of it's directed at us."
255
If there is any substance to the perception that poverty creates an environment for ex-
tremism, then the conditions in the Kingdom affected by American trade law are not yet
salubrious.2
5 6
254. Quoted in WILLIAM APPLEMAN WILLIAMS, THE TRAGEDY OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY 16 (W.W. Norton
& Co. 1972).
255. Edward Alden, U.S. Free Trade Zone on Offer-No Liberalization Required, FIN. TIMES, May 9,2003, at
6 (quoting Edward Gresser, trade analyst, Democratic Progressive Policy Institute) (emphasis added).
256. Consider two different approaches published in the same highly-regarded newspaper, The Financial
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The population growth rate of the Kingdom is 3.5 percent. Its GDP growth rate (in real
terms) is 1.2 percent. The obvious inference from these two statistics is demographic change
is outpacing economic growth, so living standards as measured imperfectly by real per capita
GDP are falling.257 The Kingdom relies considerably on expatriate workers, who account
for about 48 percent of the labor force, yet the Kingdom knows it must develop local human
capital and gainfully employ Saudi citizens. These goals are intended by its plans for the
"Saudization" of the workforce."' With a budget deficit of 4.5 percent of GDP, a ratio of
Times, within forty-eight hours of each other, and shortly after yet another horrific terrorist act inside the
Kingdom. The editors of The Financial Times wrote:
As things stand, Saudi Arabia provides near laboratory conditions to incubate thousands of bin Ladens. The
oil-dominated economy produces few jobs to employ a fast-growing, restless population. Neo-central planning
inhibits investment, while getting Saudis into jobs now occupied by millions of foreigners raises costs
because locals get paid, on average, three times more. School textbooks drip with religious bigotry,
while technology exposes Saudis to the full blast of modernity. The stultifying control of the mosque
and political grip of the security services underpin a bloated monarchy.
To prevent these challenges combining into a perfect storm, Crown Prince Abdullah, the defacto
ruler, has pledged reforms ranging from partial elections to tighter financial controls. He should now
implement them, even if it is unrealistic to expect his family to do other than tightly manage a very
gradual process of change.
Change is Needed for Saudi Stability, FiN. TIMEs, June. 1, 2004, at 10 (emphasis added).
From a different vantage point, Jamal Khashoggi, the media adviser to the Saudi Ambassador to the United
Kingdom, and the former editor of a leading Saudi newspaper, Al-Watan, observed:
The extremists in Saudi Arabia have attained levels of inhumanity seen only in the most ferocious of extremist
movements. But their cause has failed to develop into a widespread insurgency. They remain a minority among
the Saudi people.
[A]re such [terrorist] acts simply a desperate expression of their [the terrorists'] inability to influence
the government's actions-an attempt to thwart the government's modernization and reform plans.
These groups regard ideas such as elections, a greater role for women in the workplace, the enacunent
of coded laws and other reforms as contrary to Islamic teachings. Consequently, their battle against
such changes may be partly aimed at preventing what they see as a dangerous slide away from Islam.
In the end, reform is not a choice for Saudi Arabia-it is the [K]ingdom's future. While the silent
majority may be willing to take a passively cooperative stand with the government against terrorism
and extremism, there is also a need for action to develop a realistic plan to build a culture of tolerance and
progress in Saudi society.
Jamal Khashoggi, Saudi Refirmers Must Not Yield to Terror, FIN. TiMEs, June. 3, 2004, at 17 (emphasis added).
The approaches obviously differ on the breadth and depth of support in the Kingdom for extremism. However,
both agree reform is essential, and thereby imply a link between economic underdevelopment and that support.
257. See Roula Khalaf, Saudi Arabia Urged to Speed Up Economic Reform, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2002, at 6
(mentioning these statistics and reporting on a study by the International Monetary Fund); Al-Ammari, supra
note 7, at 1 (observing "[elconomic growth in Saudi Arabia has been disappointing over the last eighteen years,
averaging less than two percent annually together with population growth of more than three percent, resulting
in lower per capita income in real terms").
258. See Roula Khalaf, Saudi Arabia Urged to Speed Up Economic Reform, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2002, at 6
(discussing expatriate workers and the Saudization program).
There are about 4.5 million jobs in the private sector, of which about ten percent are taken up by Saudi
nationals. The Kingdom plans to decrease dependency on expatriates and increase Saudi participation in the
private sector. It is estimated by the year 2020 there will be near ten million jobs in the private sector, and
the Kingdom aims for seventy-five percent of them to be filled by Saudi citizens. Partly in pursuit of this goal,
the Kingdom is revamping its education system. See SAGIA Web site, at http://www.sagia.gov.sa (last visited
Sept. 20, 2004) and CIA FAcTBoox, supra note 2.
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government debt to GDP of 95 percent, and considerable vulnerability to declines in oil
prices, implementing these plans successfully while adhering to serious WTO obligations
will not be easy.2 59
The question to consider, therefore, is whether American trade law will lead to a King-
dom happily and more deeply integrated into the multilateral trading system? 60 Will it be,
like China, an active participant in WTO affairs? Or, will there be profound dislocations
in the Kingdom caused by the reforms required under the terms of accession? Will re-
sentment in the Kingdom against the United States worsen, as the psychological (if not
real) link between globalization and Americanization strengthens? Looking back in the year
2010 or 2020, will American pressure on the Kingdom (particularly after September 1 Ith,
the Afghanistan War, and the Iraq War) have contributed to an increased volume and value
of trade, and a more diversified pattern of trade?
For the vast majority of the Saudi people, as well as for Kansans, only one answer to
these questions is acceptable. Indeed, for everyone, the answer to the question "is American
trade law toward the Kingdom constructive?" is that it had better be.
Whether it will be was put in yet more doubt on the eve of publication of this article.
While Panama finalized its bilateral deal with the Kingdom by June 2004, in September
2004, the Dominican Republic and Honduras announced they would seek bilateral accords
with the Kingdom, and the United States blacklisted Saudi Arabia as a "Country of Partic-
ular Concern" (CPC) under the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 (along with
Burma, Eritrea, Iran, North Korea, Sudan, Vietnam, and China, which acceded to the
WTO on December 11, 2001), alleging failure to provide religious liberty in the Kingdom,
and triggering possible economic sanctions-which might mean yet more delay in progress
on accession.26'
259. See Roula Khalaf, Saudi Arabia Urged to Speed Up Economic Reform, FIN. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2002, at 6
(mentioning these statistics and reporting on a study by the International Monetary Fund).
260. Notwithstanding this statistical recitation, I write from a legal perspective, fully cognizant the topic is
inherently about more than just about law. May I say, however, it seems all too often American academic
economists are uncritically favorably disposed to free trade, and their enthusiasm for that paradigm leads to
overstating benefits, and understating losses, from trade liberalization. I find few (if any) better examples than
Columbia's Professor Jagdish Bhagwati, whose ubiquitous newspaper editorials and think-tank essays lead the
cheerleading for multilateral free trade. See, e.g., Jagdish Bhagwati, Don't Cry for Canczin, 83 FOREIGN Ars. 52-
63 (Jan./Feb. 2004) (asserting the collapse of the WTO Ministerial Conference in Cancfin in September 2003
was nowhere near the debacle that the Nov. 1999 Seattle Ministerial Conference was, and that multilateral
trade talks are the "only one real option"). His book, In Defense of Globalization (2004), compiles his views that
"economic globalization is an unambiguously good thing, with a few downsides that thought and effort can
mitigate." It is reviewed favorably by a leading figure in the American economic academy, Harvard's Professor
Richard N. Cooper (from which the preceding quote is taken). See Richard N. Cooper, A False Alarm-
Overcoming Globalization's Discontents, 83 FOREIGN AFF. 152-5 5 (Jan/Feb. 2004) (book review).
261. See Gary G. Yerkey, U.S. State Department Dampens Prospects of Saudi Arabia Joining WTO by End of
Year, 21 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1572 (Sept. 23, 2004); Daniel Pruzin, Saudis, WTO Members Meet on Accession
Negotiations; Progress Awaits U.S. Deal, 21 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1572-73 (Sept. 23, 2004).
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